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The Power of Belief in European Welfare-thinking – Lessons from the Past for the Future

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Introduction

> What has been will be again,
> what has been done will be done again;
> there is nothing new under the sun.[1]

Many contemporary social science theories disagree with this ancient Biblical text. Leading sociological paradigms emphasise change instead of continuity. Modernity is seen as qualitatively different from all previous periods. Even theories, which see modern society as a result of long evolutionary process, see modernity as different from past societies. It is not surprising that postmodernism is framed likewise different from modernism.

This is, however, only a partial truth. Sure, modern world have qualities that have existed never before but hopes and fears, joys and sorrows today are almost similar than those described in Sumerian cuneiform texts 5000 years ago. Although the world may be different, human nature has remained the same. My argument in this paper is that this cannot be ignored when we analyse different societies. They all have a history that influence in decisions concerning the future. In facing new, both individuals and civilisations interpret these previously inexperienced phenomena with the frames they have inherited from the past. Likewise, they will apply values and models that have been developed and tested through centuries and even millennia.

When we look our present and future, the frame we are applying is important. The future seems totally different whether we see it cyclically or teleologically as an evolutionary process. The latter one has been the dominant time-frame of in our Judeo-Christian culture. Ideology of progress is just a secular version of the old Biblical view of history between the Creation and the Apocalypse. The world is framed as evolution from one stage to another, more developed stage. The opposite of this

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[1] Eccl. 1:9 (NIV)

is the third major time-frame, namely Classical Greek description of world as a degenerative process[2].

Even if we adopt some sort of evolutionary thinking, we have to remember that the progress is not linear. If we look the changes in our societies with longer time perspective, we note that there are different kids of waves. A French historian Ferdinand Braudel divided different periods in three different kinds of periods that together form the total history (*histoire totale* or *histoire globale*)[3]. First, there are short waves, like weeks, change between winter and summer, market cycles, etc. Second, there are medium long cycles, *conjonctures* of 10-50 years. It can be said that this is a period where the zeitgeist remains almost the same. Typical examples would be the Cold War period or post-communistic era in the Eastern Europe. Then, there are *lonque durée* epochs that last a century or more. Middle Ages, Enlightenment and Modern belong to this category as well as climate changes. However, along with these Braudel's three types, we can recognise so long cycles, that they can be treated almost as constants. These are cultures or civilisations, like 3000 years of ancient Egypt, Greco-Roman culture or the Christian Europe.

In this paper, I am interested in these cultural long-term waves. When we are studying the future trends, we have to be able to differentiate these different types of cycles. We must be able to realise in which stage of the wave we are and where the medium of these waves lies. It all starts with recognising what are the "constants" in the culture.

I am looking this continuity from the welfare perspective. My argument is that what Gösta Esping-Andersen called Nordic, Continental and Anglo-Saxon welfare regimes[4], could be as well called Lutheran, Catholic and Anglican-Calvinistic models. The models have their history and, in a nutshell, they are formed in different combinations of Oriental and Greek thinking.

If we look at our present-day Europe, its major cultural divisions are those that were drawn in 11th century when Pope and Patriarch of Constantinopolis banned each other. The line between their territories has traditionally been the line between Eastern and Western Europe. In the 16th century Western Europe faced another division – that between Catholic Europe and Protestant Europe. In the Protestant world, further, there is a division between Lutheran, Calvinist and Anglican worlds. They all hold their peculiar culture and the value-systems of these cultures are stored in the ethical

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[2] Hes.WD 110-171.; Ov.Met. 1.114-124.

[3] The division was first made in Braudel's article *La lonque durée* (1958). In *The Mediterranean* he writes: " I think there are actually rapid times, longer times, and almost immobile times (Braudel 1978, 244)."

[4] Esping-Andersen 1990.

doctrines of these denominations[5]. The important point for a social scientist is that – in spite of secularisation – through the centuries, these churches have established the way of thinking in their areas. Social ethics of these religions is embedded in their respective cultures to the extent that people don't even realise that their thinking is Catholic, Lutheran or orthodox. In this, the churches have been sort of value-memories of their cultures. The common Christian tradition has been modified and interpreted according to political and cultural needs and this interpretation, in turn, has influenced in the thinking of the welfare reformers. In Geertzian terms, churches have been both *models of* their societies and *models for* them[6].

In some cases the influence of the Bible, Classics and the doctrinal texts have been more clear than in some other cases. The impact of papal encyclia *Rerum Novarum* on Christian Democratic parties and their social policies is commonly acknowledged. In other cases, the influence is more hidden. For example, Netherlands is a mixture of inputs from Calvinism, German Lutheranism and Catholicism. It might be this interaction that lies behind the Dutch model. In the same way, Finland, although mainly part of Nordic block has a 100 year history under Orthodox Russia and a huge impact from Soviet Communism.

The influence of churches might have happened in two ways. First, they have been significant actors in the field of education, health care and social care. Religious institutions have long traditions and in some countries form a significant proportion in fields mentioned above. Second, in spite of secularism, they influence in people's thinking through the philosophical concepts they have developed through centuries. These concepts have, then, became 'natural' ways of thinking especially in the field of welfare.

In this paper I present how various European subcultures have stored their most important values in their dominant religions, which, in turn, have given them models for their welfare solutions. This has happened basically in two ways. First, as path dependency theory[7] and various routinisation

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[5] A Finnish word-ethic scholar, Reijo E. Heinonen (1997), has emphasised that religion is a value-memory of culture

[6] Geertz 1973, 93. On one hand, religion explains and legitimises the existing reality and, on the other hand, it provides ethical codes and standards for the society.

[7] Path dependency theory was first used in economics by Paul David (1985; 2000) and Brian Arthur (1989; 1990). They used the success of the QWERTY-keyboard and VHS video-format as examples of the path dependency. According to them, these were not superior formats compared to other alternatives but, in spite of that, were accepted as standards. Their main arguments have been that sometimes some solutions become locked-in already in the stage when "individual transactions that are too small to observe, and these 'random' events can accumulate and become magnified by positive feedback so as to determine the eventual outcome(Arthur 1990, 82)." It is a bit like the classical story of losing the kingdom because of the missing nail of the horseshoe. Once the pattern has emerged, it becomes locked-in the system because of the positive feedback it receives.

theories[8] state, the next stage in each process is based on the previous stage. Thus, there can be seen a continuity between various epochs in European history. However, it is not only question of previous epoch giving a model for the next. Herbert Blumer's thesis of general social movement literature is valid in European cultural development as well[9]. Rather often the Bible and Greco-Roman classics have acted as this sort of literature. People have read them and they have inspired their actions. Thus, it can be said that along moving through some path, cultural influences have "jumped" directly from ancient times to various epochs of the European history. The "paths" and "jumps" can be seen in the figure 1.

Figure 1: Roots of the welfare models

However, before we can enter into the analysis of these three regimes, it would be appropriate to look a bit further past. Even in its secularised form, western thinking is basically a combination of three elements, as Berger notes: "Although we would not have modernity without Athénai or

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[8] In organisational ecology, Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman (1977; 1989) argue of hierarchical inertia, which is lowest in organisations' technical system and highest in value-systems. Social constructionists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1972) speak of routinisation of thought – just like routinisation of morning habits or riding a bicycle. In institutional organisation approach. John W. Mayer and Brian Rowan (1977, 341-346) argue that there are institutionalised rules that people take for granted and simply behave according to these rules.

[9] Explaining the behaviour of human groups, Herbert Blumer (1953[1939]; 1957) launched the concept of milling: people who face unexperienced situation first discuss about it and then – based on their previous experiences and values – determine what to do. In macro-level this milling takes place through literature and media. In explaining social movements he called this stage of the movement as a *general social movement* – a phase where the movement has not yet taken form but consists of "voices in the wilderness." Blumer called this type of literature as *general social movement literature.*

Roman law, the religious roots of modernity, as Max Weber showed, are to be found in neither Helles nor Rome, but in biblical tradition[10]." Talcot Parsons, in turn, goes even further by noting that the era circa 700-600 BC was the time which formed the value systems of the great cultures that have guided the civilisation from then on[11]. However, neither Greek nor Israeli cultures did not born in isolation but in the context of already established world system. Therefore the story of Europe begins from Mesopotamia and Egypt[12].

Europe's Oriental Origins

There are two major stories that link European roots to Orient. The Biblical story of Abram migrating from Ur to Land of Canaan is the one. All three Oriental world religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam see Abraham as their ancestor. In the case of Christianity, apostle Paulos grounds his major arguments of righteousness in his letters to Romans and Galatians on the covenant with Abraham[13]. Thus, Abraham is the first major link between the Land of Two Rivers and Judeo-Christian culture. surely there are also other contacts, but few are so positive in tone than the story of this 'Father of Belief.'

Another story is Herodotos' story of the capture of princess Europa from Phoenicia and bringing her to Grete. Looking the mythological family-history of Europa, we can see that she was a either a daughter of Phoenician king Agenor or Phoenix, who in turn were son and grandson of Egyptian king Belus. As a consequence, Europa's brothers Cilix, Cadmus and Thasus were sent to seek her but in vain. In their quest, Cilix ended to be a king in Cilicia, Cadmus founded Cadmea (later Thebes) in Boetia and Thasus settled on island of Thrace and founded a city Thasus.[14] This story gives one mythical explanation of the Oriental origins of Greek culture. While Athenian mythology

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[10] Berger 1982, 64. There is much wisdom in the joke from the Bosnian war time, when a guard heard something and asked "are you a Moslem, Catholic or Orthodox?" When a trembling voice answered "I'm an atheist", the guard shouted: "Don't play with me. Are you a Moslem atheist, Catholic atheist or Orthodox atheist?"

[11] Parsons 1969,558-563.

[12] In Egypt, it seems to have happened what Algaze (1989, 585-588; 1993, 98-109) has argued on the impact of Uruk colonies and enclaves on the local societies. Local elites adopted "ideas of rulership, modes of social interaction" and they became mediators in the trade. Along this process, ceramic industry with mass production emerged and this "points to the growing ability of local elites to control existing labor supplies." Then "the collapse of the Uruk expansion may have allowed the growth of increasingly complex and independent peripheral communities to continue unchecked." This explains why in Egypt there are not remnants of gradual evolution but a sudden jump from small villages to organised state in few centuries.

[13] Rom 4; Gal 3.

[14] Hdt 1.2. The mythological traditions slightly disagree since according to some myths Phoenix was a son of Belus (Parada 1997).

emphasises that Athenians were 'born from the soil' of Attica[15], Spartan mythology told that they were descendants of Perseus and Heracles, thus, returning from Egypt and Libya[16]. Especially Ionian culture was more 'Eastern post in the West than vice versa[17].' In any case, the myths tell of active contacts between Orient and Hellas before and during the archaic age.

In spite of common oriental roots, there are also significant differences between Greek and Oriental cultures and these differences are the basis for the tensions in the European poor relief thinking through millennia.

Max Weber noticed that the basic difference between the great river cultures and Greek culture lied in the form of agriculture. In Mesopotamia

> the basis of the economy was irrigation, for this was the crucial factor in all exploitation of land resources. Every new settlement demanded construction of a canal, so that the land was essentially a man-made product. Now canal construction is necessarily a large-scale operation, demanding some sort of collective social organization; it is very different from the relatively individualistic activity of clearing virgin forest. Here then is the fundamental economic cause for the overwhelmingly dominant position of the monarchy in Mesopotamia (and also in Egypt).[18]

Since the agriculture was based on irrigation, it required high level of organisation. Digging and maintaining canals was far too large project for any individual family. In practice, this meant that for most time of the Mesopotamian history the agriculture was organised by temples, palace and clans[19]. The more we move towards north, the more agriculture was based on rainfall and not on

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[15] Apollod. 3.14.1

[16] Hdt 6.53.1. This origin of the Hellenic culture has been a strongly disputed subject since the publication of Martin Bernal's *Black Athena* in 1987. In that book, Bernal argued that Hellenic culture was basically a loan from Egypt. Bernal's work evoked a heated discussion in the 1990's. Although it did not receive general agreement, it forced classical students to pay closer attention to Mediterranean culture in general (Levine 1996, 12-15). Some other scholars (for example, Bottéro 1992; *Greece Between East and West* 1992; Penglase 1997; Bottéro, Herrenschmidt and Vernant 2000; Rollinger 2000) point the Mesopotamian roots of Greek culture
Along with Bernal's main argument on Egyptian origins, he has been criticised by this other thesis that since the 1820's the western classic studies constructed Hellenes as white Indo-European people who did not got anything from other cultures. However, Bernal's major sin seems to be the same that he accuses the classic scholars: he ignores other imputs but Egyptian. Moreover, he does not distinguish sufficiently cultural roots from ethnic roots. A good parallel would be from contemporary Egypt (and North Africa, in general): population (except perhaps leading elite who may have Arab forefathers) are ethnically Egyptian but they speak Arabic, practice Semitic religions and have adopted many customs from Arabian peninsula.

[17] For example, Will Durant (1951, 73f.) argues that Thales could anticipate the solar eclipse because he was familiar with Babylonian and Egyptian astronomy. He also argues that Hellenes got their weights and system of measurement from Babylon. Moreover, anyone who is familiar with Hesiodos' *Theogonia* (Hes.Th) and the Babylonian myth *Enuma Elish* can see that the order of creation in *Theogonia* follows the Babylonian story.

[18] Weber 1976, 84.

[19] However, contrary to this functionalistic view of Weber, Karl Polanyi (1944, 47-53; 1968, 10-16; 1977, 40ff.), in his arguments of redistribution, pointed that also hunting required high degree of co-operation. Organisation of the hunting required division of labour and – unless it was a one-time project – the game was strored by the chief and distributed from his storage to the tribe. Polanyi also argued that individual household economy was a latecomer compared to redistributive economy. Thus, from Polanyian perspective, it is more prpbable that Sumerians *first*

irrigation and, thus, did not require co-operative action[20]. When in Orient, co-operation was interpreted as 'organic' – everyone has a certain place in the hierarchical society that was 'an image of heaven' – the Greek co-operation was based on agreements.

In Greece, every *oikos* was more or less self-supporting and, thus, autonomic. They were basically in constant competition with each other – all Greek terms for 'good' are basically competitive terms. Arthur W.H. Adkins has argued that especially in the Homeric society, the excellent ones (*agathoi*) were those who could best defend their *oikoi* and grant their well-being. Those who managed in this, had *arete* (success). The important point is to see that *arete* represents competitive values. Like *agathos*, it means goodness (in the same sense as our good athlete or good sports team), excellence, valour, bravery but also prosperity, merit, reward, fame, etc.). The opposite of *arete* was *aischron* (shame, dishonour).[21]

However, Greeks learned a painful lesson circa 1200 BC when the Sea People attacked the Eastern Mediterranean coast and, among others, destroyed the Mycenaean culture. Only Athens survived from it. This led to the emphasis of the *polis*, which basically was a military organisation[22]. It was created for the defence – or attack – and it was a creation of necessity. The basic meaning for Greek expression for civil society, *koinonia politikhe*, means literally 'the fate unity of the town.'

The competitive Greeks had also another mechanism that fostered some sort of unity among them. It was the institution of *philia*. *Philia* means literally 'my own' – my family, my belongings, my friends, my dependants, etc. Various *oikoi* created *philia*-relationships with other *oikoi*. Like Marcell Mauss[23] and other gift-theorists[24] have argued, in this sort of society, the main economic goal is not to collect fortunes but to give it away. The main currency is, then, not money but credits. The most powerful man is not the one who owns most of his resources but the one who can mobilise the largest resources through his creditors.

The *philoi*-model was utilised in Greek and Roman poor-care by granting the state allowances and subsidies on the basis of citizenship. Classical Athens knew unemployment-subsidies to sailors and in Rome there was the famous *panem et circences*-policy which granted the state support to the

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learnt co-operation elsewhere and *then* utilised this organisational resource in exploiting their new territory.

[20] Lamberg-Karlovsky 2000, 14f.; Weber 1976, 84.

[21] Adkins 1972, 12ff.; Liddell & Scott, 1940 s.w:s. *arete, aischros*.

[22] For example, in Xenophon's (Xen. Anab.) story the 10,000 marching soldiers formed a *polis*.

[23] Mauss 1967.

[24] For example, Marshall Sahlins (1969; 1972), Ian Morris (1986) and writers in *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece* (1998).

1/10 of the population – the citizens, the *philoi*. One of the first European welfare reforms occurred in Byzantium where the state cancelled the subsidies based on citizenship and adopted the Oriental model of giving the aid to the very poor – irrespective of citizenship.

The difference between Oriental and Greek societies has been described by Ferninand Tönnies with concepts of *Gemeinhaft* and *Gesellshaft*. The first is based on "natural will " (or real or imaginative kinship relations) while the latter is based on "rational will" - agreements between autonomous actors.[25]

This difference can be seen in all levels of the society, but especially in the attitudes towards the poor segments of the society. While a poor in Oriental thinking was under gods' special protection, in Greece poor were losers, rubbish[26]. While in Orient, gods required the rich to help the poor, in Greece people helped only their *philoi*. While slaves in Orient never lost their human value, in Greece they were "human legged animals", "living tools" or "extensions of their masters"[27]. Slaves were dehumanised in Greek culture in order to legitimate their inhuman treatment[28].

Throughout the European history there has been a tension between aid to the *philoi* (practically to the impoverished members of one's peer-group) and aid to the very poor. Moreover, among poor, there has been a distinction between 'the deserving poor' (ascetic monks, people impoverished because of a catastrophe, etc.) and the mob (those from the lowest classes).

The major periods when new innovations in the welfare were developed were Byzantion (from where the most welfare institutions can be traced), 11th and 12th centuries (when the majority of European monasteries were founded), Reformation of the 16th century and modernity from the 19th century on. It is in this rough time-setting where the welfare reformists emerged.

Harmony and Tension Between Oriental and Greek Thinking

Early Christian Charity

The Christian Church adopted both Oriental and Greek traditions and combined them to systematic philanthropy. A special character in Christian philanthropy was that it was question of

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[25] Tönnies 1974.

[26] Finley 1985, 38ff.

[27] Morrow (1939, 188f.) referring to Plat.Law 9.916a; 12.966b.

[28] Aristoteles justified this with his thesis of natural slavery (Aristot.Pol 7.1327b.; on this, see Harvey 2001).

identification to Christ: *imitatio Christi*. It was the responsibility of a Christian is to follow the example of his Lord who defined his mission as follows:

> he Spirit of the Lord is on me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind, to release the oppressed.[29]

Thus, evangelist Loukas presents here the social program of Christ and Christian church: aiding the poor, freeing the imprisoned, healing the sick and empowering the oppressed. Basically, Christ's declaration was the same that was announced in several enthronement declarations of Oriental kings. Also other gospels had similar tunes. Perhaps one of the most influential has been the parable of the Last Judgement. The core message of this pericope reads as follows:

> Then the King will say to those on his right, 'Come, you who are blessed by my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in, I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in prison and you came to visit me..... The King will reply, 'I tell you the truth, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did for me.'[30]

While these texts show that Christianity adopted much of the ethos of Judaism, there is one significant difference. While the *Tora* restricted the covenant between God and Israel and between different Israeli groups, Christianity expanded it to the whole mankind. The Christian Church expanded its charity actions beyond its own group as can be seen in Jesus' words "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you[31]." This aid to non-Christians was done in so large measure that emperor Julian (361-363 AD) wrote to Arsacius, a Greek High Priest of Galatia, that

> [w]hy then do we … not observe how the kindness of Christians to strangers, their care for the burial of their dead, and the sobriety of their lifestyle has done the most to advance their cause? …For it is disgraceful when no Jew is a beggar and the impious Galileans support our poor in addition to their own; everyone is able to see that our coreligionists are in want of aid from us.[32]

Julian claimed that Christians did this for egoistic reasons. Actually, charity has been one of the means of a mission strategy for Christian Church from the beginning. Rodney Stark has argued that especially during diseases mortality among Christians was lower than among pagan population. According to Stark, this was due to the basic care that Christians directed to each other. Adequate nutrition and basic nursing reduced mortality in a degree that seemed as a miracle among other segments of population.[33]

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[29] Luk 4:18 (NIV)

[30] Matt 25:34ff., 40 (NIV)

[31] Luk 6:27 (NIV).

[32] Julian the Apostate, quoted in Stark 1996, 73-77.

[33] Stark 1996, 73-77.

While the Christian Church adopted the models of justice and charity from Orient, its dogmatics was based on Greek philosophy. Platon was 'a Christian before Christianity' and his philosophy lies behind many Christian doctrines. This was a result of Christianity's moving to the west and adaptation in Greco-Roman culture. In this process, many Egyptian and Mesopotamian philosophical interpretations of Christ were doomed as heresies while the Greek philosophy became the dominant way of interpretation. A good example of Greek influence in Christian thinkin is Dante Alighieri's *La divina commedia* in which Dante's guide was not any of the prophets or apostles but a Roman Orphic poet Vergilius. In general, the Catholic view of the afterlife is more based on Platon's *Republic* than the Bible[34].

The Christian church adopted these early Biblical and Greek models but they were interpreted differently according to local cultures. Moreover, after few centuries Europe turned to a period of disorder when the epoch of invasions started. During this period, both the Church and the European culture changed.

Emergence of Welfare Institutions in Byzantium

Demetrios Constantelos notes that it was only in the third century that the concept of philanthropy replaced the New Testament concept of *agape*. The reason for the change was the *imitatio Christi* idea and for this purpose the word philanthropy – God's love to man – suited better. Combining both Greek and Hebrew views, God was seen as both philanthropic and just. "The ideal Christ is the Pantocrator Philanthropos [men loving ruler of the world]or the Eleemon [reliever], depicted as the prototype whose philanthropy men are expected to imitate[35]." In Byzantion thought concepts of *eros*, *agape* and *philanthropia* overlap and became to mean both God's love and Christian charity. [36]

A special significance was on the attributes that were imposed on the emperor. Since the emperor received his power from God, he should be "the projection of the archetype, God the Universal King[37]." Like God was the source of good, so the emperor was expected to be a source of light and blessed acts. Emperor should show philanthropy in his attitudes, in practical deeds and in legislation[38]. In this, emperor adopted models from old Land of the Two Rivers where, for

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[34] Plat.Rep. 614-621.
[35] Constantelos 1991, 31.
[36] Constantelos 1991, 25-32.
[37] Constantelos 1991, 34.
[38] One interesting example of charity legislation is from the fifth century when emperor Anastasios exempted eleven

example, king Gudea was 'the Good Shepherd.' Alike emperor's model, philanthropy was expected from all upper and middle class people.[39]

Monasticism emerged first in Byzantion from where it diffused to the west. Although mysticism was the major tone in Eastern Christianity, philanthropy became a major practice along with prayer in monasteries. Basilios the Great, 'the founder of Christian philanthropy', "decreed that monasticism should not be divorced from the needs of human society and that the practice of philanthropy ought to become an element of monk's life[40]." Constantelos tells that this practical aspect led to tradition where monasteries were not founded only in remote regions but in cities as well. Basilio's philanthropic institutions

> included a hospital, an orphanage, an old-age-home, a hospice for poor travelers and visitors, a hospital for infectious diseases, and an institution for indigents. Collectively, Basil's institutions became known as the Basileias, which was located on the outskirts of Caesarea. The staff was composed of both laymen and clergymen.[41]

In Basilio's institutions, we see the basic types of philanthropic institutions that have been a model for the rest of Europe during almost 2000 years. Although Byzantion philanthropy was Christocentric in general, some Church Fathers and laymen just wanted beggars out of public squares and streets. Some other, in turn, just wanted to have 'name' as philanthropists.[42]

When the emperor was a philanthropist by duty, this led the court practice charity as well. Along with almsgiving and supporting philanthropic institutions, "it was customary for Byzantines of all classes to designate the poor, orphans, or charitable institutions as beneficiaries in their wills[43]."

After all this a reader surely wonders that if the system was so large and ethos so profound, why there still were poor. Bronislaw Geremek argues that in the writings of Church Fathers, the poverty was a religious virtue. The New Testament concept of poverty became assimilated to humility. However, in order to be a virtue, poverty had to be voluntary. Being born as poor was no virtue.

Another factor that did not encourage to eliminate poverty was the fixed hierarchy of the society. The system was not that of sharing and equality. When the philanthropy was a religious act, the poverty was something that the rich needed in order to practice philanthropy. Thus, the emphasis was on the benefactors need of salvation and not on the poor's need of relief. A result of this

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hundred workshops of Hagia Sofia church so that their profits could be used for charity (Constantelos 1991, 90).
[39] Constantelos 1991, 33-42, 89-103.
[40] Constantelos 1991, 76.
[41] Constantelos 1991, 52.
[42] Constantelos 1991, 54.
[43] Constantelos 1991, 107.

attitude was that Byzantines did little to prevent or eliminate the poverty totally. Despite this, the state and especially the town of Constantinopolis was known of its hospitality to its citizens and foreigners. The legacy of the Byzantion is mainly in the supply of ways of thinking and organisational models for the rest of Europe.

Mediaeval Philanthropy in the Western Church

Like in Byzantion, the relationship between rich and poor was that of mutual dependency in Western Europe. It has been formulated in the *Life of St. Eligius*[44] as follows: "God could have made all men rich, but He wanted there to be poor people in this world, that the rich might be able to redeem their sins[45]." In this statement we see the phenomenon that became a prevalent feature in Medieval thinking: the poor existed so that the rich could help him and gain merits. Later by Thomas Aquinas, based on Aristotles[46], developed his view of good life. According to Aquinas, good life was the great aim of the life, as in Byzantion. However, one cannot live good life without charity and this makes the alms-giving so central in both Catholic and Orthodox thinking.

Along with direct alms-giving, wealthy people donated property to the church, which served as a stock-market of charity. The work of the church was soon institutionalised and regulated. After the great famine of 765 AD, a Merovingian king, Pippin III ordered the compulsory tithing[47]. Later Charlemagne ordered "that Church tithes were to be divided into three equal parts: for churches and shrines, for the maintenance of priests and for the poor[48]."

One significant break in European mental history was the period between 11th and 13th centuries. During that time East and West Europe officially separated in 1054 when Pope and Patriarch of

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[44] Bishop of Noyon-Tournai. Born c. AD 590, died 660. (Essen 2003)

[45] Patrologia Latina vol CXVIII, col 1625, quoted in Geremek 1994, 20.

[46] In his Nichomaean Ethics, Aristotles; writes as follows: "our definition accords with the description of the happy man as one who 'lives well' or 'does well'; for it has virtually identified happiness with a form of good life or doing well (Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1098b1.4)… For there is the further consideration that the man who does not enjoy doing noble actions is not a good man at all: no one would call a man just if he did not like acting justly, nor liberal if he did not likedoing liberal things, and similarly with the other virtues. [13] But if so, actions in conformity with virtue must be essentially pleasant. But they are also of course both good and noble, and each in the highest degree, if the good man judges them rightly; and his judgement is as we have said. [14] It follows therefore that happiness is at once the best, the noblest, and the pleasantest of things: these qualities are not separated as the inscription at Delos makes out:
'Justice is noblest, and health is best,
But the heart's desire is the pleasantest'
for the best activities possess them all; and it is the best activities, or one activity which is the best of all, in which according to our definition happiness consists.(Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1099a1.12-14.)"

[47] Wallace-Hadrill 2001, 173.

[48] Geremek 1994, 17.

Constantinople excommunicated each other. This drew one of the main cultural borders in Europe that is still visible – that between Orthodox churches and the Western Christianity.

A second major action was the occupation of Spain during the same century. This had two major consequences. Inclusion of Gibraltar into the European merchant-routes altered the older balance in which the nodes of Europe were the towns in the river-banks of the major European rivers[49]. New trade-route enchanted the commerce. On the other hand, when Spain was occupied by Christians, Byzantion fell in front of Moslems. This changed the whole power-balance in the Mediterranean.

Enchanted business changed European societies as well. The old feudal system started to erode in front of Mercantilism and urbanisation. This process had manifold consequences for European thinking. First, when international business was transformed from Jews to Christians, the legacy of Antique, preserved by Moslems, diffused among Christians[50]. Second, when the urbanisation emerged and status of the landlords eroded, there emerged a boom of retreat from civilization to monasteries as well as a boom of new monasteries[51]. Along with this *fuga mundi*, (re)emerged the distinction into those who were poor unvoluntary (*paupres cum Lazaro* – poor like Lazarus) and those who choose poverty as imitation of Christ (*paupres cum Petro* – poor like Peter). Attitude towards these differed dramatically: while the latter group, priests, monks, was respected and they were active subjects of society, the first group was seen as an object of charity. Third, along with the eroding financial basis of the noble class, there emerged fraternities whose aim was to maintain the status of this impoverished social elite. In their case it was a question of 'shamefaced poverty' to whom begging – contrary to lower classes - was an impossible option[52]. Fourth, with the increase of poverty, there emerged a distinction between 'honest' and 'dishonest' poor. A dishonest poor was the one who was able to work but chose begging as an easier way to achieve his/her earning[53]. Honest poor were those classical poor: widows, orphans, prisoners, elders and sick. Along with this distinction emerged another distinction, actually distinction between almsgiving and welfare: *hospitalitas* became to mean unconditional aid for all in need while *libertalitas* , as Geremek points,

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[49] Sailing around Gibraltar, merchants were, for example, able to avoid the numerous customs that they previously faced when they transported their goods through European river-routes.

[50] Bosl 1968, 748-751, 756—772, 781ff.,

[51] Geremek 1994, 22f.

[52] This support for the one's own peer group can be seen as one root for the German welfare model that is based on insurance against accidental impoverishment. Like in the Mediaeval syste, it maintains the status differences.

[53] Unemployment that was due to loss of land, was not counted as an excuse. When mercantile system expanded, landlords, more and more, required monetary payments instead of day labour. With the diminishing fertility of land, this led to an increase of landless population.

distinguished "between the 'honest' and 'dishonest', 'kin' and 'strangers', old and young, humble and arrogant, and provide aid to the first in each of these categories[54]." Fifth, along with the increase of low class poverty, the exaltation of poverty diminishes. The emerged a distinction between physical poverty and 'a taste of poverty.' When people do not 'taste poverty' (i.e. accept it voluntarily), they became jealous for the rich of their property. A jealous poor became a threat to society because (s)he rebelled against his/her condition and did not content with his/her lot.[55]

However, intellectually, the major impact was, on the one hand, the legacy of Moors that Spanish conquerors inherited, and on the other hand, the connection between Sicilia and Hellas[56]. A special part of this legacy was the introduction of Aristotles to the Christian world. According to William Turner, "in the twelfth century the Arabian tradition and the Byzantine tradition met in Paris, the metaphysical, physical, and ethical works of Aristotles were translated partly from the Arabian and partly from the Greek text, and, after a brief period of suspicion and hesitancy on the part of the Church, Aristotles' philosophy was adopted as the basis of a rational tool to explain Christian dogma[57]." As a sum of Canonic legislation, Johannes Gratianus collected in 12th century *Concordantia discordantium canonum*, more generally called the *Decretum Gratiani*, which also had legislation for charity. The main message of this standard textbook in the field of charity was that responsibility of charity belongs to the bishop. Since this book was a textbook it gave birth to numerous commentaries. Most significant of these commentaries was made by Thomas Aquinas who, in his *Summa theologiae* defines his *ordo caritatis* idea. Thomas writes:

> Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is nearer to God…
> Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is nearer to God.[58]

Thus, the objective of charity was not to relief the poor as such but to please and serve God. The poor existed so that the rich could have possibilities to show charity. Elimination of poverty was not even option in Mediaeval thinking.

In the practical level, the change in social conditions and attitudes from 11th century on, modified the charity in many ways. In the 13th century there emerged a practice to record those who were

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[54] Geremek 1994, 26.
[55] Geremek 1994, 18-36.
[56] Lloyd-Jones 1988, 13.
[57] Turner 2005 (1907), Ch.: The Aristotelean School.
[58] Aquinas 1920, 26:7

given help from charitable institutions. This token system[59] was, on one hand, a signal of need to control both poor and the given aid[60]. On the other hand, it quarantined the living standard for the impoverished middle and upper class[61]. In the records of poor, these 'shamefaced poor' constituted a majority of beneficiaries. Along with this, providing assistance from monasteries institutionalised and bureaucratised which lead to the diminishing role of the Church as a channel of charity[62]. This, in turn, lead to the increase of secular assistance through fraternities – especially to the impoverished members of one's social class.[63]

In the 14th century emerged the idea of municipally organised hospitals to which all assistance was centred. In 15th century, it was a practice in most European towns. In spite of these attempts, they did not abolish begging. Most beggars in 15th century were professional[64] and, for example, city of Augsburg singled them in 1475 as an own professional group who paid the same tax as day-workers. This professionalisation was seen, for example, in the way how beggars imitated the guild structure. There were contracts between two individuals for begging with a fixed salary, pools that shared their total income once a week and different brotherhoods, especially those of the blind.[65]

With these modifications, the Mediaeval society moulded its attitudes and reactions to poverty. It was the time when Oriental and Hellene ideas were combined and harmonised. It was also the time that provided organisational models for the emerging Reformation.

Differentiation of Oriental and Hellene models

The Reformation changed the track of European welfare thinking perhaps more than any other period. As we know, the fundamental *heureka*-moment for Martin Luther was when he read from apostle Paulos' Epistle to Romans that " The righteous will live by faith[66]." There were several consequences of this finding. From the welfare point of view, the major issue was that – contrary to

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[59] Those who were recorded, got a metal token that ensured them for permanent assistance.

[60] Since beggars were constituted of both local residents and those who wandered from town to town and from festival to festival, there emerged attempts to restrict begging. Already in the 14th century, Nuremberg restricted the permission to beg only to those who had a metal token. Moreover, non-resident beggars had permission to stay in town only in three days. (Geremek 1994, 46)

[61] Fraternities functioned, thus, also as mutual insurance companies.

[62] Geremek (1994 , 41) gives an example that the Abbey of St. Denis, near Paris, directed only 3 percent of its budget to assistance at the turn of the 14th century.

[63] Geremek 1994, 38-43.

[64] Geremek (1994, 50) tells that along just begging, the wandering beggars had a significant role as musicians and actors.

[65] Geremek 1994, 44ff., 50f.

[66] Rom 1:17 (NIV)

Catholic thinking – Protestants held that nobody could "earn" his/her place in heaven by donations and almsgiving. Another point was that there was no need for mediators between human and his God. Everyone had right to approach Him directly and everyone had right to read and interpret the Bible by him/herself. It can be said that these notions changed the Northern Europe and tobe North America.

"There should be no begging among Christians" - Lutheran welfare thinking

Along his spiritual mission, Luther also focused on what he saw as deacon work. This also arose from the Bible – in this time from the Old Testament: "There should be no poor among you[67]." In his *Long Sermon on Usury*, he stated that there should be no begging among Christians[68]. This notion led Luther to reform the social care of the Protestant cities. He cancelled the numerous guild-funds and combined them to one local fund which was administered by the city-council.[69]

Luther's emphasis on everyone's right to read the Bible led, as we know, him to translate the Bible into German, thus laying a foundation for the numerous other translations that often served as basses for the literal forms of the respective languages. Contrary to elitism of humanism, Luther stressed everyone's right to read and understand the Bible. This also meant that basic literacy was a right of everyone.

Ettore Gelpi and James Bowen note that when Martin Luther wanted to create educational institutions that were open to masses he realised that they "would have to be public and financed by citizens[70]." From this time we have a new model for education, namely that education is a responsibility of the state. From this basis new schools on the behalf of princes and towns were founded throughout Germany. Similar attempts were formulated in other wing of the Reformation, namely in Calvinism as well.[71] The teachings of Luther laid, thus, the foundations of the legitimacy of the modern welfare state[72]. His teaching of two regiments legitimised state intervention into the

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[67] Deut 15:4 (NIV).
[68] Luther 1962a.
[69] Lindberg 1993; 2001; Grimm 1970
[70] Gelpi & Bowen 1994,29.
[71] Gelpi & Bowen 1994,29ff.
[72] Luther expressed his main theses in two works: In a letter 'To the councilmen of all cities in Germany that they establish and maintain Christian schools' from 1524 (Luther 1962b) and in 'A Sermon On Keeping Children In School' from 1529 (Luther 1967). On the influence of Lutheranism on the Nordic welfare state, see Lindberg (1993; 1994; 2001), Gelpi and Bowen (1994), Kopperi (1996), *Health Care and Poor Relief in Protestant Europe, 1500-1700* (1997), Sørensen (1998), *Health Care and Poor Relief in 18th and 19th Century Northern Europe* (2001), Arffman (2002), Raunio (2002)

fields of education and philanthropy which had been church territory before. The issues of practical reason belong to the secular authority and the divine issues to ecclesiastical authority.

On the other hand, Luther's teaching of an individual's right to read and interpret the Bible resonated with some ancient ideals of Nordic democracy and together with other factors they influenced that all Nordic countries became Lutheran. This is, of course, a more complicated issue than presented here. Although Luther's ideas resonated with democracy, his attitude to please the nobility was totally opposite to this. This gave to the rulers a possibility to use the Reformation for their own purposes, (e.g. Gustav Wasa in Sweden). The outcome of the struggles in the era of the Reformation was the principle *quius regio, eius religio*. This meant in practice that the monarch became the head of the church. Thus, the Lutheran church became part of the state bureaucracy and much of the poor-relief of the society was organised through local parishes. This relationship can still be seen in Denmark and Norway where the Lutheran church is not independent but under the state government[73].

The Thirty Year War left a widespread ill feeling towards high dogmatism and there was a trend away from church control. This trend took two forms, namely Pietism and Enlightenment[74], which played important role in future developments. The first stressed individual *piety* and the second vowed in the name of *ratio* (reason). While the first went 'ad fontes' and concentrated of the Bible, the latter took Greek and Roman Classics as its 'holy books[75].' When, according to Hugh Lloyd-Jones, also the counter-reformation was not favourable to classical studies, majority of the classicists were protestants[76]. Thus, the division between these studies started to grow especially inside Protestantism.

According to Heinz-Jürgen Ipfling and J.J. Chambliss, this trend was accompanied by the fact that the significance of universities had diminished for two reasons. First, they had suffered from the religious wars. Second, their curriculum had remained too classical. This led to a situation where the state sponsored academies took the lead in the field of sciences. Especially Halle's Institutions[77] became significant actors in developing new models for the state, Lutheran churches and welfare. Halle became the leader of academic thought for the whole 18th century. However,

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[73] The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Denmark 2000; Church of Norway 2000.
[74] On this see McManners 1990,266-299.
[75] On the separation of Biblical and Classical studies, see Lloyd-Jones 1988, 17-36.
[76] Lloyd-Jones 1988, 19.
[77] On Pietism, its leaders and Halle Institutions see entries in *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* 1997,636(on Francke), 1284f.(on Pia Desideria), 1286f.(on Pietism), 1528f(on Spener). The articles in the book also include fine bibliographies on items.

Halle was not only a centre of education but a centre of new models for poor relief as well. In Halle these two aspects were inseparable.[78]

Developments in Bismarcian Prussia, which has been generally seen as the early version of the welfare state, were an outcome of Pietistism and its belief that poverty could be overcome[79]. Aage B. Sørensen has studied the influence of Pietism on the Nordic welfare model. According to him, the influence of Pietism is threefold. First, it strengthened state intervention into fields that had previously been a territory of the Church. Second, it established a Protestant tradition for small clubs and independent organisations. These organisations and their descendants formed the first nonprofit organisations in the Protestant part of the world[80]. Third, Halle's Institutions enabled central administration to be less dependent on land owning nobles by supplying educated civil servants to states. This educated staff was inspired by Pietistic ideas and made the first attempts to create welfare states[81].

In Northern European thinking the Lutheran emphasis on the responsibility of the society created the Nordic welfare system in which the state is the major actor in health care, social care and education. In the 20th century, Nordic Social Democrats favoured the strong involvement of the state in welfare politics. Combined with old Scandinavian and Lutheran traditions of democracy, this led to state dominance in Scandinavia. The ultimate model of the state supremacy has been Sweden and its *folkhem* (*people's home*), which was created under the Social Democrats after the Second World War. Swedish scholars evolved the Keynesian model of the welfare state[82] and "from the 1960s to the 1980s Nordic countries believed that they had created the best social policy system in the world[83]". Its influence and regulation reached to almost every sphere of human life.

The Bible, Classics and Catholic Welfare Reforms

As it is well known, Reformation awoke a Counter-reformation during which the Catholic church practically renewed those structures that Luther had criticised. Like Lutherans, Catholic Jesuits developed new educational models[84]. However, in the long run, Jesuit schools became elite

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[78] Ipfling & Chambliss 1994,36.
[79] On the influence of Pietism on Prussian (and Danish) welfare states, see, for example, Sørensen (1998) and Ipfling & Chambliss (1994, 36)
[80] See, e.g., Senaud 1955.
[81] Sørensen 1998.
[82] Pekkarinen 1993,102ff.
[83] Anttonen & Sipilä 1993,435.
[84] Especially important for Catholic education was Jesuit's 'imagination pedagogy.'

schools when Lutheran Cathecesis-schools aimed to the education of the whole population. The Lutheran and Catholic thinking clashed during the 19th century in Prussia.

Bismarck's Pietism oriented civil servants aimed to implement their ideas – and, in the same time, block the spread of Communism. However, reforms in the country also met large opposition. During the years 1871-1891 the struggle culminated in the *Kulturkampf* (cultural struggle) between chancellor Bismarck and the Catholic regions. It was a struggle for the division of labour and influence in the fields of education, culture, and welfare. In 1891 pope Leo XIII sent his encyclical *Rerum Novarum* which advocated local solutions to social problems. The social ethics in this encyclia was based on Thomism (theology of Thomas Aquinas), which, in turn, was a combination of New Testament theology and Aristotelian thinking.

Forty years later pope Pius XI sent his encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* (Forty Years) where he continued the ideas of Leo XIII and launched the principle of subsidiarity[85]. These two encyclias became the major expressions of the Catholic social ethics. Catholic Labour Movements in France, Germany and Italy adopted this social ethics as their principles and, from them, it was adopted as social policy of Christian Democratic Parties in these countries.[86]

The Catholic social ethic has seen the concept of righteousness as a property of individuals but not as a property of communities[87]. In this thinking the focus is on the actor. With the moral codes the society tries to grant that there is enough individual philanthropy to meet the needs[88]. This ethic proposed the principle of subsidiarity, which means, in a nutshell, that there is a hierarchy on who is responsible of individual welfare. It has three basic statements. First, an individual has to take care of himself. If (s)he is unable to do so, it is the responsibility of the family to do so. If the family cannot do it, the responsibility moves to kin, neighbourhoods, voluntary organisations, churches,

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[85] Subsidiarity principle means, in a nutshell, that there is a hierarchy on who is responsible of individual welfare. It has three basic statements. First, an individual has to take care of himself. If (s)he is unable to do so, it is the responsibility of the family to do so. If the family cannot do it, the responsibility moves to kin, neighbourhoods, voluntary organisations, churches, etc. The state is then the last resort when there is no other possibility. Second, the higher level has a responsibility to make sure that the lower level can carry its responsibilities. Third, the higher level is not allowed to interfere the actions of the lower level if the lower level can handle its responsibilities. On subsidiarity principle, see, for example, Mulcahy (1967), Kelly (1998) and d'Onorio (2002).
In European Union, most of the discussion on subsidiarity principle has dealt the relations of the EU and its member states. Unfortunately, in this discussion, it has been absent that the hierarchy goes from individual to EU, not only between member states and EU.
[86] On the contribution of Catholic social ethics on the Central European welfare model, see Tergel 1987, 39-133; Misra & Hicks 1994, 306-309; Hellemans 2000. On Catholic social thought, see, for example, Dorr (1992), Harte, Giordani, Herlihy & Newman (1967), Harte & Pavan (1967), McHugh (2000) and Levillain (2002).
[87] In Aristotelian ethic other people are seen in relation to an individual's own good life. Accordingly, a human cannot live a good life if she/he treats others badly. This idea has been dominant in Catholic thinking through Thomism.
[88] Kopperi 1996,224-227.

etc. The state is then the last resort when there is no other possibility. Second, the higher level has a responsibility to make sure that the lower level can carry its responsibilities. Third, the higher level is not allowed to interfere the actions of the lower level if the lower level can handle its responsibilities.

This has been accompanied by the vague understanding of the state. State has been something imposed on people, not an enterprise of the people. Especially before the modern era the state was something which was far away. Additionally, different wars shifted borders so often that state was not a stable basis for such important issues as education and welfare. From this point of view, family and parish are the more near and stable institutions and they have traditionally carried the main responsibility of people's welfare. The important point here is that this has been seen as the natural way of organising things. What Esping-Andersen say about corporate welfare states is not opposite to this thinking. On the contrary, the role of religious based welfare agencies arises from seeing their role as natural and self evident.

The Bible and Anglican-Puritan Welfare Reforms

British welfare thinking has its roots in the *Statutes of Laborers* under Edward III in 1349 and 1351. In these statutes, the emphasis was, like in the rest of Europe, on the duty to work unless being too young, old, handicapped or ill. The religious legitimisation to this rule was achieved from apostle Paulos: "If a man will not work, he shall not eat[89]." This early legislation was followed by others through centuries until Elizabeth I launched her statute in 1601. This statute is generally considered the basis of the modern British welfare tradition[90]. The basic aim behind it was, like in Luther's thinking, the total elimination of poverty[91]. The main difference to Lutheran territories was that British used voluntary organisations in this task while Lutherans relied on public funds that were funded by confiscated property of monasteries and fraternities as well as by taxes. British system, however, became part of the maintaining status quo in the country and the other name of the Anglican Church, the Established church, tells a lot of church role in Britain. Thus, it is no wonder why social reformists of the 19th century did not get a legitimisation to their protest from Anglicanism but from dissident churches, especially from Methodism.

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[89] 2 Thess 3:10 (NIV)
[90] On British poor law legislation, see Nicholls (1968), Boyer (1985), Brundage (2002) and Fideler (2003). On Scottish poor law, see Cage (1981) and Mitchison (2000).
[91] Jordan 1959, 18f., 143.

British political system, according to Pat Thane, differed from Continental systems in some important respects. He mentions that when the crown had not such competitors as the continental monarchs had, there was no need for strict centralised administration. The landlords were loyal to the crown even in the case when they got a relatively large amount of power. It was in a way, decentralised centralism. This led the British administration to be indirect and based on local governance. The main idea was that the central government creates the framework in which independent institutions can act. Local municipalities had large local autonomy and judicial power. The landlords served as unpaid local Justices of the Peace. Taxation was a typical example of decentralised administration. There was no direct income tax (except temporarily at war times). Instead, the landlords collected the taxes in rents and paid the crown its share. The poor relief was organised in local parishes as well. However, this was only in rural areas. When towns grew, the better off citizens did not turn to the existing municipal corporations to handle the emerging problems but established free associations of their own. These kinds of associations were established for street-lightning, refuse removal, etc. In general, the belief in local responsibility was strong and the dual model of coexistence of municipals/parishes and associations became the Anglo-Saxon way of organising common issues.[92]

E. Blake Bromley gives more light on this belief in local responsibility. He states that as in the case of the Lutheran territory, the Reformation has enormous impact in the British isles as well. The common feature was the attempt to eradicate poverty[93]. Bromley writes:

> The Puritans of Tudor England (led by wealthy merchants) wanted to do far more than relieve suffering and poverty. They were content to do nothing less than the eradicate the conditions which gave rise to poverty and sickness and accomplish a social reformation. Although this zeal for social change was religiously motivated, these merchants could see that the church was neither able nor ideally suited to solve the problems of their society and needed a legal mechanism to implement their secular solutions, the charitable trust.[94]

So, when in the Lutheran territory, the tool for work against poverty was the church, in Britain it was charitable associations. Basically, there was no big difference. In both areas the society was

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[92] Thane 1990,1-8.

[93] Jordan 1959, 18f., 143

[94] Bromley 1994,173f. A bit different, but not necessarily contradictory, story has been told by Karl Polanyi (1944). He argues that while Stuarts and Tudors opposed the capitalisation of land and work-force, the development was going to that direction. When the restrictions of free moving from place to place were lifted, justices of Speenhamland launched a system of minimum earning level that was paid above salary. During its fifty years, this system proved to be a catastrophe: labourers had no interest in developing their work or skills and employers reduced the wages when the municipality anyway paid the rest. When in 1834 the Parliament launched the New Poor Law, it was a reaction to Speenhamland's experiences and the pendulum swung to other end. Not only "the right to live"-doctrine was abandoned but also the old division between the unable-to-work poor and the able ones. All were thrown to the mercy of the markets: to work or to starve. This, in turn, according to Polanyi, gave rise to a countermovement, which was manifested in the emergence of the Labour Movement and the social reforms.

seen as made up of individuals[95]. In both areas it was seen that the responsibility of the poor was on the society. And, fundamentally, the resources came from individuals. The difference was the channel through which these funds were distributed. In the British system the principle was that as long there were private funds, there were no need for state intervention. If there were not funds enough, the responsibility was on the state[96]. Bromley writes:

> The Statute of Elizabeth I should be celebrated not as the classic starting point and quintessential statement of the law of charity but as the beginning of philanthropy as a voluntary partnership between the citizen and the state to fund and achieve social objectives.[97]

Bromley notes that in the time of the Elizabethan statute, "the preamble classified as charitable things which relieve the state of expenses which it would otherwise incur[98]." However, the understanding of charity changed later in two respects. First, the Protestant work ethic arose the problem of ill-spending of endowments which was not a question at all before. Second, there emerged a tension between 'entitlement' and 'charity'. In other words: "It is a cardinal principle of charity law that charitable funds should not be used in place of benefits to which an individual has a statutory right".[99]

Thus the main difference to Lutheran territories was that British used voluntary organisations in this task while Lutherans relied on public funds that were funded by confiscated property of monasteries and fraternities as well as by taxes[100]. British system, however, became part of the maintaining status quo in the country and especially that of the Anglican church[101]. The alliance between the crown, nobles and the Church of England made the church as a fortress of the upper classes.

Another difference of British and Nordic cultures lied in the educational system. The British education up to the First World War was heavily based on classical education and focused mainly on elite[102]. Lutheran countries, instead, tried to teach the whole population and had relatively minimal classical texts in their curriculum. Thus, the British schoolboys learned Athenian, Spartan

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[95] This was in contrast with the medieval Catholic view of society like a human body where all members have their proper place and where the aristocracy was in the leadership position - in general as well as in philanthropy. Leiby 1984,530.

[96] Bromley 1994,175.

[97] Bromley 1994,176.

[98] Bromley 1994,178.

[99] Bromley 1994,178f.

[100] British system, contrary to Lutheran territories, had an inbuilt hindrance to crown's intervention in the matters of its subjects: already in Magna Carta (1215 AD) James II had quarantined the peer rights of the nobles.

[101] The other name of the Anglican church, the Established church, tells a lot of church role in Britain.

[102] On classical influence on Britain, see Lloyd-Jones 1988, 52-59; Rawson 1991, 186-219, 344-367.

and Roman values while reading classics in Greek and Latin. From Athens and Sparta, they learnt that the democracy was equality of the upper classes – those who had freed themselves from the labour - not of all inhabitants. Thus, the British school system maintained and legitimised the division of classes. Moreover, vicarships in Anglican Church were given to the members of the upper classes irrespectively to their education or ability[103]. Thus, the Established Church was more a church of the upper classes than the lower. This, in turn, led to the rise of dissident churches of the lower classes. Contrary to Nordic countries, the revivals of the 18th and 19th centuries did not remain inside the majority church but carved their stream outside the Anglican Church. Thus, when the arising Labour Movement sought legitimacy for its social claims, it did not find sympathy from the upper-class-oriented Church of England but from the lower-class-based dissident churches, especially from Methodism[104]. A significant proportion of the early labour leaders become from Methodists and nobody could be sure whether a meeting in the labour-house was a religious meeting or the service in the Methodist church was a political meeting.

Anglican church, however, changed during the late 19th and early 20th century much due to the impact of the Student Christian Movement, which in turn, carried a strong heritage of the American-born Social Gospel Movement[105]. Social Gospel, again, had some of its roots in Methodism. Thus, as an outcome of this indirect influence of Methodism to Anglicanism was that the first one who ever used the concept of 'welfare state' was Archbishop William Temple[106]. He had been involved in Student Christian Movement in his youth[107].

Thus, the Lutheran and Anglican view of responsibilities grew basically from the same ground, namely the idea that the roots of poverty should be attacked. The solutions were different. However, there were also ideological differences between these two areas, namely the attitude of Labour Movement towards the church and Christianity in general.

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[103] Obelkevich 1996, 311-314.

[104] Methodism in the 19th century was an offspring of Calvinism (or its Anglo-Saxon form, Puritanism). The major difference between Lutheranism and Calvinism was that while Luther wanted to throw away from the Church everything that was against the Bible, Calvin threw away everything that was not ordered in the Bible. Thus, Methodism, emerging from this root was extremely Biblicist. Moreover, the very name – Methodism – describe how the movement created strict methodology of spiritual life on the basis of the Bible. In the same time, Methodism was a protest movement against the secularisation and cold hearthness of the Anglican Church. It was, thus, this protest movement that gave the legitimation to the claims of the emerging Labour Movement.

[105] Muukkonen 2002, 155 n2, 159-163 (A note concerning this reference: SCM was, for a great deal, a student branch of the YMCA, they have many common leaders and, along with the YWCA, a common ideological base).

[106] Temple 1940. See also Temple 1942.

[107] Turner 1991, 976f. Turner (idem.) also mentions that his "stress on corporate sin was learned from Reinhold Niebuhr", one proponents of the Social Gospel Movement.

The Labour Movement explains some differences between the British model and the Nordic systems which both had long local governance traditions and parliamentary systems. In Britain the Labour Movement got its early leaders[108] and legitimisation from Methodism and from its rebellion against the Anglican Church. In Germany and the Nordic countries there was not such opposition to the Established Church (either Catholic or Protestant[109]) because the revival movements remained inside the Church. In this situation the Labour Movement did not gain religiously articulated legitimacy but the movement had to find its legitimacy elsewhere. This lies behind the greater hostility of the Labour Movement (and especially of its communist wing) towards the Church in the Lutheran territory than in Britain. The result was that in the Lutheran territory the attitude on the philanthropy sector was more negative. The philanthropy sector was seen as a fortress of conservatism and 'an armed daughter of the Church'[110]. Consequently, social services were organised on municipal basis from 1960's on.

Puritanism and American Welfare

The United States has been seen as specially hospitable towards the associations - or nonprofit sector, as it is called there. Since Alexis de Tocqueville's notion that "Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations[111]," the United States has been seen as the major home of the third sector. The American model was founded on the British basis but - as a special spice - there was a strong allergy to central administration.

American welfare model has its roots in European refugees who rescued themselves to a new continent. While Protestantism in Europe was fighting for its existence, these early American settlers started to build their version of kingdom of God on earth. It was their experience of being persecuted by the state and church that made them to limit the power of these institutions[112]. Puritan heritage can be seen in American society thoroughly. Later, at the end of 19th century, the

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[108] "Most of these early leaders took their gospel from the Bible and their nonconformist churches."(Brand 1974,16) "Methodist class meetings and lectures had been a training ground for political radicals and early trade union organizers."(Pelling 1965,129). According to Leonard Smith the relation between Labour Movement and Methodism was first argued by Elie Halevy. On Methodism and Labour Party, see Wearmouth (1957); Smith L. (1993), Pelling (1965, 129), Brand (1974, 16).

[109] Cuius regio eius religio-principle.

[110] Seibel & Anheier 1990,8.

[111] Tocqueville 1945(1835),115.

[112] For example, Barry D. Karl (1984, 515) argues that still in the 1920's America, "voluntarism became a protection against government, the preservation of the democratic right of individual choice from the regimenting influence of bureaucratic coercion."

Social Gospel Movement had an enormous impact on welfare thinking of American churches[113]. In both cases, the inspiration was drawn from the Bible.

However, not all founding fathers were religious. They got many of their ideas from writings of Aristotles, Cicero, Platon, Thoucydides and Xenophón[114]. Especially Cicero has been a role model for American lawyers[115]. This Classic heritage can be seen in architecture of major American public buildings. It also has had consequences for American welfare thinking – especially for treatment for lower classes. While Puritans and proponents of Social Gospel emphasised brotherhood of man and equality of all men, the classical heritage can be seen in the model of American slavery, Jim Crow policy and general treatment of native American, African American and some other minorities. American slavery was the closest parallel to Greco-Roman forms of slavery[116] and differed significantly from the Oriental forms of slavery. The major difference being that, like in Greco-Roman world, American form stripped a slave from his/her humanity[117].

American model, for its part, has its roots in European refugees who rescued themselves to a new continent. While Protestantism in Europe was fighting for its existence, these early American settlers started to build their version of kingdom of God on earth. It was their experience of being persecuted by the state and church that made them to limit the power of these institutions. For example, Barry D. Karl argues that still in the 1920's America, "voluntarism became a protection against government, the preservation of the democratic right of individual choice from the regimenting influence of bureaucratic coercion."[118]

Peter Dobkin Hall emphasises that before the Civil War there were two major groups that created both for-profit and nonprofit organisations, namely the evangelical network[119] and Boston merchants. These two groups created organisations, developed administrative skills administration,

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[113] On revivalism and social reform, see Smith TL (1976), Muukkonen (2002, 155-166 - see especially references to Social Gospel literature). On American religious philanthropy, see *Faith and Philanthropy in America* (1990), Jeavons (1994), *Welfare in America* (1996).

[114] Zvesper 1989; Gummere 1962; MacKendrick 1977.

[115] Botein 1978.

[116] Orlando Patterson (1982) notes that "[t]he religion that had begun in and was fashioned by the Roman slave order was to play the identical role eighteen hundred years later in the slave system that was to be Rome's closest cultural counterpart in the modern world."

[117] One sort of maxim of this was Virginia's denial the black's right to baptism and marriage (Meltzer 1993, 203, 211)

[118] Karl 1984, 515. On Puritanism and the American society, see Niebuhr (1937), Gaer and Siegel (1964, 105-155), Perry (1964), Handy (1974), and *Religion and American Politics from the Colonial Period to the 1980s* (1990).

[119] On the religious context of the pre civil war situation see, e.g., Yoder 1993(1954) and Smith T.L. (1976). In short the situation was that all European schisms were planted into American soil. It was the Awakenings and missionary needs that brought some churches together.

and created personal and organisational networks that enabled their work. Hall[120], DiMaggio and Anheier[121] stress that the evangelical network was a result of the New England urban elite. However, this is only one side of the coin. They do not see the impact of lay religiosity that was the result of the Second Awakening. They are right that some institutions, like Harvard and Yale, were established by the New England Puritans but they fail to see the impact of the religiosity of the outcasted of New England, namely Baptism and other free church activities[122]. In fact it was free church activity in the West that made the US a Christian country. Established churches were much slower in their moves.

Hall, DiMaggio and Anheier underline that the rising organisations had close links to the urban elite. Upper class people were in boards of trustees or as patrons and in this way maintained their monitoring ability and status in the society. DiMaggio and Anheier even suspect that NPOs created by other status groups (workers, ethnic and religious communities) "are often less stable, less likely to incorporate, and less likely to claim community-wide missions than those created by the wealthy[123]". This again is only partially truth. If we look at the older studies of religious movements, we see that religious sects (with their organisations) are often products of lower classes[124]. The asceticism in the movements generates prosperity and mobility towards upper classes. Although this picture is one-sided a question remains: were the founders of the nonprofits already elite when they founded the organisations or did the organisations enable them to join the elite?

In the first half of the century the "Second Awakening" spread over the country. It created a host of interdenominational societies. According to Don Herbert Yoder these societies can be divided into two classes. The first includes those with missionary motive[125]. The latter was a combination of those societies that aimed to "reform the American society in the image of American Protestantism, with its Puritan and revivalist undertones." There were societies for temperance, anti-slavery, peace, and nearly for every reform.[126]

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[120] Hall 1987,7.
[121] DiMaggio & Anheier 1990,141.
[122] See Handy R.T. 1970,379; Hudson W.S. 1970,211f. By the 1800s the Baptists were the largest denomination in the United States. Corbett 1990,52.
[123] DiMaggio & Anheier 1990,141f.
[124] This was the main line among church-sect-theorists before the emergence of new religious movements. One of the leading theorists was H. Richard Niebuhr. See Niebuhr 1954.
[125] American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (1810), the American Educational Society (1815), the American Bible Society (1816), the American Sunday-School Union (1924), YMCA (1850).
[126] Yoder 1993,235. The work of these societies and churches was so effective the church membership grew from 7%

The evangelical network developed administrative skills and organisation cultures that facilitated their work. The 'secular wing' of the movement showed how religious ethics were transformed into practical policy. It helped committed laymen to have contacts with political power. These laymen, in turn, tended to find themselves in "positions of economic, political, and cultural leadership wherever they settled."[127]

When the Civil War broke out the Union had adequate administration and leadership neither in the government nor in the Army. In that situation people from the evangelical network and Boston merchants were recruited to reorganise the Union Army and the government. The result was that

> the Union's victory was seen by its organizers and significant element of the public as a legitimation of the claims of the organized private sector.[128]

This ensured, according to Hall, that the basic welfare and educational institutions were formed on a private nonprofit basis. When the European governments launched new services to their citizens in order to calm down the challenges of socialism, America developed a model called welfare capitalism in which the nonprofit organisations played a major role. Private companies supported voluntary organisations which in turn launched the welfare projects.[129]

The Social Gospel movement[130] at the end of the 19th century emphasised the social teachings of Jesus and saw the Kingdom of God as a 'brotherhood of men' or 'family of God' where justice, peace and unity prevails. Referring to Kirby Page's book *Jesus or Christianity* from 1929, Richard H. Niebuhr[131] argues that this "family of God" in Social Gospel theology was actually "family of Man." In this theology, the Kingdom of God has become immanent and Jesus of has become a "utilitarian moralist" while "the cosmic problem retires into the background." The task of

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in the beginning of the 19th century to 57% in 1950. Latourette 1957,19.

[127] Hall 1987,7.

[128] Hall 1987,8.

[129] Hall 1987,8-15.

[130] Social Gospel was a movement in American Protestant churches at the end of the 19th century and at the first decades of the 20th century, which tried to find Christian answers and solutions to problems of industrialism. Among its major proponents were reverends Walter Rauschenbusch, (whose *Theology for Social Gospel* from 1918 was a major definition of movements goals), Washington Gladden ('the father of Social Gospel'), Shailer Matthews, Josiah Strong, and economists Richard T. Ely and John R. Commons. The movement rose both from the experiences of these men in their work and as a reaction against too individualistic a Christianity, which focused only on salvation of souls. The peak of Social Gospel was the decade before the First World War. For example, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America endorsed it in 1908. The movement faded after WW I. On Social Gospel, see Hopkins 1967(1940); White & Hopkins (1976); Handy (1966); Visser 't Hooft (1928); and Niebuhr (1937; 1988).

[131] Niebuhr 1988, 117

Christians, according to this theology, is to implement God's will on earth. For many Social Gospel promoters this meant "peace and justice[132]".

When the European governments launched new services to their citizens in order to calm down the challenges of socialism, America developed a model called *welfare capitalism* in which the nonprofit organisations played a major role. Private companies supported voluntary organisations which in turn launched the welfare projects.[133] The welfare capitalism lasted until the 1930s when the great depression hit the country. The basic weakness of welfare capitalism was that in the critical situation the companies first cut out their donations to nonprofit organisations. In this situation the state had to rescue the welfare service sector. The tax legislation, that enabled tax substitutions, traces from this time.[134]

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After the Second World War the state became the biggest donor of the nonprofit sector although the services were launched by nonprofit organisations. Thus, the funding and delivery of services were separated. At the same time there also emerged criticism against the private welfare model. As a consequence, there were attempts to regulate both the activities of nonprofit organisations and the federal aid to them. This criticism led to the "1969 Tax Reform Act, which placed the foundations under strict federal oversight." This in turn was one major catalyst to the emergence of nonprofit studies when large foundations, like Rockefeller, wanted to know how the Act influences their environment.[136]

Although the US has been treated in international comparisons as an entity, it in fact has several competing traditions. John C. Schneider[137] has argued that there were three different tiers in the

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[132] In the Social Gospel theology, there were competing views on the kingdom. For example, Reinhold Niebuhr draws a different picture in his *Moral Man and Immoral Society* from 1932. Reinhold Niebuhr's Jesus was not a utilitarian but a perfectionist who had a transcendent dimension in his life. It was because of the uncompromising transcendent ideal that leads to the demand "Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect (Matt 5:48 - NIV)." Reinhold Niebuhr's Jesus is not a fighter for moral or social progress but a servant of the transcendental ideal. (Niebuhr Richard H. 1988, 118f.)

[133] Hall 1987.

[134] Hall 1987, 8-17; Andrews 1970, 646.

[135] Hall 1987,15ff.; Andrews 1970,646.

[136] Hall 1987,18ff.

[137] Schneider 1996,198-203. He quotes Daniel J. Elazar (1972) who defined the groups in these tiers to be East Anglian Puritans in the North, Quakers in the middle, and traditionalists in the South. Schneider also quotes

country. These tiers consisted of different groups and had different attitudes towards the state and towards the private corporations ranging from benevolent to hostile in both cases. Hall notes that similar diverse attitudes could also be seen in the policies of leading political parties[138].

Since the 1970's there has been an exponentially growing amount of nonprofit studies and research institutions in the US. While the studies reveal the origins and behaviour of the nonprofit sector, they also give more legitimacy to the American nonprofit model. The international influence has been that American theories and concepts have been applied in other countries as well. This also means that American thinking is creeping into European welfare policy by supplying theoretical frames how to organise welfare in highly competitive surrounding. Especially former socialist countries have been eager to adopt this American thinking.

Cultural Interaction Between Welfare Regimes

During the second half of the 20th century, there has been a trend towards blurring of these traditional regimes. The oil crisis in the 1970s caused many western states problems of payment deficit. At the same time the rising costs of education, social service and health care led governments to focus on the costs. Martin S. Feldstein notes that in the US "in the three years from mid-1967 to mid-1970, the cost per patient-day rose some 42 per cent." However, he points out that the discussion did not focus on why this happened but only on how it happened. Obviously, the discussion in general created negative attitudes among taxpayers.[139]

Some time later the rise of neo-conservatism led to questioning the whole basis of the Keynesian model of the welfare state. Lester M. Salamon and Alan J. Abrahamson[140] note that this had assumptions about the third sector, too. Following neo-liberalistic ideas Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in Britain justified the cut-offs of public expenditures by claiming that state activity is doing harm to private philanthropy and enterprise. However, as Burton A. Weisbrod states, the output of the privatisation policy was harmful to the third sector. Since the state was the major donor of third sector, the cut-offs heavily injured the NPOs. At the same time, the US

Raymond D. Gastil (1975) who argues that the cultures of the first settlers in each region tended to dominate the latter regional culture.

[138] Hall 1987,6f.

[139] According to Feldstein, the components of cost are more a result than a cause of higher prices. The main cause for higher costs was the pressure of rising demand (created by Medicaid) and the low net price that a patient had to pay. Feldstein 1971, 870.

[140] Salamon & Abrahamson 1982

Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 had an effect of reducing private donations because it raised the marginal price of a donation for the donor[141].

Reaganism-Thatcherism was the dominant doctrine during the 1980s and the 1990s especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. This meant that the state reduced its activities either by moving the responsibility to municipalities or by privatisation. The doctrine of free market often meant that the focus was on the private business and not on the nonprofits.[142]

The political left has been hesitant to surrender the welfare services to the for-profit sector. This has led to new interest towards the third sector among the political left which traditionally opposed it. The basis of the new interest is that with public subsidies and it being under public control the third sector is supposed to maintain the welfare services on a satisfactory level. The other reason for the new interest lies in the emergence of *new social movements* which favour grassroots activities and claim that the public sector has moved too far from the citizens.

Thus, in the 1980s and 1990s the political left and the political right have found each other as they see the important role of the third sector. However, they come to the same point from different directions. For the political right, the third sector fits into the model of liberal society in which state has a limited role. For the political left, third sector is a rescue from market forces that enables democratic control of services. On the other hand, it is also a field where direct democracy can be implemented.[143]

Conclusive notes

When we face the future possibilities and threads, we face them armed with our cultural inheritance. Like Weber has argued in his *Essays in Sociology*:

> ...very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.[144]

They do not direct the events, but they direct the explanation of phenomena and give models for what is right in a new emerging situations. However, when the world is shrinking down and communication channels become more and more elaborated, it can be expected that there will be both clashes of civilisations and diffusions of them.

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[141] Weisbrod 1988, 92ff., 103f; Taylor 1992, 151-155.
[142] Hudson P. 1998,452f.
[143] Trägårdh 1999.
[144] Weber 1970, 280

Looking Esping-Andersen's regimes from the point of view of this brief presentation of history shows that Nordic countries have a deep emphasis on ancient Oriental communal thinking. Anglo-Saxon countries, in turn, follow the pattern of Hellene competitiveness. Central and Southern Europea welfare model, finally, is based on Thomistic combination of Aristoteles and the Bible. These master frames will guide the thinking of people in these respective countries when they face the threats and opportunities of the future.

There are, however, some potentials that will modify the thinking in these blocks. Immigration can change the population to the extent that the dominant way of thinking has to change. It can react in defence of its own identity (as we have seen around the Western world). The other possibility is that the society can accept the plurality by emphasising some special aspects in its value system. I suppose that, for example, the latter is true in United Kingdom, where after the WW II, there has occurred an emphasis of speaking about either United Kingdom or Britain instead of England. This goal to give its traditional subjects sense of belonginess in the UK has also helped the immigrants express their own cultures inside the dominant culture. In general, this is related to a larger problem: the clash of religion-based civilisations of which Samuel Huntingdon has spoken. Religion can easily be directed to support xenofobia: they do not believe like us, they are heathens, they violate our basic values. However, religion has also a potential to build bridges. In the Islam – Christianity dialogue (as well as with Judaism) we could remember that members of these religions are all 'Abraham's children' – they all trace their roots to Abram who departed from the Land of Two rivers and brought the Oriental communal values westwards. In these religions, there are more in common than difference. It is pity that, especially Protestant politicians – due to their own historical experiences – do not recognise the positive potential of interfaith dialogue.

The role of elite is another factor that can alter the traditional views – at least for some time. What Algaze argued for Sumer and its colonies is valid in today's world as well: national leaders tend to identify themselves to the elite in other – more successful countries. They adopt the world-views and values of these elite groups and enforce them in their own societies. Thus, there might occur a clear division between the elite's values and those of the people – again 19th century England with its strict class-division serves a good example.

Along with these, there is the clash of generations, which can alter the traditional views. The sin of the baby-boom generation is that, once they got in power, they have not given the youth similar

voice than they claimed themselves in the 1960's. The generational experience[145] of today's youth is too often the feeling of being neglected: the society does not socialise them to work for the benefit of the whole society. Thus, there emerges a feeling that they do not belong to their societies. This is partly because of the crisis of the education but mainly because of the crisis of parenthood. Combined with the rapid development of communication technology, this often leads to the seek of communities from other directions. In Nordic countries people have been upset of the violent demonstrations during the WTO meeting in Göteborg in 2001[146] and this year in Helsinki during the ASEM meeting. In both cases, the confrontation with the police is something that the older generation does not understand. However, it can be explained so that these young people identify themselves more to their international networks than to their own society. They also adopt frames of the state and of the police from outside – frames that their parents do not share. We might see similar trends in Islamic youth movements as well.

Globalisation and European unification are, however, the major set of factors that influence in modification of traditional frames. Globalisation has rapidly altered the economic rules of in the West. People see their jobs flow to China and other countries where the labour-costs are lower than in Europe. Although from the charity perspective, it is good that people in the Third World get jobs and have a possibility to slowly increase their standard of life, for unemployed Europeans this has been painful.

The interesting point is how far are the governments and citizens ready to go in sacrificing their life into the altar of economic competency. This discussion has been discussed at least once already in history, namely during the 19th century when the globalisation of that time, called *haute finance* caused similar problems.

Karl Polanyi, trying to explain the causes for the economic crash down of the 1930's argued in the 1940's that the 19th century liberal free market policy was purposefully created and its function required dilution of the structures of the old society: land, labour and money were made commodities. This caused similar problems we face today in our societies: poverty exists side by side with prosperity. Polanyi continues that in order to protect their integrity, people spontaneously started several counter-movements. These included labour-movement activities, parliamentary legislation and national protectionist actions. However, it also included some self-controlling mechanisms of the free-market system since if left alone, free market would have destroyed itself.

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[145] On generational experience, see Mannheim 1972.
[146] On Göteborg demonstration, see Peterson 2001.

The last attempt to re-establish the 19th century economic system after the WW I led to three major counter-movements in the 1930's: various New Deal solutions (like in the US), Fascism (in Germany, Italy and Spain) and five year planning (in the USSR). According to Polanyi, they were all reactions to the otherwise unbearable situation where Western societies were.

If we look our societies through Polanyian lenses, we could identify different counter-movements that aim to protect the society from both the evils of globalisation and Brussels' bureaucrats. Different social movements are, of course, most evident aspect of this counter-activity. This includes anti-globalisation and environmentalist movements as well as religious fundamentalism which all aim to political results. However, there is also movements that could be called expressionist movements: various non-political religiosity and *panem et circences*-type escapism. What we have not yet seen is the 12th century-type flee from cities to monasteries. Like in 19th century, we also face protectionism when great powers see something to threat their national interests but we also see the rise of new civil society activities. In Polanyi's sense, these are all expressions of societies' need to protect themselves. The point – that Polanyi misses – is that this counter activity does not arise out of nothing – like Blumer and other collective behavior theorist argue, it is based on the value-system people share. The question the, is: do we know the value-systems people have? If we know, we can have some idea how people could react in a new situation. If we know, we can also distinct the short turbulence in history from the long waves that continue after the turbulence is over.

Abbreviations of Biblical and Classical Texts

All Biblical quotations are from The Holy Bible. New International Version. International Bible Society 1984.
　　Available at http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search= (24.9.2006)
Classical texts are from the Perseus Digital Library, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cache/perscoll_Greco-Roman.html
　　(25.9.2006)
2 Thess – Paulos' second letter to Thessalonikians.
Apollod. – Apollodoros: Library and Epitome.
Aristot. Nic. Eth – Aristoteles: Nicomachean Ethics.
Aristot.Pol – Aristoteles: Politics.
Deut – Deuteronomy.
Eccl. – Ecclesiastes.
Gal. – Paulos' letter to Galatas.
Hdt. – Herodotos: The Histories.
Hes.Th. - Hesiodos: Theogonia.
Hes.WD. – Hesiodos: Work and Days.
Luk – Gospel of Loukas.
Matt. – Gospel of Matthaios.
Ov.Met. – Ovidius: Metamorphoses.
Plat.Law. – Platon: Laws.
Plat.Rep. – Platon: Republic.
Rom. – Paulos' Letter to Romanos.

Xen. Anab. – Xenophon: Anabasis.

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