

**"THE SUBJECT MATTER OF SOCIOLOGY, SIMPLY
STATED, IS THE HUMAN GROUP"**

Evaluating the Concept of Social Movement in the
Collective Behavior Approach

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Abstract

This study evaluates the Collective Behavior approach that was the dominant approach in the studies of social movements from the 1920s to the 1970s.

The roots of social movement studies lie in six classical traditions: Marx (class struggle), Durkheim (collective consciousness), Mill (a sum of individual cost-benefit calculations), Weber (charisma and bureaucracy), Simmel (interaction of individuals), and Le Bon (crowds).

The studies began in Chicago University in the 1920s by Robert E. Park. His pupil Herbert Blumer made the basic classifications in the field. In interactionist tradition Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian stressed the emerging norms that modify collective behavior and Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang focused on collective processes.

In structural functionalistic string Talcott Parsons stressed the impact of cultural trends in movement emergence and Neil Smelser developed a value-added theory of the movement formation.

Third string was mass society tradition that stressed the impersonal character of society and how this creates ties between movement leader and followers. Fourth string was relative deprivation tradition which explained that movements are expressions of deprived people.

Collective behavior tradition was attacked in the 1960s when its theories did not fit into the student movement and there was a paradigm shift to resource mobilization approach. However, the ideas of collective behavior tradition survived from the attack and have been alive in new social movement studies.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Starting Points of the Study

This study arose from my larger research project on World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations. That study deals how the mission view of the YMCA changed in the turbulence of 1960s. I soon found out that there is no adequate theory of international nongovernmental organisations. At best there are some classifications but they are so controversial that they do not help much to explain such octopus as YMCA is. So I started my search for the theory.


I started with a mind-map in which I first focused on the dimensions the World Alliance has. YMCA movement is over 150 years old and the World Alliance itself is only 11 years younger. Thus, it is one of the oldest of contemporary international nongovernmental organisations. It is also one of the biggest contemporary youth movements in the world. It started as a revival movement but did not become a sect as many revival movements in the nineteenth century did. Instead, YMCA became the pioneer of the ecumenical movement and even further - it has been one of the first Christian bodies in which interfaith dialogue¹ has taken place. However, YMCA is not only a religious movement but also a social movement and a non-governmental organisation with wide social and educational programs. Today YMCA has over 30 million members in 100 countries

Cohen Jean L.

1982 Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory. The University of Massachusetts Press. Amherst.

¹ Interfaith dialogue is a *terminus technicus* meaning dialogue between different religions. Concepts of interdenominational dialogue and ecumenical dialogue mean dialogue inside Christianity.

and runs activities in the fields of youth work, sports, social work and ecumenism. All this can be seen in the adjoining picture where these dimensions have been presented in ellipses.



The second step was that I figured the research fields in which these dimensions have been studied. They are presented as boxes in the picture. This enabled me to determine the perspective from which I view the World Alliance of YMCAs. It also helped to exclude some fields.

I chose the perspective that World Alliance of YMCAs is an *international non-governmental organisation* (INGO). This was because the World Alliance works mainly in this context. The next step was to seek adequate theory from *INGO studies*. As I mentioned, this search did not prove to be successful. The next step was naturally to 'come down'

from international level and seek how associations are studied in national and local levels. This led to **nonprofit sector (third sector) studies** which have increased significantly since 1970s¹. However, also this search gave only some part of the needed tools. The major weakness of third sector studies is that, although they see the importance of organisations' ideology, they do not study it. However, the studies gave a good general view of the environmental conditions and structural forces that influence YMCA. Also the focus on such themes as **philanthropy, altruism** and **voluntarism** gave light to the dynamics of the movement. These studies explain the motivations of the people involved in activities in which they are not the main beneficiaries.

The next step was to look on the religious movement studies. They are to a great extent based on Max Weber's and Ernst Troeltsch's **church-sect typology** and focus on such religious movements that become sects. However, they do not have much to say about those movements that do not become sects. I got the same result also from **new religious movement** studies which are concerned of movements that were formerly called cults. They are movements that are not separated from some existing church in the society but have their origin either in some Eastern religion or in some new therapy form. In Finland the **revival movement studies** deal with the groups that do not become sects but remain inside the church frame. However, also revival movement studies lack the inter-denominational aspect. So, I had to continue my search. Religious movement studies gave some useful information of the diffusion dynamics of a religious movement but generally they either had a strong ideological-theological

¹ Muukkonen 1999.

colouring or 'explained religion out' by reducing it to some outer determinant like deprivation.

The other research fields were only partially fruitful. There were some interesting details but not a basis for adequate theory. Their main contribution is to resonate with the theories above and give special information in some details. They can also explain how the special features of the movement goals influence to the movement. YMCA is an old movement and has gone through various triumphs, setbacks and transformations. **Historical studies** give background for the episodes that have been significant to YMCA. **Ecumenical studies** have a similar task to locate discussions in YMCA to wider ecumenical trends. **Youth studies** were some sort of disappointment. The problem of youth studies is that they are like press: focus is on everything that is unusual. I found only one research on the evolvement of the youth culture of ordinary youngsters. I mean those who go to piano lessons, serve as volunteer group leaders in youth associations and are also in all other ways 'normal descent kids'. One understudied theme is in which way the youth organisations differ from other organisations. The vast amount of minor members in youth organisations has certainly some consequences on these organisations. **Education** and **psychological studies** are more concerns of the studies of local associations than World Alliance.

From the study fields mentioned above I have found some "pearls" but not enough for the theory¹. From my field experience I see that these theories do not explain sufficiently the 'why' questions related to YMCA. In third sector studies there are two main questions: 'why do they

¹ For me a theory is a tool that helps to understand YMCA in such a way that both outsiders and insiders can agree that we are speaking of the same movement.

exist' and 'how do they act'. However, there remains the questions 'why do they act as they do' and 'why do they change their action'.

After that I entered into the studies of social movements. The main contemporary traditions are American based **resource mobilization** approach and European **new social movement** approach. When I read the volumes of these theories, I noticed that before 1970s there had been a vital theory tradition called **collective behavior**. In the modern introductions to social movements this theory tradition is normally passed quite quickly as a part of the necessary history of the field but no more. The critic these introductions present is largely taken from the time when resource mobilization was emerging and campaigned for its space in sociology. I got the impression that some authors in 1990s, who were criticising collective behavior, have not actually read the original theories but just quoted the previous critics. A good example is from **Mario Diani** and **Ron Eyerman** who stated that "the assumption was made that collective behaviour could be analysed within the same categories used to explain individual behaviour. Additionally, participation in social movements tended to be treated as a form of irrational and/or unconventional behaviour and was often associated with the actions and attitudes of marginal individuals¹." However, the only classic of collective behavior they have in their bibliography is Turner and Killian². However, even in that case it is not quoted but only mentioned. This awoke my curiosity and I started to go through the hallmarks of collective behavior tradition. The more I read, the more I noticed that much in the modern theories in the field of social movements has been

¹ Diani & Eyerman 1992, 5.

² Reviewed below.

invented already before 1960s. I got the impression that in the critics it has been more question of internal power structures in the American sociology than the question of the validity of these theories. The critics seem to be centred on the claim that collective behavior theorists do not see the influence of structures but concentrate on individual behaviour.

Lewis Killian defends collective behavior approach against its critics as follows:

Since inception, the study of collective behavior has been characterized by inconsistency & self-criticism. Primary critics, predominantly those associated with social movement theory, have argued that collective behavior theory is undermined by a reliance on irrationality, emotion, & the creation of new structures in explanations of group phenomena. Drawing on the work of the Chicago school & various other collective behavior theorists, it is suggested that these criticisms are mostly unfounded¹.

Another question is whether the pupils of collective behavior 'stars' have followed the path that their teachers laid. **John D. McCarthy** and **Mayer N. Zald** note that "indeed, scholars following Gurr, Smelser, and Turner and Killian often ignore structural factors, even though the authors mentioned have been sensitive to broader structural and societal influences, as have some others¹." Whatever the reason for the neglect, I think that evaluating the hallmark studies of collective behavior tradition is useful for the understanding of social movements.

1.2. The Task and the Method of the Study

As I mentioned above, this study is a part of a larger project on YMCA and, in general, international non-governmental organisations. In order to construct theory,

¹ Killian 1994.

I go through several related subfields of sociology that deal with the issue. This study is 'a part of a part'. My intention is to evaluate the usefulness of social movement studies in the research of international NGOs and especially in the case of the YMCA. In this particular study I concentrate on the oldest of the traditions that focuses on social movements, namely on the collective behavior² approach that arose in the USA in 1920s and lasted till 1970s when it was replaced by resource mobilization approach. With the rise of **constructivism** and European new social movement approach, the old theories have become again of current interest. Many of the 'new' inventions on **ideology, identity** and **opportunity structures** of 1980s and 1990s can be found already in these theories.

The method to find the material for this study is what **Pertti Alasuutari** calls "**detective method**" in his textbook of qualitative methods¹, namely that I have tried to find the main traditional roots of the collective behavior studies. This has been done by looking the bibliographies of the studies on social movements and especially reviews of the studies prior to the 1970s. This process gave me an impression of the main traditions in the field of collective behavior.

After identifying the main theoretical traditions, I spotted the hallmarks of these traditions. In this study I have reviewed those works that have left their theoretical footprints in the field. After each review I have evaluated the main contribution of the scholar to the theory of social movements. I also have shortly described

¹ McCarthy & Zald 1977, 1214.

² Although I write in British English, I use the American forms in the quotations of American scholars and in concepts that have emerged in the US.

some variations of the main strings of the approaches. The following evaluating scheme is from **Daniel L. Pals**² who has used it in the evaluation of theories on religion. I have modified it a bit. The two last questions are my own and it replaces Pals' focus on empirical evidence of theories and the religious attitudes of scholars. The evaluating scheme contains the following questions:

1. How does the theory define social movements?
2. What type of theory it is?
3. What is the range of the theory?
4. What is the root metaphor³ behind the theory⁴?
5. How could this theory be used in studies of international NGOs⁵?

1.3. The Field of Social Movement Studies

Social movements are one form of collective action. They have been defined in numerous ways depending on the background philosophy or the world view of the researcher. The strictest criteria for them are in the **neo-Marxist definitions**, according to which there have been only few social movements in the whole human history. On the opposite side there is the resource mobilization theory that includes almost anything in the concept of social movement. I come to these in detail below. Now it is sufficient to agree with **Ron Eyerman** and **Andrew Jamison** that the science has become a tool of power⁶: boundaries are always also devices of power and propaganda. This is

¹ Alasuutari 1989, 9-15, 25-42, 124-131.

² Pals 1996, 269.

³ On root metaphors in sociology, see Brown 1977.

⁴ The last of these questions replace Pals' last question which focused on the religious attitude of the scholar who is studying religion.

⁵ Because this is a search for the research theory, the comments on NGOs and YMCA are at this stage based on my field experience as a YMCA secretary and volunteer board member. More detailed and analysed results will be given when I have used the tools that I have found, namely in the study of the transformation of the World Alliance of YMCAs from revival movement to social service organisation during the period from 1955 to 1973.

⁶ Eyerman & Jamison 1991, 1f.

important when we remember that many of the social movement researchers are either studying their own youth activity or are openly supporters of some ideology or world view. When you exclude something, it does not exist in your realm. It does not mean that it does not exist in the realm of somebody else. However, excluding something is a decision that from my point of view is very much depending, not on scientific reasons, but on ideological ones.

My own view is closer to those definitions which focus the field openly and inclusively without boundaries. I have quite practical reason for this. Social movement studies have become a sub-discipline of sociology¹. 'Social movement'² is *de facto* a main concept and it can be then divided to more sophisticated sub-concepts like political movements, reformation movements, religious movements, etc. With strict preliminary boundaries there is a danger to exclude significant phenomena.

Social movements in a broad sense have existed through the human history. One of the earliest note on such a movement is the royalist movement in ancient Israel described in the book of Samuel

Then all the elders of Israel gathered together and came to Samuel at Ramah; and they said to him, Behold, you have grown old, and your sons do not walk in your ways. Now appoint a king for us to judge us like all the nations.³

¹ ISA has two Research Committees that work under this title.

² If the concepts 'social movement', 'collective behavior' and 'collective action' ought to be in some order, then 'collective behavior' would be the largest category including all collective phenomena, 'social movement' is a sub-category of it and 'collective action' would mean a certain event of action. However, the terminology is unclear and I guess that many scholars would have some critical notes on this definition. In many cases the concepts are used almost as synonyms.

³ 1 Samuel 8:4-5. All Bible verses in English are from American Standard Bible translation.

The royalist movement transformed the old cult based alliance to a kingdom in circa 1000 BC. After that, one of the most important movement was the prophetic movement of Israel circa 700-600 BC. **Talcott Parsons** called that era the time which formed the value systems of those great cultures that have guided the civilisation from that on¹. The great religions of the Middle-East - Christianity and Islam - began as social movements. Crusades, Reformation, the French Revolution, Bolshevism etc. are some of the past large movements. In a smaller scale there has been the 'prohibit the sex from warriors' - campaign of the ancient Greek women, the plebeian campaigns for equality in ancient Rome as well as modern anti-Nestle and anti-Shell campaigns. Hundreds of this kind of examples can be found during the history.

In spite of all this, social movement research is a relatively new subsector of sociology. Although its roots can be traced to the midst of 19th Century, the field got wider attraction only after the rise of the new social movements of the 1960s, namely **student movement, peace movement, women's movement and environmental movement**, sometimes bound together under the label **new left**. These seem to remain also the main subjects of the sub-discipline since the 1970s, the main inclusions being the ethnic and minority movements and the new activity in previous socialistic countries. In the following sub-chapters I will introduce the main traditions of social movement research, their world views and main research results.

¹ Parsons 1969, 558-563.

2. Classical Approaches to Social Movements

Social movements were important to the classics¹ of sociology. In his work *From Mobilization to Revolution* from 1978 **Charles Tilly** links the social movement paradigms to the classical theories of sociology². According to Tilly the approaches of social movements can be understood as descendants of four classical roots: Marxian, Durkheimian, Millian, and Weberian³. However, this leaves out the main stream in the long run, namely social psychological studies of social movements⁴ which have been dominant in the collective behavior approach. In their book *Collective Behavior* **Ralph H. Turner** and **Lewis**

¹ I use the word classic in two senses. First, like here, it refers to those scholars that have been generally classified as scientific classics. Second, I use the word for those scholars that have left such a hallmark in their special fields that the latter works are either based on them or in opposition of them.

² **Anthony Oberschall** goes even further and describes the dependence of the classics of sociology on the European moralist philosophers and their stereotypes. Oberschall 1973,3-11.

³ Tilly 1978,12-51. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald give a bit different classification of the roots of the field in their *Social Movements* article in **Neil Smelser's Handbook of Sociology**. They start from later researchers and the only classic they refer to is Max Weber. According to them, the approaches to social movements are collective behavior, mass society, relative deprivation, and institutional school.(McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1988,696). The first is the same as the mass-psychology in my presentation. The second links to Durkheim, the third is a version of Marxist grievances and Durkheimian anomie, and the last links to Weber. **Margit Mayer** gives a third classification: 'classical' traditions of collective behavior and breakdown theories, which attempt to explain why and how people protest; resource mobilization approach, which is a critique to classical traditions; class analytical approaches originating in urban sociology developed to modern class society analysis; populist-traditionalist interpretation, which focuses on the 'citizen action' and communitaristic theories; and integrative perspectives, which emphasize cultural and symbolic dimensions and construction of meaning. (Mayer 1991,49.)

⁴ In the Critical Mass Bulletin there was a discussion in 1973-74 whether or not the social movement studies should be within the social psychology section of the American Sociological Association. McCarthy & Zald 1977,1213,n.2. Stanley Milgram and Hans Toch argue that "No discipline other than social psychology is naturally suited to the scientific treatment of collective behavior... Only social psychology... places the study of collective behavior at the core of the discipline." Milgram & Toch 1969,509.

Killian present the fifth¹ root, namely mass-psychology. However, there is still one root that the reviews of social movement studies do not tell anything. This root is in the sociology of **Georg Simmel**. **Donald N.** Levine and his colleagues have evaluated Simmel's influence on American sociology in the 1920s and the 1930s and found that his influence was bigger than the impact of most scholars mentioned above².

Surprisingly there is quite little emphasis on classical studies of religious movements in social movement studies although both Durkheim and Weber underlined the importance of religion. These have been done in the field theology and anthropology, but they form such distinct research tradition, that I leave it out here and hopefully come back to them in an other occasion. Here I start with **Karl Marx** and follow mainly the work of Tilly.

2.1. World as Class Interests

KARL MARX, in his analysis of the French Revolution 1848 (Napoleon III)³, underlined the interests of different classes (namely the Parisian proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the enlightened fragment of the bourgeoisie) and the temporary coalitions they made. He identified the actors to be classes which were formed according to the means of production⁴. Marx's actors acted because of their common interests, mutual awareness, and internal organisation. Tilly criticises Marx that he paid little attention to the importance of generalised tension, momentary impulses, personal disorganisation, or personal

¹ Turner & Killian 1959,4-12; 1987,1-31.

² Levine & al 1976,813f.

³ Marx 1958a,b.

⁴ The only exception was Luis Bonabarte. Marx admitted that his

attitudes of the French to the Bonapartian Empire. The Marxian tradition has been strong especially in European studies of social movements.¹

The problem of the Marxian tradition has often been a limitation of social movements as political movements² or class movements. It is basically an economic theory on class struggle and an ideology. The stricter the Marxism, the less it has attributed to states, ethnic movements, religious movements³, gender issues, minorities and so on. **Jean L. Cohen** also points out that "The class analysis cannot account for the peace, ecological, women's or citizen initiative movements proliferating in the West⁴." Following **Luis Althusser, Matti Hyvärinen** points out that the Marxian tradition does not have any real theory of even organisations of class struggle. This is more true in the case of non-class subjects of movements that do not have a form of organisation. The neglect of religion has often meant to the Marxian studies that things that can not be reduced to materialistic factors have been totally ignored. It can not be said that for Marx the beliefs or other commitments did not exist, but surely he did not focus on them⁵. Thus Marx and his followers have not given a general theory but a theory that sees everything from the perspective of material economic interaction.

actions could be based on some other than class interests.

¹ Tilly 1978,12ff.

² Tilly concentrates on conflicts and denies that there would be a model of peaceful collective action. Tilly 1978,50. **Alain Touraine**, the pioneer of new social movement approach, sees social movements same as class struggle. Touraine 1981,94.

³ Surely, there is a great variety among the Marxist tradition but, according to Tilly, many traditional Marxian scholars are not really Marxian in a strict sense of the determination (Tilly 1978,43). Sometimes it is difficult for an outsider to make any claims on Marxian thinking because there is always some Marxian sect or scholar who has stressed just that issue what one claims to be non-Marxian.

⁴ Cohen 1983,97.

⁵ Tilly points also that "Marx did not see that many French workers

In a way, Marxism can also be seen as Judaism without the concept of God. The theory or ideology has its salvation history (dialectical processes) that has its fulfilment in immanent paradise (Communist society). It has its chosen people (proletariat) and a collective Messiah (party). The old claim that Communism is a conspiracy of Jews has some validity. Marx could not escape his Jewish backgrounds and his thinking is full of secularised Jewish concepts. In a way, he was not far away from the old Sadduceans who did not believe in life after death, either. It is no wonder why there were so much Jewish leaders in the Communist movement. The way of thinking was familiar to them.

One weakness of Marxist tradition has been in its preview of collective action as an expression of a structured class contradiction. The classical problem in Marxism has been how to move from class in itself to a class for itself, from the potential to action. Normally this gap has been filled by some kind of *deus ex machina* (the party, the intellectuals) who helps to raise the consciousness which the actor is lacking. Hyvärinen notes that Marxism has three problems related to its class theory: Historical-Philosophical Determinism sees labour class as a 'universal class' with a mission to fulfil the benefits and goals of humankind. This eliminates the question of the making of a collective subject. Class-reductionism is based on the idea that every class almost automatically produces a party or class movement to defend its interests. This has left out the civil society as a field where different groups emerge. Economic theories have supposed that social struggles and collective subjects emerge like elements from the economical conflicts.¹

were already sympathetic to Bonaparte in 1848." Tilly 1978,13.

¹ Hyvärinen 1985,19ff.

Alberto Melucci calls the Marxist approach **an actor without action**. The other possibility is the view that sees social movements as **a sum of atomised events**. Melucci calls this to be **an action without an actor**.¹

The strength of the Marxian tradition in social movement studies is that it sees history and society as dynamic process and not as a static system as the following Durkheimian tradition does. This enables to study the transformation processes from a positive viewpoint. For Marx the movements were positive phenomena that create something new - not awesome monsters that threaten the harmony. His Hegelian world view stresses the process of thesis - anti-thesis - synthesis. Everything new becomes through the process of class struggle as an anti-thesis for the previous phenomena. This stress on class struggle underlines also that the movements may be composed of different groups of people who have different interests.

In the case of NGOs and YMCA the Marxian emphasis has been seen in focusing on such problems as racism, underdevelopment, migration, unemployment, poverty, and gender equality. These questions came in the agenda of YMCA in 1960s and in many countries replaced the old emphasis on Bible-study and revival campaigns. Additionally, there has also been other struggles over the power in the movement. Besides the supporters of religious activities and social programs there have been those who have seen sports as the main task of the movement. All these groups have tried (and try constantly) to influence the goals and the policy of the movement from grassroots to global level. From the Marxian point of view YMCA and other NGOs can be seen as fields of competing interests.

¹ Melucci 1980,199f,212-215; 1992a,240; 1992b,45.

2.2. World as Collective Representations

EMILE DURKHEIM¹ pointed out that the society is a system of **collective conscience** of similar individuals. With concepts of **social facts** and **collective representations** he underlined the importance of group influence in human behaviour. Collective representations form a distinct social fact that cannot be reduced to individual psychology. The new division of labour threatens the common conscience because it puts together people who do not share the common world view. This gap between the level of differentiation and the level of shared consciousness is **anomie**. The Durkheimian idea is based on a tension between disintegration (which leads to **anomic collective action**) and integration (which leads to **routine collective action**). Somewhere between these there is the **restorative collective action**.²

When explaining Durkheim's idea of collective representations Talcott Parsons wrote:

It is not a system of ideas *about* an existent empirical reality exterior to the minds of individuals. It is rather a body of ideas which themselves form the effective factor in action, that is, the effective factor is itself present 'in the minds of individuals,' not merely a representation of it.³

The Durkheimian tradition is basically social philosophy that tries to explain the dynamics of society from shared representations. For Durkheim the society is constituted of the ideas that people have. In this respect, his view is opposite to Marxian thinking in which the ideas are subordinated to material factors. Durkheimian philosophy can be seen almost in all twentieth century standard analyses of industrialisation, urbanisation, deviance,

¹ Durkheim 1933, 1951.

² Tilly 1978, 16ff; Turner & Killian 1959, 4f.

³ Parsons 1968(1937), 389 (italics in original).

social control, social disorganisation and collective behavior. In social movement theory the Durkheimian tradition has been alive in the structural functional and mass society strings of collective behavior. In the Durkheimian tradition the society is seen as an organ. It is an optimal system in which everything is in their right places. This metaphor holds the idea that all new things are potentially harmful because they disrupt the perfect system. In this tradition social movements are always indicators of disharmony. From the system's perspective they can be seen positive when they are forms of restorative collective action. In other cases they are negative because they cause disintegration¹.

The merit of Durkheimian tradition has been in the concept of collective conscience. As mentioned in the introduction, the world is not just structures and facts. More important is how we pick these facts from the raw data that our senses receive all the time. This forms our world view through which we interpret the reality². Additionally we must have some way to share our world view with others. This requires common understanding of the concepts and important elements that are included in our view. This is what collective conscience means. In all religious movements the world views are extremely important and thus all theories that deal with the shared understanding are valuable. This is in the case of YMCA, too. In general, Durkheim's ideas show that the collective

¹ In this Durkheimian thinking one can find echoes of the Hebrew concepts of *sedek* (righteousness) and *shalom* (peace) which both are terms of unity in harmony. Every act that strengthens the unity of the tribe is righteous and the sin is actually an act that breaks this unity and harmony. Achtemeier 1986,80f.

² World view studies are one important field that should be accompanied to social movement studies. In the new social movement tradition there has been some attempts to this direction but not enough. I have given some presentations of the Finnish world view studies (e.g. Muukkonen 1999,34-38) but I will do it more systematically in an other occasion.

representations influence both movement's identity and its mission.

2.3. World as Sum of Utilitaristic Calculations

JOHN STUART MILL¹ and utilitarianism saw collective action as a calculation of individual interests. In contrary to Marx and Durkheim, Mill saw social phenomena as a sum of individuals' acting. For him it was a question of individual choices, collective consequences of alternative decision rules, and the interaction of them. The Millian approach has utilised the mathematical models of political arithmeticians² and has been strong in different collective choice theories: game theory, public goods, some theories of voting analysis, formal organisation and power.³

Millian focus on individual decisions resembles in some senses Marxian class interests. In both theory tradition's interests, whether individual or collective, are central in explaining people's behavior. The difference is that Marx focuses on prevailing class structures but Mill starts from the free will of an individual. Millian thinking has evidently got elements from the voluntaristic philosophy of Duns Scotus and William Occam who were the leading figures in British philosophy in thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. **Simo Knuuttila** has studied the philosophical roots of modern ideas. He notes

¹ Mill 1950.

² Mathematical models of political arithmeticians and especially social mathematics were presented by **Concordet** in his **Oeuvres Complètes** in 1804 (Oberschall 1973,8-11). Later in this tradition were **Boris Sidis** and **N. Rashewsky**. Milgram & Toch 1959,562f.

³ Tilly 1978, 24-35.

that "according to Duns Scotus in every choice a man chooses freely again and again his goals, too¹."

From the perspective of religious movement scholar, the basic weakness of the utilitarian thinking is that it does not value altruism, religious belief or ideology as important factors. Millian tradition also ignores the grievances and other structural factors lying behind the action. When this approach takes these phenomena into account they are normally reduced to some form of cost-benefit calculation. For example, altruism is often explained as giving personal satisfaction or in other similar way. This kind of explanation is quite oppressive because it does not value actors' own definitions of their motivations. This same tendency is, unfortunately, seen also in many other scientific traditions².

The other problem of utilitarian approach is that it requires rational thinking preceding behaviour. This is more an ideological than an empirical thesis. People do not always behave rationally (some would say that they seldom do). The other point is that it ignores the unconscious, ritual and unarticulated behaviour. Some symbol theorists, like **Ernst Cassirer**, point out that the action comes first and the determination of its meaning or its articulation follows afterwards³.

The weaknesses of utilitarian theories have also been their strength. When pointing to the individual

¹ Knuuttila 1999,20.

² There has been claims that science is masculine (Keller 1985), it is bourgeois (Marxists), science is colonisation (Galtung 1979), it is oppression over disabled (Stone & Priestley 1996),

³ **Sigbjørn Stensland** has pointed it as follows: "The interesting point from Cassirer's point of view is that action, the running, takes place before the feeling of the state. The cognitive aspect then is something which is the result of the whole sequence. Accordingly, it is not a judgement of how to act, but only a registration of what has occurred." Stensland 1986,71.

rationality they have brought individual actor in the centre of analysis. Human beings are not (only) animals that behave according their instincts. Neither are they robots that are products of some outer system. They really make choices from their own premises and those choices influence to society. Thus while focusing on individual actor this tradition explains also macro level phenomena as a product of individual choices.

In social movement studies the major proponent of this tradition has been the resource mobilization theory family. Besides social movement studies, this approach has had an enormous influence nonprofit (or third sector) studies¹. It is a pity that these third sector studies and social movement studies have not interacted but occasionally.

In the case of NGOs the Millian tradition calls attention to both micro and meso level phenomena. It is not really organisations that act but people in organisations. These people make decisions from their own premises and the organisation is a sum of these decisions. Sure there are some individuals whose decisions are more important than others'. Thus the decisions of staff in international organisations are more important than decisions of members in local level. However, in the case of federal type organisations, like YMCA, local decisions get sometimes so wide support that they influence national decisions and they in turn influence international decisions.

¹ A classical introduction to the third sector studies is **Walter W. Powell's** edition ***The Nonprofit sector***. Powell 1987.

2.4. World as Ideas

MAX WEBER¹ is major classic in the history of sociology the, who regarded the meaning of ideas as essential part of his theories. He writes in his *Essays in Sociology*:

very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.²

According to Weber, the thought of human being is the dynamo or 'switchmen' of action and the way he sees the world is essential to the outcome. Weber held that the belief was the root cause of all actions. For him the major issues of groups were the collective definitions of the world and of themselves. The goals, standards of behaviour, and other justifications rise from these definitions. Beliefs play a crucial role when a group commits itself to follow charismatic leaders, objects, and rituals.³ In this I recognise that Weber followed the traditional Christian thinking that the spirit is superior to the matter. Typical example is in the beginning of the Gospel of John: "In the beginning was the Word⁴." The Christian emphasis in Weber's thinking is perhaps due to Weber's Huguenot heritage from his mother. In every case, he knew well his Bible and he also followed the discussions of exegetical studies of his time¹. In sociology it has been the tendency to reduce religious beliefs to social structures but Weber represents the other possibility: structures (as well as sociological theories) can emerge from beliefs.

Weber offered his major contribution to the importance of beliefs in his studies of charisma. He got the word

¹ Weber 1968.

² Weber 1970, 280.

³ Tilly 1978, 37ff.

⁴ John 1:1

from New Testament where it means all spiritual gifts ranging from ecstasy to leadership². For Weber charisma is the opposite force to bureaucracy. It changes people inwardly when bureaucracy transforms objects and arrangements. However, Weber sees that charisma has a tendency to routinise. When the movement diffuses "it faces the problem of the 'routinisation' (veralltäglichen = everydaying) of the charisma... which states dramatically the process of turning something extraordinary into something ordinary³." In general, Weber uses the concept of charisma mainly connected to leadership. A charismatic leader is the one who is able to make people follow him/her because of his/her personal attraction and not because of the formal position. Although it was originally a term connected to spiritual authority, Weber widens it to all authority that is not from formal status.

The problem in Weber's thought is that he does not theorise from where charismatic leaders and movements arise. His theory is a modification of his earlier prophet - priest -theory which stressed the distinction between these two roles. The theory was based on the 19th century Old Testament studies of which Weber was much aware. For Weber a prophet or charismatic leader comes from outside of the system and the priest is the guard of the system. He did not pay attention to that, for example, Luther was a prophet that came from inside the system⁴.

¹ Berger 1963.

² "Since we have gifts that differ according to the grace given to us, each of us is to exercise them accordingly: if prophecy, according to the proportion of his faith; if service, in his serving; or he who teaches, in his teaching; or he who exhorts, in his exhortation; he who gives, with liberality; he who leads, with diligence; he who shows mercy, with cheerfulness." Romans 12:6-8.

³ Tilly 1978, 37f.

⁴ Weber 1963, 20-31, 46-59. On this theme, see Berger 1963.

Weber's other major contribution to social movement studies is his concept of bureaucratisation. Along with **Robert Michels**'¹ 'iron law of oligarchy' the concept of bureaucracy has paved the way for understanding the mechanisms of organisations and political parties. For Weber bureaucracy was the most effective and just way to handle administration - it was parallel to rationality in the field of administration. When Michels held the dilemma of democracy and the tendency to oligarchisation, Weber took oligarchy for granted. Democracy in organisations was a utopia for him and he regarded it to be natural that there is oligarchy in organisations.²

Weberian explanations flourish in the studies of complex organisations and nation state activities³. In social movement research the Weberian stress on ideas has been important in the classical collective behavior tradition and in the European new social movement approach. In the case of YMCA the stress on ideas is important because the bond between the YMCAs round the world is the Paris Basis from 1855⁴. When the structures, goals, strategies and tactics differ from country to country, the Basis has tied these different organisations together.

When Tilly comments on the above mentioned four classics (Marx, Durkheim, Mill, Weber), he points out that the Weberian tradition has been strong in empiricism but often weak in theory. Durkheimian and Millian traditions have,

¹ Political Parties. Michels 1966.

² Siisiäinen 1983.

³ Tilly 1978, 37ff.

⁴ "The Young Men's Christian Associations seek to unite those young men who, regarding Jesus Christ as their God and Saviour according to the Holy Scriptures, desire to be His disciples in their faith and in their life, and to associate their efforts for the extension of His Kingdom amongst young men. Any differences of opinion on other subjects, however important in themselves, but not embraced by the specific designs of the Associations, shall not interfere with the harmonious relations of the confederated Societies."

on the contrary, been reformulations after reformulations but with a narrow empirical connection. Marxian tradition, on which Tilly relies, has not paid enough attention to belief systems, to emergence and fall processes and decision-making processes.¹ The classics have different views on mobilisation and that is why there should be some combination of the theories.²

However, it is astonishing that Tilly and other social movement scholars, in general, ignore one of the major European sociologist that inflated social movement theories through his pupils. In the 1920s and the 1930s **Georg Simmel** was more influential European sociologist in the USA than any of those that Tilly mentioned³. The special link to social movement studies was via Chicago University and collective behavior tradition.

2.5. World as Interaction of Individuals

Georg Simmel's sociology is quite desperate task to review in few pages. He himself proposed that best way to view his works is to look the index of his *Soziologie*¹ from 1908. In general, Simmel dealt with so many topics and with such a disorganised manner that in his case there is no one central root metaphor that describes his work. However, **Donald N. Levine** has, with his colleagues, summarised Simmel's theses in eight theses, which deal with the task of sociology, the nature of society and interaction processes. Levine and others claim that Simmel's philosophy gave legitimacy to new-born science of sociology in the USA in 1920s. Simmel state that the task of sociology is to concentrate on its core concept:

¹ Tilly 1978, 41f, 48, 50.

² Tilly 1978, 42ff.

³ Levine & al 1976, 813f, 840ff.

society. Society, in turn, "is to be viewed... as the modality of interaction among individuals."²

Kurt and **Cladys Engel Lang** express Simmel's idea of society as follows: "Social structure in its simplest manifestation is revealed by the patterned interactions between two people³." With this they refer to Simmel's concepts of dyads and triads. According to Levine and others Simmel saw that "all human interaction should be viewed as kinds of *exchange*." This reciprocal interaction "takes place in discrete identifiable forms." These forms then will be fixed and they become cultural forms.⁴

Further Simmel sees that there is a fundamental dualism in society. Levine and others express it as follows:

Every tendency in interaction is to some extent balanced by an opposing tendency... The principal sociological dualism are conformity and individuation, solidarity and antagonism, publicity and privacy, compliance and rebelliousness, and constraint and freedom.⁵

Simmel emphasised the link between social structure and individual's interaction. In small groups "the individual's views and needs are directly effective." In large groups this is not any more possible. Thus

the large group creates organs which channel and meditate the interactions of its members and thus operate as the vehicles of a societal unity which no longer results from the direct relations among its elements. Offices and representations, laws and symbols of group life, organizations and general social concepts are organs of this sort.⁶

Simmel parallels these organs with scientific concepts. "A concept isolates that which is common to singular and

¹ Simmel 1908.

² Levine & al 1976, 823.

³ Lang & Lang 1961, 6.

⁴ Levine & al 1976, 823f.

⁵ Levine & al 1976, 823f.

⁶ Simmel 1950, 96f.

heterogeneous items¹." Thus for him, social structure is some kind of abstractisation of human interaction.

Simmel's major contribution to American sociology is inevitably in the thinking that the society is interaction of people and all structures are comparable to interactions in small groups. Thus it is no wonder that especially Chicago school and Chicago based American Journal of Sociology distributed his ideas in the 1920s and the 1930s. Actually, some of his students later became influential in American sociology. Simmel's theses can be seen especially in interactionist theories.²

Simmel's theory resembles Mill's in that respect that he also traces the society from the actions of individuals. The difference is that the Simmel traces the society from the interaction of individuals. So there must be at least two persons. Society is not a sum of individual actions but a generalisation of individual interactions. The focus on micro level does not mean that the theory is of micro level. On the contrary, the main notion is that micro level interactions have a tendency to be formalised and thus they are elementary forms of social structures. However, in the case of INGOs much that was said about Mill, can be said about Simmel's theories. In both theories the focus is on individual level and the macro structures are explained from micro level phenomena.

However, the collective behavior tradition is not a child of sociology. Its sixth, and most important, root is reviewed by Turner and Killian³.

¹ Simmel 1950,96.

² Levine & al 1976,815-818.

³ What follows is based on Turner & Killian 1959,4-9; 1989,1-21.

2.6. Social Movement as a Crowd

CROWD PSYCHOLOGY, COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY or **GROUP PSYCHOLOGY** of the 19th century is the early root of collective behavior studies¹. The classical crowd psychology included **convergence** or **instinct theories**, which carry the assumption that human behaviour is the result of releasing the forces located within individuals². In this tradition there were **Gustave Le Bon**³ and **Gabriel Tarde**⁴ in France, **Scipio Sighele**⁵ and **Pasquale Rossi**⁶ in Italy, and **Sigmund Freud**⁷ in Austria. Especially Le Bon developed such concepts as **collective subject**, **collective soul** and the **mental unity of crowds**. Actually, Turner and Killian call him the founder of collective behavior studies. Gabriel Tarde analysed processes of imitation and made a distinction between the crowd and the public.

The starting point of the studies was the notion that normally respectable and rational citizens can do awful things in crowds. One of the early attempts was to explain collective behavior in terms of psychopathology. Freud, for example, saw the crowd as a substitute of superego which told what to do and what is right⁸. The basic idea of this approach is said in **Everet Dean Martin's** memorable

¹ To be exact, there were historical studies by, e.g., **Justus Friedrich Carl Hecker** and **Charles Mackay**. Hecker wrote about the Medieval Dancing Mania (Hecker 1832) and Mackay described many of the epidemics of that time (Mackay 1841). Turner & Killian 1959,9.

² Turner & Killian 1987,19ff. Gustave Le Bon put it this way: "...unconscious phenomena play an altogether preponderating part not only in organic life but also in the operations of the intelligence... The greater part of our daily actions are the result of hidden motives which escape our observation." Le Bon 1924a,889.

³ Le Bon 1896.

⁴ Tarde 1890.

⁵ Sighele 1898.

⁶ Rossi 1900.

⁷ Freud 1922.

⁸ Turner & Killian 1959,8.

saying that a crowd consists of 'people going crazy together'¹. Le Bon used the theories of psychoanalysis to explain collective behavior. For him the prototype of collective action was **crowd**. His notion was that a **psychological crowd** or an **organised crowd** is formed by a gathering of people when

The sentiments and ideas of all the persons in the gathering take one and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics.²

In organised crowds the unconscious (instincts, passions, and feelings) is released and forces of contagion and suggestion take the lead. Le Bon used the language of medicine to describe how sentiments spread like a flu in crowds. Because of this irrationalism he sees the behaviour of crowds mainly as deviant and criminal. Individuals can be led to such deeds that they normally would not accept and "in crowds it is stupidity and not mother-wit that is accumulated." Here Le Bon is trying to formulate scientific theory from the common-sense knowledge that is expressed, for example, in the Finnish proverb "In crowds the stupidity is concentrated". However, Le Bon also notes that there are positive sentiments like heroism in crowds.³

The concept of crowd as a prototype of collective behavior should be understood in the context of time. When there were practically no mass media, the only form of a joint action was physical gathering. This metaphor predominated until radio, television, internet, mass mailing, faxes, etc. enabled movements to launch mass mobilisation without being physically in the same place.

¹ Turner & Killian 1959, 8; 1989, 5.

² Le Bon

³ Le Bon 1924a, 890-893. Le Bon has been accused that he saw the crowds only negatively but he notes also: "Were peoples only to be credited with the great actions performed in cold blood, the annals of the world would register but few of them." Le Bon 1924a, 887.

However, Le Bon extended the conception of crowds also to not face-to-face situations. So he wrote of **electoral crowds, parliamentary assemblies, sects, castes** and classes as instances of crowds. Although Le Bon also saw positive elements in the crowds, the general concern of this tradition was on criminal phenomena. As a consequence the tradition got a heritage that determined all collective action as irrational and deviant¹.

In explaining the tendency to label collective behavior as deviant, the Marxian class interest perspective will give quite a realistic remind. The early theorists of psychology as well as of other sciences (including sociology) came from upper classes who did not really understand the life conditions and motivations of the lower classes. When their own upper society was challenged, they determined the challenging forces as deviant.²

Le Bon also analysed the French Revolution. For him the main cause for the revolution was the vanishing of respect for the old traditions. His argument starts with the idea that "any profound study of a revolution necessitates a study of the mental soil upon which the ideas that direct the courses have to germinate." His thesis is that philosophers first challenged the authorities and ruined the respect for the tradition. The next step was that the unemployed nobility followed them and spread the message. After the loss of confidence in the foundations of the society, all classes felt uneasy and new norms started to emerge. The religion was replaced with Ratio in the minds of the middle classes. When the Revolution reached the

¹ Turner & Killian 1987,4f,19. Hyvärinen

² "Mob, disorder, and mass movement are top down words. They are the words of authorities and elites for actions of other people - and, often, for actions which threaten their own interests." Tilly 1978,227. See also Oberschall 1973,11ff.

lower classes, the mystic elements took the lead. These mystic elements were the real strength of the Revolution. At the end the Ratio formed the doctrines of new Revolutionist religion in which the Ratio was the only god.¹

2.7. Discussion on the Classical Approaches

However, in spite of the classical roots, the European sociology has not created any adequate theory of social movements. In his review article on social movement research in Germany **Dieter Rucht** points out that none of the German classics provided refined conceptual tools for the analysis of social movements². The major influence of the classics has been in creating the world views of the research traditions. In social movement studies the different world views and root metaphors play an important role in explaining the movements.

The practical result of the lack of defined social movement theory in Europe was that before the 1960's the movements were studied as one part of the society in the general sociology. This meant that they were explained in terms of established theoretical traditions. There was no real subsector to study movements. Social movements were seen "as organised and strategically acting collectives"³. The only exception in sociology was the studies of THE MOVEMENT, namely labour movement. However, also labour movement was studied more as an institutionalised part of the welfare state. In Europe, sociology, social democracy,

¹ Le Bon 1924b, 905-909.

² Rucht 1991, 176.

³ Neidhardt and Rucht 1991, 425.

and the welfare state developed hand in hand.¹ The major development of the field took place in the US.

Theories presented above have been rarely referred by the recent social movement theorists². If these theorists have not been totally rejected, they have at least been kept in silence. I suppose that one reason for this is the notion of deviance that the activists of the 1960's disliked. However, when emphasising instincts and other biological forces, the crowd psychologists also represent the biological explanation tradition of collective behavior. Today socio-biology is almost a dirty word and the constructivist tradition openly rejects the biological explanations of behaviour³. The ideas of Le Bon and others have also rejected by other scholars. One reason to the neglect might be that much theorising in the field of social movements has been done in the cultural context Protestantism. The classical Protestantism has always been unresponsive to ritualism and emotions. The other explanation could be that the Western philosophy has a tradition where reason and emotion are treated as opposites⁴. The third reason might be that Le Bon "remained vague, indeed mystical, on the question of how and under what conditions collective behavior emerges⁵." The fourth, and perhaps the most influential reason has been the misuse of the socio-biology in ethnic and gender relations⁶.

¹ Eyerman and Jamison 1991,17-18.

² Earlier contagion-like theorising has occurred in deindividuation theorists in psychological social psychology, mass society theories and in concepts like 'circular reaction' and 'unilateral transfer of control'. Snow & Oliver 1995,574.

³ Hjelmar 1996,171.

⁴ Snow & Oliver 1995,589.

⁵ Turner & Killian 1959,5.

⁶ Amitai Etzioni summarises the allergy of socio-biological explanations as follows: "...the argument that all human nature is constructed is supposed to protect a position from being vulnerable

However, there is some wisdom in these old theory traditions. The dynamics of groups become much more vivid when we combine them with Cassirer's notions that action precedes cognition. Another example could be **Desmond Morris'** comparative studies on human and other animal gestures¹ and behaviour². Both theorists underline that there are forms of communication that are prior to articulation³. This non-articulated communication can lead to action, create commitment, or raise enthusiasm. In the case of large international conferences there is even a special word for it: conference euphoria⁴. New social movement researcher **Sidney Tarrow** adopts a similar concept for the peaks of protest cycles: moments of madness⁵. An other point is that Le Bon describes the contagion in a similar way as the interactionists and constructivists describe the collective process of defining the phenomena. Tarrow also points out the importance of the *zeitgeist*⁶ (spirit of the time) just in a similar way as some scholars in the new social movement approach.

to discriminatory implications." Etzioni 1995,33.

¹ For example his work *Bodywatching*. Morris 1985.

² In his famous best-seller ***The Human Zoo*** Morris writes: "The zoo animal in gage exhibits all these abnormalities that we know so well from our human companions ... the city ... is a human zoo." Morris 1969,8.

³ The easiest way to recognise the uselessness of words is to remember how we have spent time with own babies. A lot of interaction with no words.

⁴ On the other hand, it is good to remember how Matti Hyvärinen comments Le Bon's theses: "It is not plausible that a worker, who is participating to a permanent crowd because of the party call, would experience from week to week again and again a transformation to a totally other person. Tenth demonstration for the same issue does not necessarily have any influence on him." Hyvärinen 1985,46 (my translation).

⁵ Tarrow 1993.

⁶ On *zeitgeist*, see Mannheim 1972,129-135.

3. Collective Behavior as Interaction of Individuals

3.1. The Emergence of the Collective Behavior Approach

THE COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR tradition has been closely connected to the Chicago school¹ and interactionism. For a long time it was one of the most undervalued fields of sociology². The paradigm got wider attraction first along the rise of student movement in the end of 1960s and second along the constructivist theories in the European New Social Movement approach.

Turner and Killian remind that in the beginning sociology was much inflated by static views of cultural determinants in England and in America. "Emphasis was placed on the notion that man's social behavior was 'culturally determined' or 'culturally conditioned,' while remaking of culture through collective behavior received relatively little emphasis³." This might explain why the field so strongly underlined the difference between conventional and collective behavior. **Kurt** and **Gladys**

Engel Lang express this difference in their determination:

Collective behavior is the field of sociology that focuses on the sequences and patterns of interaction that emerge in problematic situations...

Problematic situations are defined here as those in which participants lack adequate guides to conduct.⁴

¹ On the sociology of Chicago school see, e.g., Kurtz 1986(1984).

² Neidhardt and Rucht 1991,422. Marx & Wood note that before 1969 only approximately dozen books had been published on general collective behavior topics when between 1969 and 1975 there were 24 publications. Marx & Wood 1975,363.

³ Turner & Killian 1959,6.

⁴ Lang 1968,556.

One of the early sociologists was **Edward Alsworth Ross**¹. He had a social-psychological orientation and he was strongly influenced by group psychology and especially by Tarde. Ross saw that the idea of imitation accounted both 'planes' (traditional influences) and 'currents' (changing influences). Other social-psychologists involved in the field were **William McDougall**² and **Floyd Allport**³. Both denied the idea of group mind as an explanation of crowd behaviour. McDougall tried to explain the spread and intensification of emotions in a crowd and concluded that it was a question of expressing primary emotions and instincts. Allport saw the group behaviour as a sum of individual reactions.⁴

ROBERT E. PARK can be seen as the father of American collective behavior studies. He was a pupil of Simmel in Berlin⁵ and got from Simmel the only systematic instruction in sociology he ever had⁶. Park launched the term collective behavior in his Heidelberg doctoral thesis **Masse und Publikum** in 1903. Combining the Continental and British traditions, he made also a distinction between **the public** and **the crowd**. This distinction was typical to Simmelian dualism. While he believed that the former was controlled by rational norms and the latter was not, he argued that both "serve to bring individuals out of old ties and into new ones⁷." He used the word 'crowd' in a broad sense which covered such classical phenomena as last

¹ Ross 1912(1908)

² McDougall 1912.

³ Allport 1924.

⁴ Turner & Killian 1959,6.

⁵ Levine & al 1976,816. Levine & al state that Park got "the only formal instruction in sociology he ever had" from Simmel. Idem.

⁶ Baker 1973,257.

⁷ Park 1972,x.

vast migration of peoples, the Crusades, and the French revolution¹.

Park's career as a journalist after his graduation arose his interest in sociology². Thus he had a special contact to public. However, Park had an idealistic view of the mission of the newspapers that colours also his understanding of public³. It seems that Park's public was the sphere of intelligent elite and he, as well as his predecessors, was familiar with the customs and rules of the upper classes⁴. Thus, for him it was easy to see elite's behaviour as 'rational.' The crowd consisted of those who did not have access to power, and thus the powerless groups used the methods that were available to them. From elite's perspective crowd behaviour was irrational and deviant. Clearly the class structures influence the concepts.

In the US collective behavior studies started in the Chicago school in 1920s. Together with his colleague, **Ernest W. Burgess**¹, Park published a textbook **Introduction to the Science of Sociology**. It also contained a chapter on collective behavior. The form of the book was such that each chapter contained, first, an introduction to the subject, secondly a selection of the prominent studies in the field and lastly a section on problems. This meant

¹ Park 1972,19f.

² Baker 1973,254.

³ Park writes in his life history as follows: "There were a group of us who believed that the newspaper, by the mere fact of reporting, with philosophic insight and scientific accuracy, the trends of current events, was destined to bring about profound and immediate changes." Park called this a movement for the "organization of intelligence". Baker 1973,254f.

⁴ Both his parents were physicians and his grandfather was a country doctor. Additionally, his fellows in his childhood were Scandinavians, who although not belonging in the elite, had a tradition of respect for the law. (Baker 1973,251). Thus, he had no experience how rational the lower classes could see the upheavals. Even today this attitude of Scandinavians is seen in the EU when they take the directives more seriously than South Europeans.

that the publication was partly a monograph and partly an anthology. I suppose that this is why Park and Burgess have been seen as "heavily influenced by the European mass psychosis theory but elaborated it greatly²." In fact they ended the chapter of collective behavior with the notion:

Le Bon's book on the *Psychology of Revolution*, which is the sequel to his study of *The Crowd*, is, to be sure, an attempt, but the best that one can say of it is that it is suggestive.³

Park and Burgess introduced previous studies concerning crowds, different mass movements like Klondike Rush, The Woman's Temperance Crusade, The French Revolution, Bolshevism, and Methodism. Their focus was on social unrest, psychic epidemics, mass movements, revivals, crowds, sects, institutions, fashion, reforms, and revolutions all of which they included under the definition of collective behavior. Their definition for the concept is still valid:

Collective behavior, then, is the behavior of individuals under the influence of an impulse that is common and collective, an impulse, in other words, that is the result of social interaction.⁴

Park and Burgess' definition of collective behavior is profoundly interactionist and in this respect loans much from Simmel. However, Simmel's influence is implicit: although Park and Burgess include ten selections from Simmel in their book, none of them is in the chapter of collective behavior. His influence is more in the way they are thinking.

Park and Burgess do not actually define social movement but speak of mass movements (which they neither define). They include mass migrations, religious and reformatory

¹ Park & Burgess 1924.

² Neidhardt and Rucht 1991,422. Opposite to this, Turner and Killian see Park in a more positive way. They point that "he did not regard collective behavior as abnormal or undesirable." Turner & Killian 1987,6.

³ Park & Burgess, 1924,934. Italics in original.

⁴ Park & Burgess, 1924,865.

crusades, and revolutions. Thus their treatment of the concept is wide. However, although authors do not define social movements, their impact to social movement studies has been enormous. They laid the foundations on which others build.

HERBERT BLUMER, Park's pupil, is the next important scholar in this tradition. He was a refugee from Germany and the experience of fascism, together with industrialism and urbanisation, was the context of his thought. He was also a pupil of **Georg Herbert Mead** and was the first to connect interactionist ideas of social construction to social movements¹. In symbolic interactionism the world is seen as a symbolic order which is created when persons interact through the use of symbols². Thus the world that people see is not an objective reality but is combined of aspects that are relevant to them. From this basis Blumer criticised the previous studies in 1957:

A consciously directed and organized movement cannot be explained merely in terms of a psychological disposition or motivation of people, or in terms of a diffusion of an ideology. Explanations of this sort... overlook that fact that a *movement has to be constructed* and has to carve out a career in what is practically always an opposed, resistant, or at least indifferent world.³

However, Blumer's main contribution was to present a classification and taxonomy of the movements. Below I review one of his main articles where he represents his theory.

¹ Turner & Killian 1987,6. Neidhardt and Rucht 1991,423.

² Turner & Killian 1987,26.

³ Blumer 1957,147.

3.2. Blumer and Classifications

3.2.1. The Field of Collective Behavior¹

Herbert Blumer presented his ideas first as a part of Robert E. Park's edition *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology* in 1939². In the book part four deals with collective behavior. Although I am most interested in social movements, I think that it is important to focus on Blumer's general understanding of collective behavior because it creates the scientific background to all discussions of social movements in collective behavior tradition.

In the beginning Blumer links the concept of collective behavior to "such topics as crowds, mobs, panics, manias, dancing crazes, stampedes, mass behavior, public opinion, propaganda, fashion, fads, social movements, revolutions, and reforms." He notes that "while most of the collective behavior of human beings exists in the form of regulated group activity, there is a great deal which is not under the influence of rules and understandings." It is this part of behaviour that the field of collective behavior is interested. The relation to the general sociology³ is, according to Blumer, as follows:

sociology in general is interested in studying the social order and its constituents... as they are; collective behavior is concerned in studying the ways by which the social order comes into existence.⁴

Although Blumer

¹ Third stage titles used here are from Blumer.

² Here I review the same part of the revised edition of the book, this time edited by **Alfred M. Lee** and labelled as *Principles of Sociology* from 1953(1951).

³ Simmel's influence is seen in the need to define the task of sociology and the relation of collective behavior to it.

⁴ Blumer 1953,167ff.

3.2.2. Elementary Collective Behavior

Elementary collective behavior refers to those occasions where established ways of acting are disturbed. With this Blumer refers to mechanisms that

are elementary because they appear spontaneously and naturally, they are the simplest and earliest ways in which people interact in order to act together, and they usually lead to more advanced and complicated forms.¹

In this situation the mechanism of **circular reaction** occurs. "This refers to a type of interstimulation wherein the response of one individual reproduces the stimulation that has come from another individual and in being reflected back to this individual reinforces the stimulation." Blumer contrasts the circular reaction with conversation where responses are made through interpretation. This interpretation lacks from circular reaction. While conversation "tends, in degree, to make people different; circular reaction tends to make people alike."²

The background of collective behavior lies in restlessness of people which is a state where people cannot satisfy their impulses, desires, or dispositions by the existing forms of living. When "restlessness is involved in circular reaction, or becomes contagious," social unrest occurs. In this stage people are, according to Blumer, "likely to move around in an erratic and aimless way;" they have exited feelings "in the form of vague apprehensions, alarm, fears, insecurity, eagerness, or aroused pugnacity;" and they are "psychologically unstable, suffering from disturbed impulses and feelings." In this stage the "usual routines have broken down" and it

¹ Blumer 1953,174.

² Blumer 1953,170f.

is "the crucible out of which emerge new forms of organized activity."¹

The new formation the basic type behaviour is called **milling**.

In milling, individuals move around amongst one another in an aimless and random fashion, such as in the interweaving of cattle and sheep who are in a state of excitement... Their attention becomes increasingly focused on one another and less on objects and events which would ordinarily concern them. Being preoccupied with each other they are inclined to respond to one another quickly, directly, and unwittingly.²

The important aspect of milling is that it makes people, who normally might not recognise each other, sensitive to each other. The intense form of milling is **collective excitement** which gives rise to **social contagion**. This

refers to the relatively rapid, unwitting, and nonrational dissemination of a mood, impulse, or form of conduct; it is well exemplified by the spread of crazes, manias, and fads.³

These three types of behaviour, "milling, collective excitement, and social contagion, are present, in varying degrees, in all instances of spontaneous group behavior." In the case of social movements, these processes are more intense in the early periods when the movement is formed. However, they also exist in the latter periods when there are episodes of crowd action in the movement's life span.⁴

3.2.3. Elementary Collective Groupings

A typology of the elementary collective behavior was one of Blumer's major contribution to the field. From Le Bon Blumer adopted the concept of **crowd** and divided it into four types:

The first can be called a **casual** crowd, as in the instance of street crowd watching a performer in a store window. The casual

¹ Blumer 1953,171ff.

² Blumer 1953,174.

³ Blumer 1953,175f.

⁴ Blumer 1953,176f.

crowd usually has a momentary existence... it has a very loose organization and scarcely any unity.

A second type may be designated as the *conventionalized* crowd, such as the spectators at an exciting baseball game. Their behavior is essentially like that of casual crowds, except that it is expressed in established and regularized ways.

The third type of crowd is the *acting*, aggressive crowd, best represented by a revolutionary crowd or a lynching mob. The outstanding mark of this type of crowd is the presence of an aim or object toward which the activity of the crowd is directed.

The remaining type is the *expressive* or "dancing" crowd, such as is common in the origin of religious sects. Its distinguishing trait is that excitement is expressed in physical movement as a form of release instead of being directed toward some objective.¹

Blumer describes the formation of the crowd to contain the following stages:

First is the occurrence of some exciting event... this kind of experience... presses the individual on to action

This becomes clear in the second step - the beginning of the milling process... The most obvious effect of this milling is to disseminate a common mood, feeling, or emotional impulse.

Another important result may come from the milling process, and may be regarded as the third important step in the formation of the acting crowd. This step is the emerge of a common object of attention on which the impulses, feelings, and imagery of the people become focused.

The last step may be thought of as the stimulation and fostering of the impulse that correspond to the crowd objective, up to the point where the members are ready to act on them.²

According to Blumer, acting, or psychological crowd, is spontaneous, has no history, no heritage, no social organisation, no leadership, no norms, and no identity. It acts on the basis of aroused impulse. In this kind of crowd

individual loses ordinary critical understanding and self-control as he enters into rapport with other crowd members and becomes infused by the collective excitement which dominates them. He responds immediately and directly to the remarks and actions of others instead of interpreting these gestures, as he would do in ordinary conduct.³

The dominant mark of another major type of crowd, namely expressive crowd, is that "it is introverted. It has no goal or objective." The form of action is in physical excited movements like "laughing, weeping, shouting,

¹ Blumer 1953,178f. Italics without bolding in original.

² Blumer 1953,179f.

³ Blumer 1953,180.

leaping, and dancing." The typical feature in expressive crowd is that the action tends to become rhythmical.¹

A **mass** differs from a crowd in the sense that it is formed of individuals acting not together but alone at the same time. Typical examples are gold rushes in which each individual tries to reach the goal alone or with one's family. "It has no social organization, no body of custom and tradition." In this respect, a mass is a great deal like a crowd. The difference is that the mass does not mill or interact as the crowd does. In mass advertising the lack of contacts becomes evident: the appeal is addressed to the anonymous individual, not to any collectivity.²

A **public** is the third form of elementary collective grouping. It refers "to a group of people (a) who are confronted by an issue, (b) who are divided in their ideas as to how to meet the issue, and (c) who engage in discussion over the issue." Like the previous forms of collective behavior, also the public is "lacking in the characteristic features of the society." The typical feature of the public is that it is "marked by disagreement and hence by *discussion* as to what should be done." Blumer holds the view that public discussion is rational and marked with arguments and counter arguments. This argumentation is also the seedbed for **public opinion**. As a special case of communication Blumer mentions **propaganda**. Unlike public as a form of behaviour, propaganda is only one way communication. "It does not give fair consideration to opposing views." Its characteristic "is the effort to gain the acceptance of a

¹ Blumer 1953, 183ff.

² Blumer 1953, 185-189.

view not on the basis of the merits of that view but, instead, by appealing to the other motives."¹

3.2.4. Social Movements

Social movements are "collective enterprises to establish a new order of life." They arise from the social unrest

and derive their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme or system of living.²

Blumer classifies social movements into three types. First, there are **general social movements** that are much like cultural trends. They can be seen as ideas that occur here and there without any specific organisation. The main form is literature which has elements of protest and utopia. "Such a literature is of great importance in spreading a message or view... and so in implanting suggestions, awakening hopes, and arousing dissatisfactions." Also the 'leaders' of this kind of movements "are likely to be 'voices in the wilderness', pioneers without any solid following." A general social movement is dominated by the same mechanisms as mass behaviour.³

The other main type of movements is **specific social movement** which

can be regarded as the crystallization of much of the motivation of dissatisfaction, hope, and desire awakened by the general social movement and the focusing of this motivation on some specific objective.⁴

Thus this kind of movement has "well defined objective or goal which it seeks to reach." It develops an

¹ Blumer 1953,189-195.

² Blumer 1953,199.

³ Blumer 1953,199-202.

⁴ Blumer 1953,202.

organization and structure which makes it essentially a society. It also develops leadership and defined membership, division of labour, a body of traditions (values, philosophy and rules) and a general body of expectations. These do not exist from the beginning but are developed during the movement's career. Its behaviour, which is in the beginning loosely organised and impulsive, "tends to become organized, solidified, and persistent."¹

Since Weber's bureaucratisation theory and Michel's oligarghysation theory there has been different schemes dealing with the life career of a social movement. Blumer adopts the scheme of stages in social movements from **C.A.**

Dawson and **W.E. Getty**²:

In the first of these four stages people are restless, uneasy, and act in the random fashion that we have considered... in this stage the agitator is likely to play an important role. The stage of popular excitement is marked even more by milling, but it is not quite so random and aimless... In this stage the leader is likely to be a prophet or a reformer. In the stage of formalization the movement becomes more clearly organized with rules, policies, tactics, and discipline... Here the leader is likely to be in the nature of statesman. In the institutional stage, the movement has chrystallized into a fixed organization with a definite personnel and structure to carry into execution the purposes of the movement... Here the leader is likely to be an administrator.³

Blumer develops these stages further and elaborates the mechanisms how a movement grows and becomes organised.

First of these mechanisms is **agitation** which

plays its most significant role in the beginning and early stages of a movement... Agitation operates to arouse the people... in two kinds of situations. One is situation marked by abuse, unfair discrimination, and injustice, but a situation wherein people take this mode of life for granted and do not raise questions about it... The other situation is one wherein people are already aroused, restless, and discontented, but where they either are too timid to act or else do not know what to do.⁴

The first situation calls an agitator that is "capable of saying very caustic, incisive and biting things... his

¹ Blumer 1953,202.

² Dawson & Getty 1953.

³ Blumer 1953,203.

⁴ Blumer 1953,203f.

function is to make people aware of their own position." In the second situation an "excitable, restless, and aggressive individual" is needed whose "appearance and behavior foster the contagion of unrest and excitement." In general, Blumer notes, "that the tactics of agitation vary with the situation, the people, and the culture."¹

In Blumer's definition of the second mechanism is the development of ***esprit de corps***. It

might be thought of as the organizing of feelings on behalf of the movement. In itself, it is the sense which people have of belonging together and of being identified with one another in a common undertaking... In developing feelings of intimacy and closeness, people have the sense of sharing a common experience and of forming a select group... it serves to reinforce the new conception of himself that the individual has formed as a result of the movement and of his participation in it.²

According to Blumer *esprit de corps* is important to the social movements in three different ways. First, it creates the in-group-out-group relation. Second, it forms an informal fellowship which develops sympathy and solidarity. Third, mass meetings, rallies, parades, demonstrations, and ceremonies give to an individual participant an experience of being part of something big and important.³

However, *esprit de corps* is not enough for the evolution of a movement. Blumer distinguishes another necessary mental element that a movement must have in order to gain success, namely ***morale***:

Morale can be thought of as giving persistency and determination to a movement; its test is whether solidarity can be maintained in the face of adversity. In this sense, morale can be thought as a group will.⁴

Blumer distinguishes three elements in the morale.

¹ Blumer 1953,204f.

² Blumer 1953,205f.

³ Blumer 1953,206ff.

⁴ Blumer 1953,208.

First is a conviction of the rectitude of the purpose of the movement... A second conviction closely identified with these beliefs is a faith in the ultimate attainment, by the movement, of its goals... Finally, as part of this complex of convictions, there is the belief that the movement is charged with a sacred mission.¹

When a movement gets features of a sect it creates a saint cult around its leaders, heroes and martyrs. Similarly it creates its creed, sacred literature and myths. These are combined in movement's **ideology** which Blumer defines as follows: "The ideology of a movement consists of a body of doctrine, beliefs, and myths." It has a twofold character:

In the first place, much of it is erudite and scholarly. This is the form which is developed by the intellectuals of the movement... another... popular character... seeks to appeal to the undereducated and to the masses."²

Blumer further divides specific social movements into **reform** and **revolutionary movements**. "A reform movement seeks to change some specific phase or limited area of the existing social order... A revolutionary movement... seeks to reconstruct the entire social order." From these goals also arise the different attitudes toward society and vice versa - society's attitude to movements. Reform movement adopts the basic values of the society and thus it has respectability. Revolutionary movement, on the other hand rejects the values of the society and thus it is often blocked from existing institutions and often illegal. This leads different types of movements to adopt different general procedures and tactics. A reform movement appeal to public opinion but a revolutionary movement tries to make converts.³

A third major type of movements is an **expressive movement**. It does not seek change in the society but the

¹ Blumer 1953,208f.

² Blumer 1953,210.

³ Blumer 1953,211-214.

tension and unrest is released in some type of expressive behaviour. Blumer notes two kinds of these movements, namely **religious movements** and **fashion movements**. He states that religious movements have the features of the dancing crowd. There is "a feeling of intense intimacy and *espirts de corps*." There are also feelings of exaltation, ecstasy and projection of the collective feelings on outside objects. Further, when these feelings become chrystallised, they form the creed and the ritual of the sect. When the sect is attacked it has to elaborate its greed and thus develops its own theology. Finally, a sect has a belief that it "consists of a select group of sacred" and that it has to convert the others.¹

Fashion can be "found in manners, the arts, literature, and philosophy, and may even reach into certain areas of science." Blumer differentiates fashion from custom which is static while fashion behaves as a movement. According to him, "fashion is based fundamentally on differentiation and emulation." It is the process where the elite class distincts itself with some marks and the lower classes follow the example. After that the elite have to invent new ways to distinct themselves. Fashion does not follow the mechanisms of other movements and it also differs in that it does not develop to be a society. There is no we-feeling in same sense as in other movements.²

Blumer's conclusion links collective behavior to social order. For him, social order consists, among others, at the following elements:

First, a body of common expectations, upon the basis of which people are able to co-operate and regulate their activities to one another.

Second, a set of values which are attached to these expectations and which determine how important they are

Third, the conceptions which people have of themselves in relation to one another and to their groups.

¹ Blumer 1953,214f.

² Blumer 1953,216f.

Fourth, a common subjective orientation in the form of dispositions and moods.

In general, we can say that movements centering around the mechanisms of the public give rise to the political phase of the social order; those using primarily the mechanisms of the crowd and of rapport give rise to a moral order and a sacred order; and those, like fashion, which stress the mechanisms of the mass, yield subjective orientations in the form of common tastes and inclinations.¹

3.2.5. Reflections on Blumer's Theories

The importance of Blumer as a social movement theorist lies in several aspects. First, he pioneered in linking crowd behaviour phenomena to general sociology. Although he depended heavily on Le Bon's concept of crowd, he saw it as a first stage in the process where new social order emerges. Second, he elaborated categorisations that have had their impact on later research: either they have been accepted or they have been the target for criticism. In both cases, Blumer's categorisations have lived in the minds of later scholars. Third, he on one hand distinguishes social movements as a more institutionalised form of collective behavior. On the other hand, he shows how the crowd mechanisms also work in social movement episodes. Fourth, his concept of general movement links sociology to history of ideas and explains how the ideas function in society. This aspect of his work has, unfortunately, been forgotten in the latter research.

In Blumer's work can be seen his interactionist background and Park's emphasis on Simmel's sociology. For him, the basis of society lies in human action and especially in human interaction. As a result, this focused his attention on micro and meso levels of phenomena. Scholars from other traditions certainly do not accept this but (also) emphasise macro level forces. There are some details where, I think, Blumer has gone astray.

¹ Blumer 1953, 221.

First, he sees public quite idealistically as rational. His public seems more like readers of academic journals than consumers of yellow press. Here he evidently follows his teacher Park. Second, he links all religious movements unproblematically with sects and expressive movements. There is certainly much more variety among religious movements. Even in Blumer's time social gospel, muscular Christianity, ecumenical movement and missionary movement were quite far from the model of expressive movement but were definitely religious movements. Third, although he recognised that the tactics of different movements vary according to the culture, he did not use this notion in his typology. Actually many of the types he mentions can be seen as variations in strategy and tactics and not as categories *per se*. However, Blumer's work is one of the major hallmarks in the study of collective behavior.

Blumer's definition of social movements is wide. He includes big cultural trends, reform movements, revolutions, religious groups and even fashions in the concept. In this his concept resembles Park and Burgess' concept of mass movements. The focus is on the emergence of the new social structures not on exact political activity. Thus it is not only the political movements that create new social structures but new structures can emerge from any of the forms listed above. Basically there lies behind Simmel's idea that structures in large groups are chrySTALLISATIONS of small group interaction.

In the case of INGOs, Blumer's theory means that one has to focus on the processes of the movement formation. In different stages of a movement different mechanisms and leadership forms are activated. Especially important are his notions on *esprit de corps*, morale and ideology. They all emphasise that a movement is not only constituted of its structures or opportunities but the internal

mechanisms are the clues that bind a movement together. *Espirit de corps* calls for the studies how emotions are aroused in the movements. Typical methods to do this in international conferences are excursions, parties, cultural happenings, services, emotional speeches, etc. Blumer's note on morale focuses the attention to questions of commitment. How people become and remain committed to the cause? Finally, the stress on ideology reminds that there also is an immaterial level of interaction. People have a personal relationship to the cause of the movement. Sometimes this relationship can be even stronger than relationship between people in the movement. Ideology often gives words to followers: 'That is how I also think.'

Later Blumer made an important addition to his theory. He made a notion that a grievance should be determined as a grievance before action can happen. In 1971 he wrote:

Social problems are not the result of an intrinsic malfunctioning of a society but are the result of a process of definition in which a given condition is picked out and identified as a social problem.¹

As long as something is seen natural, it is not a cause for a protest. Later, the interactionist string of collective behavior was further developed by **Ralph Turner** and **Lewis Killian** in 1957². Their book **Collective Behavior** is one of the other major hallmarks of the theory of social movements. However, it is also an 'other-side-of-the-coin' theory of sociology. The title of this work - "The subject matter of sociology, simply stated, is the human group" - is a quotation of the first sentence of the first chapter in their book. It continues as follows:

Scientific analysis is made possible by the existence of certain regularities in group life... Just as evident as the regular, predictable phases of man's social behavior are instances in which change rather than stability, uncertainty rather than

¹ Blumer 1971,301.

² Turner & Killian 1959(1957). Killian 1964.

predictability, disorganization rather than stable structure, are characteristic.¹

Turner and Killian's work focuses on the processes in which the structures emerge. Thus, their sociology does not start from the structure and its functions but from interaction between different human beings and their different needs. Thus it can take into account also different outcomes and explain why there are different structures rather than one structure that explains all the aspects of society.

3.3. Turner and Killian's Emergent Norm

Turner and Killian's book can be described as a commented anthology. They build their work on excerpts from those previous works that they regard important. Thus it is both a review and a summary of the field in 1950s. Much of their empirical material is based on Killian's (and his colleagues') experiences of disaster situations. Part one of their book is labelled as "The Nature and Emerge of Collective Behavior." In part two Turner and Killian deal the phenomena of crowd and in part three the diffuse collectivities. However, those phenomena interest me in this study not *per se* but as explanations of social movements. Because Turner and Killian give the theory already in the part one, I skip the parts two and three and concentrate on part four as which is labelled as "The Social Movement."

¹ Turner & Killian 1959,3.

3.3.1. The Nature and Emergence of Collective Behavior

THE FIELD OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR is the first topic of Turner and Killian. After a short review of the emergence of the field they define collective behavior:

Collective behavior is the study of behavior in collectivities... Institutional behaviour characterizes groups which are envisaged in and guided by culture of the larger society... Collective behavior, on the other hand, develops norms which are not envisaged in the larger society and may even oppose these broader norms.¹

From this definition the writers move to deal with the topics that at the time were discussed in the field, namely group mind, irrationality and emotionality, and tension. The **group mind** issue had dealt with the question "whether the group is something other than the sum of individual responses." Turner and Killian point out that group activity describes both many individuals acting together and totality in action. One of the problems of totality in action is that it is often explained with analogies derived from individual behaviour. In groups there is also the phenomenon of different roles. The other question related to group action is whether individuals in a group act differently from acting alone. Turner and Killian point out that "persons seldom have any clear-cut attitude on any given matter" and that in the literature the extreme claims are seldom found. For them the group mind is basically a question of collective decision making. People are aware of each other's attitudes and this affects their behaviour.²

Another theme of the previous studies had been the question of **irrationality** and **emotionality**. Turner and Killian criticise the observers' tendency to single out only those phenomena that (s)he disapproves and labels them with value-laden terms. With the definitions used to

¹ Turner & Killian 1959, 39f.

² Turner and Killian 1959, 14ff

describe crowd behaviour, much of the institutional behaviour is emotional and irrational. They also point out that in everyday usage irrationality is often linked to nonconformal behaviour: it is 'irrational' to violate the norms of the society. However, they remind that their definition of collective behavior deals just with those occasions wherein the old norms cease to influence or they do not exist at all. "To refer to this behavior as irrational or emotional is either fallacious or a tautology."¹

On the other hand, they also describe individual reactions in disaster situations. People may feel shock reactions, they may restrict their attention to some task without remembering anything of it later, they may have different fear reactions, they have role conflicts, they seek for security or they may redefine the situation. Many of these forms of behaviour are irrational in the sense that there is no rational calculation before action. Often there is simply no time for calculation. It seems that in these cases Cassirer's 'action first - explanation afterwards' - model would explain the behaviour. Additionally, if we think that many of these types of behaviour emerge at the same time, there surely are situations where a group of people acts irrationally. However, authors also note that if some individuals remain relatively calm, "their decisive action may, in turn, reduce the uncertainty of the situation."¹

The third theme to which Turner and Killian refer is the **tension theory**. This theory also grows from the metaphor of an individual. It states that behaviour results from tension which in turn results from unsatisfied needs. The action gives satisfaction and resolves the tension.

¹ Turner and Killian 1959,16f.

However, Turner and Killian point out that there are other mechanisms than satisfaction which reduce tension, as well too. People can forget, calm down when they see the results of their anger, etc. They do not remain in the state of tension even if they are not satisfied. They do not reject the importance of catharsis but they doubt if it can be generalised to all situations.²

Turner and Killian also state that "collective behavior arises out of a complex societal roots and not of a single condition. Especially they underline that "division of labour, the normative order, and communication are interdependent and interacting features of social organisation. Changes in one are likely to be accompanied by changes in the others." However, Turner and Killian note that social changes are not autonomous but "products of the interaction of individuals." They stand clearly for the individual actor pro social structure, which explains why their analysis remains in micro and meso level.³

SOCIETAL CONDITIONS also influence to collective behavior. Turner and Killian state that there are three

certain salient features which are relevant to the emergence of collective behavior. Every group is characterised by some sort of division of labor... Out of this division of labor arises a structure of interdependent roles...

A second, essential basis for group cohesion is a normative order, or consensus as to the behavior that is expected of the group members by each other...

Both social organization and the normative order, and hence the very existence of the group as a social system, depend upon communication.⁴

They further point out that there must remain some kind of "we"-feeling in order to keep the communication process on. Without communication, there is no collective action.

¹ Turner and Killian 1959,57.

² Turner and Killian 1959,17f.

³ Turner and Killian 1959,16f.

⁴ Turner & Killian 1959,20f.

Social organisation does not fade away in collective behavior but

Just as routine social behavior may be explained on the basis of these characteristics of social organization, collective behavior must be viewed as arising from changes in them.¹

The issues that create the potential for the change are a break of informal organisation structures², value conflicts in society³, social change and frustration⁴, and inadequacy of communication⁵.

Authors sum their thesis as follows:

collective behavior arises out of a complex of societal roots and not from a single condition... Human social organization, with its norms, its structure, and its web of communication, provides an indispensable framework for the social behavior of the individual. Within this framework he is able to build up his own actions in terms of what he can expect of other people and what he assumes they expect of him. Changes in the salient features of the social matrix of behavior create for him an "unstructured" or critical situation in which action becomes more problematic than usual. Hence the nature of individual reactions to such situations must be taken into account in understanding how collective behavior develops.⁶

INDIVIDUAL REACTIONS TO CRISES are important to Turner and Killian. They stress the actor's importance in sociological theory. They state that

Social change should not be regarded as autonomous, however, but as the products of interaction of individuals. Culture does not "change itself" in an impersonal, automatic fashion... Social adjustment is the product of the interaction of numerous individual responses.⁷

There are different ways in which different people react in crisis situations. First, there are defence reactions that include shock reaction and sensation of disability. Second, there is restriction of attention, which means that an individual sees, for example, only that his/her

¹ Turner & Killian 1959,21.

² Turner & Killian 1959,24.

³ Turner & Killian 1959,28.

⁴ Turner & Killian 1959,31.

⁵ Turner & Killian 1959,36f.

⁶ Turner & Killian 1959,39.

⁷ Turner & Killian 1959,40.

family is in danger and does not care for his/hers personal security. Third, there are different fear reactions ranging from physiological or emotional states to overt behaviour like screaming or running wildly. Fourth, there are efforts to redefine the situation ranging from new interpretations to "going to see what happened". Fifth, behaviour is related to role conflicts. The most important choice is between love and duty. A worry on a member of the family and the possession in the society may cause a conflict whether to seek and help their beloved ones or take care of their duties and help the whole community. Most of the people resolve this dilemma for the favour of the family and leave their occupational responsibilities as secondary. This, of course, is one major source of disorganisation in disaster situations. Sixth type of behaviour is the search for security in extreme situations. In these unstructured situations the individual is susceptible to suggestions from others¹. However, there are differences between individuals and what is an unstructured situation for one may be well structured for another.²

SOCIAL CONTAGION refers to "the apparent lack of differentiation in the behavior of the individual actors." Turner and Killian state that this is because the crowd behaviour is built up by process of milling which they define as

a search for socially sanctioned meaning in a relatively unstructured situation. It is not sufficient, however, that the situation simply be unstructured for milling to begin. The situation must also have importance so that the members of the collectivity are motivated to act or, at least, to understand the situation.³

¹ Here the authors refer to the famous autokinetic study of Sherif and Harvey where they viewed a pinpoint of light in a dark room and when one said that it moved, also the others begun to believe that it actually moved.

² Turner & Killian 1959, 40-57.

³ Turner & Killian 1959, 59.

In its simplest form milling can happen with a minimal physical or verbal activity. People just 'read' the body language of each other and interpret their attitudes unconsciously. Turner and Killian call this **incipient milling**. In its more complex forms milling is a process either in face-to-face situations or via communication devices and mass media. Milling is essentially a communication process. One special form of milling is rumour. In the milling process there are two contingent processes. First is the development of a common mood. Here emotions play a crucial role. Second, there is a development of a common image of the situation which aims to cognitive clarity of the situation. Different preconditions of milling give rise to two types of crowds. **Emergent crowds** emerge slowly during a long period of time when

(1) there is a minimum of pre-existing group feelings and channels of communication in the collectivity; (2) a strong sense of urgency is not initially present; and (3) the course of action developing in the crowd depends upon a division of labor and coordination between the actions of the crowd members.¹

The other form of a crowd is **precipitous crowd** and the milling process for it happens when

(1) there exists a high degree of presensitization and established channels of communication in the collectivity; (2) the implications of the incident seem obvious and are perceived as demanding immediate action; and (3) the course of action that seems appropriate is simple and requires little coordination.²

Thus Turner and Killian disagree with Blumer's understanding of milling. For Blumer it is mere irrational action the importance of which is that people become aware of each other. For Turner and Killian it is a process of creating common interpretation of the situation.

¹ Turner & Killian 1959, 58-64.

² Turner & Killian 1959, 64.

3.3.2. The Social Movement

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS lie in the borderline of organised group behaviour and individual behaviour. They have "a considerable degree of organization, the emergence of rules and tradition, and stability and continuity in time." In social movement crowd behaviour can be used as effective tactics to strengthen the esprit de corps but it "is a phase of the movement rather than the whole of it." Turner and Killian define social movement as follows:

A social movement is a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part.

As a collectivity, a movement is a group with indefinite and shifting membership, with leadership whose position is determined more by informal response of the members than by formal procedures for legitimizing authority.¹

Authors exclude mass movements, fan-clubs and cults and call them quasi-movements². Mass movements, like mass migrations and gold rushes remain as individual activity. Fan-clubs attach to some "hero himself rather than to any cause he represents." And although a cult has continuity it "makes demands only to the behavior of its members."³

When explaining life cycles of social movements, Turner and Killian state that they form a framework for organising different aspects of a movement together. They rely on **Rex D. Hopper's** article ***The Revolutionary Process***⁴. According to Hopper there are four stages which require different kinds of processes and leadership. I have collected Hopper's text into the following table:

¹ Turner & Killian 1959,308; 1987,223.

² Later, in their third edition they admitted that the exclusion is not total because some self-help and religious groups have themes of social betterment through personal transformation. Turner & Killian 1987,225.

³ Turner & Killian 1959,308f.

⁴ Hopper 1959(1950),310-326. Italics and capitals without bolding in original.

	1. THE PRELIMINARY STAGE OF MASS (INDIVIDUAL) EXCITEMENT AND UNREST	2. THE POPULAR STAGE OF CROWD (COLLECTIVE) EXCITEMENT AND UNREST	3. THE FORMAL STAGE OF THE FORMULATION OF ISSUES AND FORMATION OF PUBLICS	4. THE INSTITUTIONAL STAGE OF LEGALIZATION AND SOCIETAL ORGANIZATION
Characteristic conditions	1. General restlessness 2. The development of class antagonism 3. Marked governmental inefficiency 4. Reform efforts on the part of government 5. Cultural drift in the direction of revolutionary change 6. Spread and socialisation of restlessness	1. The spread of discontent 2. The transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals 3. The fabrication of the social myth 4. The emerge of the conflict with the out-group and the resultant increase in i-group consciousness 5. The organization of the discontent 6. The presentation of the revolutionary demands	1. The fixation of motives (attitudes) and the definite formulation of aims (values) 2. The development of organizational structure with leaders, a program, doctrines, and traditions	1. Causal characteristics: A. Undermining the emotional foundations of the revolution B. Return to old habits C. Economic distress 2. Resultant characteristics: A. End of Reign of Terror B. Increase of central government C. Social reconstruction D. Dilution of the revolutionary ideal E. Re-accommodation of church and state F. "Reaction to reaction" G. Institutionalization
Typical processes	Milling	Intensification of milling, social contagion and collective excitement	Discussion in public	Legalization and formalization
Effective mechanisms	Agitation, imitation, propaganda, et cetera	Agitation, imitation, suggestion, propaganda, formation of esprit de corps and the "social" or "revolutionary myth"	Development of group morale and ideology	Intensification of ideology formation and perfection of tactics
Types of leaders	Agitator	Prophet and reformer	Statesmen	Administrator-executive
Dominant social form	Psychological mass	Crowd	Public	Society

However, these stages should not be seen in the same manner as with living organisms that they determine the career of a movement. Rather, the stages should be seen as "preconditions for the development of the following stage. Without the preceding stage, any particular stage cannot come about."¹

¹ Turner & Killian 1959, 319.

A related issue to life cycle is the success of the movement. The institutionalisation is not the only way to measure the movement's success. Sometimes a movement ceases to exist because its goals have been adopted by the society and there is not anymore any reason to campaign. Sometimes it can gain power but lose its 'soul', i.e., it becomes part of the old system. Sometimes it does not have definite ideology but it seeks only to have power. Further, there is measure that sees the adherency base as a criterion. The importance of the different measures "depend upon the perspective of the observer."¹

From life cycle and success of movements Turner and Killian turn to different classifications. They quote **Louis Wirth's** article ***Types of Minority Movements***², where Wirth classifies movements pluralistic, assimilationist, secessionist and militant. He defines their characteristics as follows:

A pluralistic minority is one which seeks toleration for its differences on the part of dominant group... on the other hand... Above all it wishes to maintain its cultural identity... the assimilationist minority works toward complete acceptance by the dominant group and merger with the larger society... The secessionist minority represents a third distinct type... The principal and ultimate objective of such a minority is to achieve political as well as cultural independence from the dominant group... The militant minority has set domination over others as its goal.³

Turner and Killian state that the same movement "may fall into different types at different times. The type refers to the current characteristics of the movement rather than to any immutable characteristics." They also point out that the principle in Wirth's system is to look at the relationship of groups with their environment, and that these categories refer to ideal types. Now the authors remind that the different understandings of

¹ Turner & Killian 1959,320.

² Wirth 1959(1945)

³ Turner & Killian 1959,321-326.

success also influence the type of the movement. From this basis they classify the movements to **value-oriented**, **power-oriented** and **participation-oriented movements**.¹

Further Turner and Killian give one classification more that crosscuts the previous categorisations. The categorisations are presented in the following table²:

Public Definition	Type of Opposition	Means of Action
(1) Respectable-nonfactional	Disinterest and token support	Legitimate means
(2) Respectable-factional	Competing movements advocating same general objective	Legitimate means
(3) Peculiar	Ridicule and ostracism	Limited access to legitimate means
(4) Revolutionary	Violent suppression	Chiefly illegitimate means

VALUE ORIENTATIONS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS influence social movements' emergence and behaviour. Although the following types do not exist as pure but all movements are some kind of combinations of these types. Turner and Killian call movements whose publicly-understood program determines their course as **value-oriented movements**. The other types are **power-oriented movements**, **separatist movements** and **participation-oriented movements**. In value-oriented movements "the ideology and program are linked together in their espousal of certain changes in the values of the society." Authors see the ideology as a justification of **manifest program**. Ideology includes "interpretation of the historical processes that have led to the current state of affairs," extends it "into the prediction for the future" and "includes a re-evaluation of the worth of population segments." They also stress that "the vital element in the ideology and program is a sense of value, a feeling for a

¹ Turner & Killian 1959, 326f.

² Turner & Killian 1959, 328f.

certain direction of change."¹ These movements can further be divided to movements of **societal manipulation** vs. **personal transformation**. Turner and Killian suggest that the emergence of personal transformation movement requires three conditions:

First, there must be a world-view prevalent in the society that incorporates a basis for believing that widespread self-improvement is possible.

Second, the conception of the universe must be such as to lead people to assume that the state of the social order will reflect the integrity and character of individual men.

Third, the circumstances giving rise to the movement must be such that the people can take some responsibility upon themselves for their present unsatisfactory condition.²

The third criterion explains why labour movement and feminist movements did not become personal transformation movements: the members did not regard themselves to be guilty for their depressed situations. In general, these movements do not get their adherence basis from depressed groups because "these movements are not so much associated with serious deprivation as with loss of a sense of personal purpose and worth in life." However, these movements may also change society drastically when they have gained power in society. "Most Christian codes, for example, have been translated into laws imposed upon the general populace at one time or another."³

POWER-ORIENTED MOVEMENT is the second type of movements. These movements are "devoted to dominating the larger group or society ... while leaving its value objectives flexible or undefined." There are some subtypes like **control movement**, **counter-movement** and **separatist movement**. The last two are characterised by a relationship with another movement or group and are complementary.

¹ Authors refer also to **Karl Mannheim's** subdivision of ideas to ideology and utopia that ideology is conservative in its implications while utopia is unrealistic and fantastic. Turner & Killian 1959, 331f.

² Turner & Killian 1959, 331-334, 352.

³ Turner & Killian 1959, 333f.

Counter-movement's "principal objective is to oppose and defeat another movement¹" while separatist movement tries to reduce or eliminate "the power of the dominant group by achieving some degree of separation." Control movements are normally highly centralised and this is accentuated in elitist groups without mass support like military *coup d'etats*. If the movement is based on mass support, for the succession, "there must be some weakness in the established power" and "the masses must lack effective organization through which to determine and register their interests in a continuous manner." Even when based on mass support, control movements' success is based on "the support they receive from one or more of the established elite groups."²

SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS' activities, on the other hand, "are devoted to the maintenance or attainment of its separate identity as a group... thus any distinctive ideology tends to be subservient to the strategic concerns of becoming an independent group³." There are several reasons for the emergence of this kind of movements. First, there may be a threat of a bigger movement absorbing the smaller. Second, there are **splinter movements** from **parent bodies**, like **sects** and **nativistic movements**. For the splinter there are several reasons like undervalued status of some group or ideological differences. Usually "most separatist movements begin as reform or control movements." The way in which the society sees the movement affects the degree of separation:

A *segmental* movement, one whose members continue normal social participation in most respects, is more likely to continue to be regarded as harmless than a *totalital* movement which governs the entire lives of its members. At the same time the *totalital*

¹ This affects to movement so much that Turner and Killian state: "The most important determinant of changes in the ideology of a counter-movement is the increasing success or failure of the initial movement." Turner & Killian 1959,383.

² Turner & Killian 1959,361ff.

³ Turner & Killian 1959,385.

movement almost necessarily requires physical separation from other people if it is to carry on successfully.¹

As I mentioned before, Turner and Killian remind that there seldom are purely one type movements: "Within any movement there is likely to be a fairly continuous struggle between value-orientations and power-orientations." Many power-oriented movements have originally been value-oriented movements which have gone through transformation. There are three major ways in which this change may happen:

First, a strong belief in the unlimited worth of a movement's objectives tends to provoke the attitude that any means are justified by the ends to be gained... Such an attitude makes the members and leaders impatient with value-toned discussions of what methods are proper and what are not.

Second, a movement may be taken over or subverted to power considerations by outsiders who see its potential usefulness to themselves.

Third, certain kinds of opposition so narrow the range of tactics available to a movement that it has no alternative other than to adopt effective means irrespective of their immediate consonance with the values of the movement.²

PARTICIPATION-ORIENTED MOVEMENT is the fourth type of movement. In it the "major characteristics... center around the satisfaction that members gain from *the mere fact of participation* in the movement itself." There are three subtypes. ***Passive reform movements*** "occupy themselves with preparing for the state of societal reform that is to come without their active intervention." Typical examples of these are millenarian and messianic movements. ***Personal status movements*** "promise their members the benefits of greater success or recognition within the society or afford them a basis for reinterpreting their own position in the larger society." These kinds of movements are found among minority, religious, political, aesthetic, and intellectual groups "which remain out of touch with practical considerations

¹ Turner & Killian 1959, 385-406. Italics in original.

² Turner & Killian 1959, 372f.

of implementing their schemes." **Limited personal movements** compensate "for the frustrations of conventional life without replacing that life." Secret societies, like free-masons, belong to this category.¹

Again Turner and Killian remind that the types of movements are mixed in real life. They remind that

in some movements the concern of reform is carried by but a small segment of the membership, while a large membership is moderately indifferent to value orientation... Hence a movement whose impact on society is that of a value-oriented movement may be actually a small reform movement saddled onto and making use of a large participation-oriented movement.²

PARTICIPATION-ORIENTATIONS refer to factors that lead individuals to join in a social movement. Turner and Killian point out that activity in a movement is a choice between the movement and other kind of activities. "Thus the gratifications of movement participation must outweigh the gratifications available to the individual from more conventional activities." All activities have some respond consequences from individual's associates. "In this connection the classification of movement according to respectability is important." Authors point out that close conventional bonds are obstacles in joining a movement that is not entirely acceptable and that

participation in a social movement is more likely to provide the personal gratifications of group membership otherwise lacking in the lives of those who are relatively isolated.¹

From many speculations of **participation-proneness** Turner and Killian pick five characteristics that facilitate the participation. First, "imperviousness to certain kinds of social isolation may be necessary." In the modest form this isolation means that individual's fellows cannot any more tell jokes of certain parties or movements and their leaders if (s)he is present. Second, "something of a

¹ Turner & Killian 1959, 409-430.

² Turner & Killian 1959, 431.

desire for martyrdom often seems to be a component of movement participation... In a less active form, rank and file members often pride themselves in belonging to a despised minority." Third, "authoritarian types are to be found among the adherents of almost any movement with a program of societal reform. These are people who are dissatisfied unless they can impose their will on others²." Fourth, there is "the sense of personal inadequacy that drives some people to identify themselves with movement that is symbolized as strong and uncompromising³." Finally, there "is a tendency to see issues in simple 'black and white' terms. These different types of members influence both to the course of the movement and to the interaction of its members and "the techniques that can be effectively employed by the movement will be related to membership composition."⁴

Although the motives of members are important, they alone are not enough as Turner and Killian state:

Whatever the motives of its members, a social movement must weld them into a group with a strong in-group sense and enthusiasm for the "fellowship" or "comradeship" of the movement, and give them determination to continue in the face of obstacles.

It is in the development of *esprit de corps*⁵ more than anywhere else that the mechanisms of crowd behavior come into play in the social movement. A social movement with a strong *esprit de corps* is in some sense a diffuse crowd, in which enthusiasm has become contagious.⁶

THE FOLLOWING AND LEADERSHIP are closely connected. The following is a term with which Turner and Killian turn the question of leadership upside down. Their "interest is not so much with leadership in general as it is with leadership as an aspect of social movements." They

¹ Turner & Killian 1959,432.

² Here the authors refer to the work of **Theodore Adorno &al.** Adorno 1959(1950).

³ Here the authors refer to the work of **Erich Fromm.** Fromm 1959(1941).

⁴ Turner & Killian 1959,440f.

⁵ Here the authors refer to the work of Blumer. Blumer 1959(1953).

⁶ Turner & Killian 1959,442. Italics in original.

determine the term following as follows: "The *following* is a collectivity made up of persons interacting in some measure to express their admiration of some public figure." Turner and Killian start from the concept of ***fans*** and they claim that "many of the characteristics of followings about political leaders or leaders even of scientific thought are basically like those of the fan clubs or movie stars." There are six features that characterise the following:

- (1) The followers develop a definite group sense, communicate extensively among themselves, and develop symbols and norms whereby the in-group can be distinguished from the outgroup.
- (2) The followers develop a prestige hierarchy among themselves based upon proximity to the leader and recognition extended by him.
- (3) Members of a following invariably define their relations to other followings as opposition and rivalry.
- (4) The members of a following preoccupy themselves with accumulating every conceivable item of information about their hero, preoccupying themselves with identifying and interpreting the hero's opinions on various subjects.
- (5) The followers identify with the leader, so that they gloat in his successes and suffer personally under his setbacks.
- (6) To the followers, the prestige of their leader translates the commonplace into the profound and resolves uncertainties by providing a position that they can adopt.¹

Turner and Killian deal closer to the charismatic movement and its characteristics. They note that "the personal following of the charismatic leader provides a highly flexible body of adherents who will give enthusiastic support without questioning unexplained changes or ideological inconsistencies in the movement program." In charismatic movements there are basically two kinds of leaders: those of ***symbol*** and of ***decision-maker***. "The leader as a symbol is one whose own activities are of less significance to the course of the movement than the image of him that the members hold." The symbol (s)he represents "is partly a product of his own personal characteristics, partly a creation of the promoters of the movement, and largely a projection by the followers." On the other hand, "the leader as decision-maker is one who actually helps to

determine the course of the movement by his own preferences and activities." Authors state that "there is usually a somewhat continuous conflict between those leaders who are more value-oriented and those more concerned with the power and organization of the movement itself."²

END-PRODUCTS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS occur in some time of movement's history. "The social movement is by definition dynamic. When it loses this characteristic it ceases to be a social movement and either disappears or becomes a different social form." Turner and Killian mention four forms to which a movement can transform. First, "a movement is institutionalized when it has reached a high degree of stability internally and been accorded a recognized position within the larger society."³ Typical example is how a sect become either denomination or church. However, a movement may also "become institutionalized without surviving as an independent organization⁴." This happens when a movement finds its place in an existing organisation. Second, a movement may decline in spite of the leaders and functionaries interest to maintain it⁵. Third, before a value-oriented movement reaches institutionalisation or decline, the movement conservatises its values and accepts to a greater extent the values of the wider society⁶. Fourth, the movement may lead to revolution⁷ which "must be examined as a shift in power." New rulers must establish new order and stabilise it.

¹ Turner & Killian 1959, 455ff.

² Turner & Killian 1959, 463-466, 472f.

³ Turner & Killian 1957, 480.

⁴ Turner & Killian 1957, 491.

⁵ Turner & Killian 1957, 492f.

⁶ Turner & Killian 1957, 501-505.

⁷ Turner & Killian 1957, 502ff.

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND SOCIAL STABILITY

are all parts of the same process. In their last chapter, Turner and Killian sum and evaluate their work. They state that

Viewpoints differ initially concerning whether collective behavior has any real effect on the course of events or whether it is merely the impotent shadow of events that are taking place or already past.¹

If the change is seen as a consequence of historical causes then collective behavior is seen as "a sort of collective mental illness which impedes the organized processes of the society." The other extreme is "the assumption that social change originates in collective behavior."²

Turner and Killian summarise the relation of collective behavior to change as follows:

- (1) A certain amount of isolated and sporadic collective behavior characterizes the most stable society and has no important implications for change. It is simply a response to events which fall outside the limits with which the established order and culture are prepared to cope.
- (2) Widespread collective behavior over a period of time is probably not a sufficient condition to bring about social and cultural change, though it probably always makes the social order more susceptible to change when the necessary ideas and values can be supplied.
- (3) Widespread collective behavior becomes the major vehicle of change when contact between diverse cultures or developments within the culture supply novel values about which collective behavior can become focused.
- (4) Collective behavior then becomes the medium through which tentative directions of change are tested until one major direction prevails.
- (5) Thus collective behavior is an integral part of the process of social and cultural change. It appears probable that broad potential directions of change are predetermined in the very developments of culture and society... But it is also plausible that details of change and selection among limited alternatives may actually be determined in the collective behavior processes, within a range of broadly predetermined directions.³

The other side of the coin in change is stability. Turner and Killian note that "what are the new ideas of

¹ Turner & Killian 1957, 516.

² Turner & Killian 1957, 516.

³ Turner & Killian 1957, 526.

one period become the conservative values in a stable era that follows." Thus preservation and transformation are both essential parts of collective behavior. "In a stable social order, social movements tend to be absorbed into established institutions, to become institutionalized themselves... or to disappear." They may serve as some kind of 'safety valves', "releasing accumulated tensions, letting people express their discontents so as to get them out of their systems." However, they are not moments for catharsis but "rather a process of testing the group's commitment to their value system by discovering what it is like to have them attacked." In these kinds of situations "the actors discover where their profounder identification lies."¹

Thus, in summary, collective behavior has a place both in change and in stability. In stability it helps to maintain a certain fluidity which resists tendencies toward total inflexibility in the social structure. And it helps to maintain some of the vitality and vigor and religious devotion to values that characterize periods of change. While institutional behavior is associated with man's submission to essential routines, collective behavior is associated with his ideals. The institutionalization of collective behavior helps to weld these two aspects of life together.²

3.3.3. Evaluation of Turner and Killian's Theory

Turner and Killian's work has been one of the main contribution of the interactionist sociology in the field of social movement studies. When one reads the latter critics on collective behavior approach one should keep in mind that their theory is based on interactionist thinking that was much based on Simmel's sociology. Much of the critics is actually a debate of actor oriented vs. structure oriented research. The authors' statement that "culture does not 'change itself'... Individuals change

¹ Turner & Killian 1957, 527ff.

² Turner & Killian 1957, 529.

culture¹" tells precisely what is their frame of reference. It is Simmelian understanding that structures are basically stabilised forms of individual interaction.

Turner and Killian try to explain human behaviour in all kinds of non-formal collectivities. Social movements were seen as a bridge between informal behavior and institutional behavior. This notion constituted the place of social movements from this on. Although authors also point out that the line between formal and informal behaviour is often a line drawn in the water, the distinction between collective behavior and institutions has remained influential. This is in line with the old Weberian dichotomy of charisma and bureaucracy. However, this distinction had far reaching consequences. First, social movement scholars from that on left organisations to other scholars. Although resource mobilization approach brought social movement organisations back in the field, there remained a tendency to ignore institutionalised movements. Second, when third sector studies emerged in the 1970s, social movement scholars had almost no contact to this emerging field of studies. Even today these fields do not interact although they both focus, for example, on NGOs. Third, the neglect of institutions led to situation that there is no theory of the behavior of institutionalised movements (except of labour movement). When an institutionalised movement finds itself again in mass mobilisation situation, the new mobility is not a new movement. It has old structures, old procedures, old community ties, old sources of resources, old reputation, etc. Turner and Killian's note on collective behavior episodes could be used in the development of theories of institutionalised movements, their behavior and their change.

¹ Turner & Killian 1959, 40.

Turner and Killian have used previous research from some related sub-disciplines but not from others. They use studies from social psychology, social anthropology and sociology of religion. However, they do not refer to the studies that have macro perspective as a starting point. Consequently, authors have little to say about economical and political structures. Although Turner and Killian's attempt is to explain the emergence of structures, they do not reach the structure level. Their approach remains on micro and meso levels.

In general, as it was said in the end of last chapter, Turner and Killian follow the path marked by Blumer. Their work is wider and deeper than his but basically it follows the traits of Blumer. One of the major exemption is that they exclude mass movements, fan-clubs and cults. With this exclusion they change significantly the wide perspective of Park and Blumer. It seems that the more sophisticated the definition the more it excludes. Killian's field experience of catastrophes also colours their theory. The root metaphor of Turner and Killian is not crowd but a catastrophe situation. In catastrophes there are several kinds of behaviour and this variety can also be seen in social movements. Although the general notion is that movements are not deviant, there can also be deviant movements in the same way than there are robbers in catastrophe situations.

Turner and Killian's emphasis on emergent norm calls attention to the values and norms of INGOs. Additionally, it calls attention to the roots of these values. This means that different world views and belief systems become important factors in explaining movements' features. In institutionalised movements this means that both the cultural contexts of the movements' emergence era and the

contexts of collective behavior episodes are important. During the collective behavior episodes the movements' transformation takes place. However, these transformed movements should not be seen as new movements.

3.4. Elaborations of the Emergent Norm Approach

Turner and Killian have themselves conducted more work from their premises to which I will come below. Killian pointed later that social movements could be interpreted not so much as creatures, but as the "creators of social change." They are collectivities with a "complex and relatively stable structure, a broad program of change, and elaborate ideology." With this definition Killian was quite close to the European tradition which was represented in US by **Rudolf Heberle**.¹ Heberle situated social movements, not to collective behavior, but to historically oriented political sociology.¹

Turner and Killian's theme of emergent norm have been elaborated by several researchers. Seeking an additional prototype for collective action from catastrophes and disturbances **Jack M. Weller** and **E.L. Quarantelli** add the dimension of whether or not new relationships are present. They see that institutional behaviour occurs in situations where both norms and relationships are enduring. Collective behavior has three variations depending on the stability of either factor. When the system of norms is enduring but relationships are new, there are *coup d'etats*, looting groups, and lynchings. In the opposite situation (enduring relations, emergent norms) there are hospital responses to disasters, police responses to riots, and many fad and fashion episodes. Finally, when

¹ Heberle 1951.

both are emergent, there are search and rescue groups in disasters, mass hysteria, some crowds, etc. They underline that collective behavior should not be limited to the last occasion. Emergent norm theory calls attention also to the cases where the behaviour is partly institutional and partly collective.²

Michael Brown and **Amy Goldin** link emergent norm to works of **Harold Garfinkel** and **Erving Goffman** and state that collective behavior emerges when there are competing collective constructions of situation³. This link appears to be important in present day social movement research when the focus is in the framing processes of individuals and collectivities.

The concept of emergent norm has remained central in collective behavior tradition. Its strength is in pointing the process of decision making in unstructured situations. It helps to understand how people create new frames when they face a totally new situation. Its strength is also its weakness. Although all cultural phenomena are created by individuals, they also exist independently. For example, language that I speak was before me and will also remain after me.

Turner and Killian's weakness is that they do not deal much with the macro level structures and how they lead the actions of individuals. This weakness was corrected by one more classic in collective behaviour string, namely the work of **Kurt** and **Gladys Engel Lang**. Their book was based on their lectures on the subject and it tries to build bridges to other fields of sociology.

¹ Neidhardt and Rucht 1991, 424-425.

² Weller & Quarantelli 1973, 675-681.

³ Brown & Goldin 1973.

3.5. The Langs and Collective Processes

Following the tradition of Park, Blumer and Chicago School Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang published a volume called ***Collective Dynamics*** in 1961. In that book they presented their contribution to the theory of collective behaviour. As the title expresses, they put "emphasis on process rather than form." This meant that they did not see unorganised behaviour so different from organised behaviour as their forerunners. As they put it

We think the subject matter of collective dynamics cannot be entirely defined in terms of certain forms of collective action, that is, the crowd as distinct from an army or the public as distinct from a deliberative body. In our view, what gives unity to the field consists of the processes by which the actions and thoughts of persons in collectivities are sometimes rather unexpectedly transformed. These processes of transformation can be observed in many contexts, in organized groups no less than in unorganized multitudes.¹

The Langs define the subject matter of collective dynamics to be in "a variety of transitory social phenomena." They see that the lack of structure distinguishes the target from the rest of sociology. They define the collective dynamics to refer to

*those patterns of social action that are spontaneous and unstructured inasmuch as they are not organized and are not reducible to social structure.*²

For them collective behaviour is "social action that cuts across social structure and has not yet crystallized into a structure of its own." In this way they follow the lines of Blumer, Turner and Killian. They are interested in the "general relationship between collective dynamics and social structure." Although collective behaviour cannot be reduced to structures, the structures have influence on the emergence of collective behavior.³

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, v-vii. Italics in original.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 3f. Italics in original.

³ Lang & Lang 1961, 12-19.

3.5.1. Collective Processes and Collective Forms

BASIC PROCESSES in collective dynamics, according to Lang and Lang, can be divided into five categories. First, **rumour** or "**collective definition** is the process by which cognitive assessments are brought in line with one another so that some common and plausible assessment emerges." This resembles the milling that Turner and Killian underline as the process of social contagion¹. Second, there is the process of **demoralisation** which refers to situations when "norms and standards of behavior no longer serve as points of orientation." In other words, demoralisation means the situations when people seek for their personal benefit (e.g. rescue from danger) even when this causes harm to the collectivity. Third, in such cases when the behaviour "does not threaten the unity of the group, one can speak of a process of **collective defence**." Fourth, there is a process of **mass conversion** which refers to "the unexpected change of fundamental values under group influence." Finally, the process in which the elementary behaviour turns into a more permanent form is called **crystallisation**. Although these five processes are the basic forms of dynamics, the Langs underline that these processes

must not, however, be thought of as always following one another in the same order. Their relationships are complex; their sequence varies according to the phenomena studied as well as according to the viewpoint of the observer.²

3.5.2. Susceptibility and Polarization

Mechanisms that produce and fasten basic processes described above are inbuilt in them. The first group of mechanisms is centred on the concept of **contagion**. This,

¹ Turner & Killian 1959, 59.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 43f. More detailed study of these processes in pp. 51-206. For the brief introduction to the themes, see Lang & Lang 1968, 558-561.

in turn, contains **imitation** connected to **learning** (learning by doing), **circular reaction** and **suggestibility**. Lang and Lang sum the meaning of these four mechanisms as follows:

The concept of imitation helps to explain follow-the-leader behavior, when the proper response is in doubt but the goals of leaders are assumed identical with that of followers. Circular reaction draws our attention to the dissolution of norms, when collective excitement builds up a readiness to follow suggestions at variance with normal behavior. To understand the specific direction new forms of behavior take, a dynamic approach that takes account of inner conflicts is needed. Through identification, people become suggestible to propositions that appear highly irrational. Hence, the three approaches supplement each other.¹

The second mechanism connected to the basic processes is **leadership**. Lang and Lang stress the importance of leaders in the collective dynamics: "The leader occupies a position of centrality in the sense that he is the *focal point* for the activity in his group... Followers may initiate action, but their influence is not central." The Langs distinct the leadership into two categories: formal and informal. **Informal leader, instigator**, is the one who gains the authority from other than official sources. The **formal leader, initiator**, is the one who has got official authority. However, the authority must be legitimated and the Langs refer to Weber's trichotomy of legal-rational authority, traditional authority and charismatic authority. Based on this trichotomy they develop four statements concerning leadership in unorganised collectivities:

1. There is, at first, no established leadership, and leadership seems to be won by sheer force of personality.
2. Elementary collective behavior occurs when there are breaks in routine... The charismatic leader typically announces his mission and calls for converts where existing routines no longer suffice to answer pressing social problems.
3. The charismatic leader, rather than he dependent on the existent status system, is likely to smash it and set up his own.
4. Leadership legitimated by personal appeal always evolves additional sources of legitimation.²

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 229.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 231-238.

There are also other roles of leadership. First, "an **innovator** is most often an infectious catalyst, an instigator, whose suggestion 'catches', whether immediately or after some time has elapsed." Second, an **influential** is the one who "seem to be more able than others to influence public opinion and behavior." Finally, "the **agitator** seeks to arouse people and to get them to do something he wants them to do."¹

Third mechanism in the processes of collective dynamics is the **susceptibility of followers**. Susceptibility depends, according to Lang and Lang, on situation definition, awareness of alternatives, intellectual factors, motivational beliefs, self-confidence, need for high ego defending, authoritarianism, and ideology. From these the Langs develop "a typology of susceptibles":

1. **Members of deviant subcultures or antisocial groups**. These have the lowest threshold for participation in counter-norm activity supported by their deviant codes... The counter-norm activity is raised to a norm among the alienated nucleus in which it is cultivated...
2. **The impulsive**. This category of persons has an extremely labile internal balance... Their impulsiveness is a function both of failure to internalize effectively the norms and of failure to master techniques by which tension can be dissipated...
3. **The suggestibles**. Loss of responsibility through anonymity implies that responsibility is displaced on external agents and that the individual can once more enjoy being unaccountable... The suggestibles tend to respond to cues in their immediate surroundings...
4. **The opportunistic yielders**. This category of persons can be observed to follow a movement or to hold an opinion when it appears to become dominant.
5. **Passive supporters**. This category of people promotes impressions of universal support. The passive supporters do not actually participate in a mob, hold an opinion, etc. But they do nothing to counter it...
6. **The resistant**. Persons who have internalized standards and norms directly opposed to the object of contagion constitute the resisters.²

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 241-246.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 261-289. Italics (but not bolding) in original.

The fourth group of mechanisms is around the concept of **social object**. "Those who are social objects occupy a central position without being leaders." This category refers to mechanisms that create **victims, villains, martyrs, idols, heroes, and fools**. These mechanisms "can be considered an effort to affirm social norms." These mechanisms create sanctions and collective defence, serve as demonstrations of solidarity, give normative standards of reference, condense and crystallise ideals, and they can stabilise the situation.¹

3.5.4. Collective Processes in the Mass Society

Mass society has also, according to authors, some special collective processes. Most important of these special processes are **public opinion, mass communication, fads, and social movements**. Below I introduce only briefly the first three and concentrate on the last one.

PUBLIC OPINION, according to Lang and Lang, "takes its place alongside custom and law." It differs from the other processes "in that it operates primarily in those situations where acquiescence to standards cannot be taken for granted and where consent must therefore first be ascertained." This draws attention to the processes of the modifications of standards in collective action. Opinion always concerns an issue but it

is not a matter of determining what the rule is but, rather, whether it ought to apply or how it should be applied. To say something is a matter of opinion means that alternative judgements are possible... Hence, public opinion is to some extent always unpredictable.²

MASS COMMUNICATION has a special role in collective dynamics and mass society. Lang and Lang define it as

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 291-331.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 370f.

follows: *"Mass communication, then, refers to the use of a technology by professional specialists to disseminate large amounts of identical content to a physically dispersed mass."* In the communication situation the effects are greatly determined by the different mediators like dispositions, habits, norms, and interests. If these do not support the content of a message the consequences can be opposite to original intention.¹

FASHION is, along with the public opinion, mass communication and social movements, the third major process in mass society. The Langs title this theme with words identification and differentiation. Fashion has three main features: First, it is transitory, not permanent. "Second, its novelty... governs its acceptance." It is independent from rationality. Third, it is trivial. Because it does not affect traditional values people feel free to indulge themselves into the world of fashion.²

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS is the last process of collective society that the Langs introduce. They define a social movement to be *"large-scale, widespread, and continuing, elementary collective action in pursuit of an objective that affects and shapes the social order in some fundamental aspect."* Thus, social movements differ from previous forms of collective action in their aim to change society in some fundamental way. "Moreover, social movements seek changes in behavior or belief that are to be enforced by sanction, where conformity is not optional." This, according to Lang and Lang, explains why social movements often also are political movements that aim to change legislation. This also explains why there

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 423f. Italics in original

² Lang & Lang 1961, 465.

are strong counter movements that oppose the intentions of social movements. However, not all social movements are revolutionary. "But the objectives of every movement have this in common: the interests it represents have failed to find full recognition and representation in the existing power system."¹

The Langs note that previous students of social movements have seen them either as a group venture or as a form of elementary collective behaviour. Authors combine these two aspects and state:

Actually the elementary and organized aspects must be considered together when dealing with any specific social movement. A phenomenon that is purely elementary and lacks all organization would be mass behavior, while spontaneity and contagion serve to distinguish the social movement from more highly organized associations and interest groups.²

In organisations, like political parties, mass support is sometimes "carefully elicited, but it is never permitted to dominate the organization." In social movements it is the mass that "often force upon the leadership tactics and objectives that go beyond limited objectives." Another distinguishing feature in social movements is "the sentiment and enthusiasm, the sense of mission," that is much stronger in social movements than in interest organisations. Third distinguishing feature is the informality of membership.¹

However, social movement must have some kind of organisation. There is normally an organised core that is often confused with the movement itself. This "core group serves to mobilize, define, and channel emotions and grievances that have not yet been self-consciously put in the service of some larger cause." It has three functions: First, "the originating spark, the inspiration, goes from

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 490ff.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 493.

the core group to other groups who become dedicated to the same cause." Second, "the core group supplies the directing cadre around which vague unrest crystallizes." Third, "the core group heads up the movement by claiming to be its legitimate spokesman."²

Lang and Lang review shortly the previous classification models of social movements. There have been four types of classifications. First, what the Langs call phenomenistic is according to "some **external criterion**, such as the area of activity, the interest represented, or the content of its ideology." Although this kind of classifications are useful in some specific purposes, there is no way to have any general system in this tradition. The second type of classifications is according to **value orientations**. Here authors refer to Park and Burgess and the distinction between inward and outward directed movements. However, the Langs note that "the moral crusader, failing to change men's minds through 'suasion,' often turns toward legislative reform." Thus the same movement can be both inward and outward bound in its different stages. Third way to classify movements is according to their **goals**. Basically this is a modification of the previous. In expressive movements like revivals and messianic movements, the movement becomes an end itself. The institutional movements, on the contrary, try to pursue some changes in legislation or institutions of the society. These movements can be divided into several sub-groups like reform, revolution, minority rights, etc. "A fourth formal criterion for differentiating among social movements is **the pattern by which they grow**." Such movements, that have a core group which spreads its message, the Langs call **centrifugal movements**. The

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 494.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 495f.

opposite is the type in which there is originally no exact core group but "the movement develops out of many small independent groups, separated from each other, which then join in a common enterprise." This kind of movements the Langs call **centripetal movements**.¹

Lang and Lang see that social movements are both "collective enterprise to effect changes in the social order" and response to changes in society. Thus they see that social movements occur more frequently in societies in change than in stable ones. Authors mention two main fields where a change can happen, namely in **life conditions** and in **shared perspectives**. They state that "every social movement... depend on shared perspectives." However, before the emergence of a movement can happen some psychological prerequisites must be fulfilled. The Langs sum them in two terms: "widespread *discontent* plus *faith* in the mission of the movement." These, as well as core groups, develop during the latent periods of protest cycles.²

With 'changes in life conditions' authors refer to different catastrophes like natural disasters, economic depressions and wars³. Any of these can be a turning point in the development of a social movement. However, authors point out "that it is not only the change in conditions but the perspective from which they are viewed that account for the cycles of activity." With perspective the Langs mean that "a cause that appears at one time as a specific issue may become linked with broader national or

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 497-505.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 507f. Italics in quotations in original

³ Langs give, as an example, an analysis of how the American Civil War halted some movements (antiforeign movement), changed some (temperance movement, women's movement and labour movement) and created new ones (Ku Klux Klan).

class interest. A general humanitarian goal is redefined as a class interest or vice versa."¹

Structural conditions are necessary prerequisites for the social movements but it is not enough. "At the same time it gets its impetus from some specific person or event." There are several ways in which the structural unrest becomes a movement. Authors mention the impact of **early leaders; leaders; the following; organisation, strategy and tactics; ideology;** and **unifying forces**. The role of early leaders is summed as follows:

Speaking generally, social movements get their impetus from instigators or initiators who supply **examples**, from the active **direction** of a recognized leader or core group, from a small group or leader who offers a **solution** (ideology or plan) for their unfocused sentiments, or from any combination of these.²

In the beginning of the movement the leaders are mostly agitators "who are able to stir things up." However, the movement needs also a vision and this is supplied by a prophet. Later, the role of administrator becomes more and more important. "Finally, the statesman is the politician who adroitly moves within the realm of the possible and helps the movement gain its objectives." However, the Langs point out that these leadership roles cannot identify with each stage of the movement. Different roles can occur together in different stages or they may not occur at all. On the other hand, "it is a rare for a single individual to survive the transformation of a social movement." This is true also vice versa: "Many one-man movements... do not survive the death of the leader unless they develop an effective apparatus."³

The Langs argue that leadership is not only skills but commitment to the cause of the movement. "The assumption

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 508-512.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 517f.

³ Lang & Lang 1961, 520ff.

is that the leader undergoes some kind of conversion that ties him to a cause." Often this means that, especially a reformer, sacrifices his/hers life to the cause. Authors also state that this kind of leaders are seldom from groups that are the potential beneficiaries of the movement. On the contrary. Lang and Lang state that:

Women of better-and-average education, secure in economic status, and seeking a socially useful outlet for their energies, have provided a high proportion of the leaders in American reform movements.

Movements... have often recruited their leaders from among the young and discontented 'intellectuals' of a society... The dissatisfied intelligentsia have been the traditional reservoir of 'revolutionary' leadership."¹

When focusing on the following of social movement the Langs make distinctions according to "the **phase** of the movement in which they join; their **proximity** to the core group; and the degree of involvement and **commitment** to the cause." By phase the following can be differentiated as follows:

There are, first, the **early converts** won over the movement when it is still small and sectarian. They are followed by the **active reinforcements**, 'old fighters' through whose support the movement begins to attain some significance even though the odds are still against it. The **joiners** constitute the mass of supporters who climb on as the bandwagon begins to roll and the movement becomes, so to speak, respectable. A last category, the **resisters**, consists of potential followers, persons who might be expected to display some affinity toward a movement which they strongly resist.²

Another distinction is between the active core versus periphery. Lang and Lang describe it as follows:

A central core of followers... perform the routine work and dedicate what spare time they have to the movement... Opposite to this cadre is the larger rank and file of the movement, who 'march' along... Beyond them is a much larger periphery of individuals, not clearly either in or outside the movement. They act as a 'cheering' section, whose support can be mobilized on occasion.¹

Third way to distinct the following is according to the degree on involvement. "Participation that entails a

¹ Lang & Lang 1961,522ff.

² Lang & Lang 1961,524f. Italics without bolding in original.

complete rupture of previous associations means total commitment." This kind of participation is often found in totalitarian movements. The mechanism in inward and outward movements seems to differ from each other. In inward movements (save various utopian communities) the task to proselytise leads to relations to outer society in order to get converts. "The outward movement is more likely to require a complete commitment on the part of all but the most peripheral followers." Reform movements rarely insist complete rupture of social relations outside the movement. The Langs also note that the size of the movement affects to the involvement demands. The bigger the movement, the fewer demands will be stated. Thus the growth of the movement is a two edged sword. When the movement expands it gains respectability but at the same time the demands of the movement will be softened.²

Recruitment base in different movements varies significantly. "The inward movement usually directs its appeals to those whose anxieties and problems it promises to solve." In the case of outward movements the question is more complicated. As mentioned above, there are people "in the upper or upper-middle classes who have a sense of responsibility toward those less fortunate and have leisure time to devote to reform activities." However, when the movement mobilises masses, the recruitment base changes to these depressed classes and, as a consequence the humanist spirit disappears.³

Every movement faces various structural problems. Major questions deal with the relationships and hierarchy, with needed staff, and with membership criteria. This means that a movement leaves behind the stages of social unrest

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 526.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 526ff.

³ Lang & Lang 1961, 529f.

and popular excitement, and turns to the stage of formal organisation. If the process goes on, the movement will reach the stage of institutionalisation¹. In this change process the role of the leader changes, too. The organisation may lead to oligarchy (as Michels² has supposed in his famous oligarchy thesis) or it may lead to factionalism. The latter "is most likely to develop when there are many bases of power while a central apparatus through which control can be exercised has not yet fully developed."¹

According to Lang and Lang, movements do not grow in one determined way. There are several factors that shape the style of their organisation. First of these factors is the **degree of opposition** the movement encounters. If the environment is hostile, the movement is more "likely to develop a quasi-military style." Second factor is the **social position of its followers**. "The style of organization tends to be adapted to what followers expect." Third, the **aims of the movement** influence its style. Fourth, the **cultural ethos** of the society effects in a way that the movement carries the heritage of the place and time of its emergence. Last factor is the **type of leader**. These factors influence the style of organisation which, in turn, is connected to **strategy** ("over-all design for action") and tactics ("day-to-day contingencies") of the movement. Distinctions by strategy refer to such poles as reform versus revolution, violence versus non-violence, mass mobilisation versus personal transformation, etc. "In each strategy there usually corresponds some particular set of tactics." However, sometimes the tactics "becomes an end in itself, but, on the whole, tactics are more subject to change than

¹ These stages are from C.A. Dawson and W.E. Getty (1935, chapter 19.)

² Michels 1911.

strategy." Tactics also have two other features: First, successful tactics are also copied from movement to movement. And second, "tactics are directed as much to maintaining the internal stability of the movement as to the achievement of its concrete objective."²

Movements have normally some official set of doctrines that form its ideology. According to Lang and Lang, ideology has the following five elements:

1. A **statement of purpose** defining the general objective of the movement and giving the premise on which it is based.
2. A **doctrine of defence** – that is, the body of beliefs that serves as a justification for the movement and its activities.
3. An **indictment**, a criticism, and a condemnation of existing social arrangements.
4. A general **design for action** as to how the objective is to be achieved.
5. Certain **myths** that embody the emotional appeals, a promise of success (based on a revolution or an 'objective' law of history), its heroes, and the many folk arguments that are taken seriously.³

Lang and Lang emphasise the importance of ideology with the warning: "Attention to the structural aspects of a movement should never lead one to ignore its ideology." First, ideology serves as a clue between different groups. Second, the analysis of ideology "helps to identify the class whose interests the ideology reflects." However, ideology of one movement has many faces. There is an elaborated version for the core group and a simplified version for the masses. Sometimes they are apart from each other and in such cases this mass ideology hides the core ideology. Simplified mass ideology also serves in hiding the diversities inside the movement. Along the ideology there are symbols and actions which serve as unifying forces for the movement. Rituals and symbols together with

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 531ff.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 534-537. Italics without bolding in original.

³ Lang & Lang 1961, 537. Italics without bolding in original.

the informal experience of fellowship create the *esprit de the corps*, that is needed for positive identification.¹

3.5.5. Research in Collective Dynamics

Lang and Lang speculated why the field of collective behavior had been so neglected among sociologists in their time. They saw five reasons for this. First, the emphasis had been on structures pro elementary phenomena. Second, the tools developed to study structures did not fit well to studies of collective dynamics. Third, phenomena of collective behavior are transitory and there must also be luck to be in a situation where they occur so that they could be studied. Fourth, the nature of these phenomena is such that they are not directly amenable to observation because they are complex and require knowledge of the entire society. Finally, the use of respondents instead of observers raises questions of reliability and representativeness. They sum the problems as follows: "To persist in empirical research, the student of collective behavior has either to compromise somewhat his commitment to systematic techniques or to run the risk of missing the most intriguing features of the phenomena under study."¹

After pointing to the problems, the Langs introduce some research techniques that could be used in the field. The first method they see useful in the study of gangs, social movements or rumours, is the opinion poll survey. The merit of this technique is that it can bring comparable data to statistical analysis. However, this has its price, too. First, "survey data tend to put the emphasis on the determinants of the individual response." Second, "a survey tends to focus not to emergent behavior but only on some particular aspects of the behavior." Third, "the

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 538ff. Italics without bolding in original.

survey fosters the tendency to concentrate on the most organized aspects of collective behavior."²

Another method is the experimental study in laboratory. It permits the manipulation and control of the situation, as well as the use of trained observers. But this has its negative side, too. At the worst, the phenomena in laboratory have nothing to do with real life. Thus the Langs see that experimental studies in actual institutions, like prisons, could be useful. Institutions form miniature societies and there are usually staff or trained observers for help.³

Third technique for the studies of collective behavior is the case study method which, "more than the others just discussed, preserves the full view of the phenomenon in its qualitative richness." The dangers of this method are that "the investigator is most likely to find data on (a) the more structured and enduring phenomena in their more organized phases..., and (b) the more successful and dramatic phenomena." Practically this means that there are "vivid descriptions of a single incident or collectivity" but no mapping them to a wider perspective.⁴

Fourth and fifth methods for analysis of collective behavior are analysis of aggregate trend data and different forms of mass observation. Statistics can "offer many clues about the type of person who accounts for the trend... but the specific processes still have to be inferred." Mass observation was used in Britain and it was

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 546f.

² Lang & Lang 1961, 547f.

³ Lang & Lang 1961, 549.

⁴ Lang & Lang 1961, 549f.

based on volunteer observers who report on the unprompted discussions they have listened.¹

Lang and Lang sum up the task of the study of collective dynamics as follows:

In collective dynamics, on the other hand, one must begin by sampling the various perspectives from which a phenomenon can be experienced... Out of all these perspectives emerges a collective definition, and the process through which it emerges is what has to be reconstructed.

In studying all the other processes, such as demoralization, collective defence, crystallization, conversion, it is equally necessary to consider all the perspectives that enter the situation. Not only does the crowd consist of an active core, but timid followers, passive bystanders, the actions of possible victims, even the impressions gained by a mass medium audience, etc., all contribute to what the crowd is all about. To be able to command data of such complexity, the investigator needs, above all, something that one might call a sensitivity to the group atmosphere. It consists of at least two completely different elements. (1) theoretical sophistication, which sensitizes the investigator to significant clues he might otherwise ignore, and (2) trained imagination, which enables him to discern and imaginatively reconstruct out of these clues the total situation in which the various direct and indirect participants interact.¹

3.5.6. Evaluating Lang and Lang

The significance of the Langs' work lies in its perspective. Authors try to locate the place of collective behavior dynamics to other fields of sociology. Thus those interested in structures find a theory how structures emerge, and those interested in mass society find a theory of its mechanisms. Those who focus on ideology and identity questions find that many 'new' inventions are already in their book.

Langs see social movements much in same way as Turner and Killian. First, social movements are one form of collective action. Second, they are large-scale and continuing action. However, when Langs note that social movements often aim to force changes by sanctions they

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 550ff.

also explain why social movements are so often political movements that have so strong counter movements. This is a step towards the limitation of the concept. Langs, in fact, deal only with the political movements.

The work of the Langs was often mentioned in the publications of the two following decades but then it faded from bibliographies. In general, the rise of constructivism brought the interactionism and its theories back into serious consideration. However, the interactionistic classics like Park and Burgess, Blumer, Turner and Killian, and the Langs are still too seldom read. Much of the modern theory of social movements can be found already in these classics. But, as we know, interactionism was never a major trend in American sociology. This position belonged to structural functionalism and the second main string of collective behavior lies in that tradition.

¹ Lang & Lang 1961, 553.

4. Collective Behavior as Result of Structural Strains

4.1. Parsons and Unusual Events

4.1.1. Explanation of Fascism

Talcott Parsons started the second string in the American approach. He also began from the context of fascism and tried to explain the European turbulence to Americans in an essay in 1942¹. For Parsons social movements are **implications of unusual events**. Big social changes inflate individuals and they react to these changes. He starts from Durkheim's theory of anomie. Human beings seem to have "a deep-seated need for relative stability of the expectations to which the action is oriented." They also have a "need for a sufficiently concrete and stable system of symbols around which the sentiments of the individual can crystallize." When these needs are not fulfilled people are in a state of anomie or, in psychological terms, in a state of insecurity.²

Parsons states that "an increase in anomie may be a consequence of almost any change in the social situation which upsets previous established definitions of the situation, or routines of life, or symbolic associations³." Thus it is not a consequence of only negative effects but as well a result of positive ones. He lists several factors that have caused anomie in the modern society, namely "Industrial Revolution...,

¹ Parsons 1959(1942).

² Parsons 1959(1942), 84.

³ Parsons 1959(1942), 85.

migration of population from rural areas..., instability of the new economy..., rapid and violent changes of fad and fashion..., 'debunking' of traditional values..., enormous development of popular education, and the development of mass means of communication." In this situation "the extent to... which the individual can be expected to take completely for granted has disappeared." Instead of this security a modern man has got "the burden of decision."¹

Basically the state of anomie is not "a consequence the... fortuitous disorganizing forces" but is, in Weberian terms, a consequence of the "process of rationalisation." Parsons sees the development of science as "the most convenient single point of reference." The influence of science can be seen in "technology..., [in] codification and systematization of personal rights and individual liberties..., [in] the modern institution of ownership..., [in] the patterning of functional roles primarily about their functional content itself with clear segregation from other elements" like kinship, local ties, class and ethnicity, and as "central part of the cultural tradition of our society" that Parsons calls "critical rationality."¹

According to Parsons, science has questioned "the cognitive status of the 'non-empirical' elements of philosophical and religious thought." It also has a "tendency to eliminate patterns and entities of primarily symbolic significance." He sees that the development of patterns of rationality "is in itself the most important single source of anomie." Rationality is "functioning as the 'ideology' of social and political movements." This is especially true in the case of the political left. At the

¹ Parsons 1959(1942), 85f.

same time "science has been taken as the prototype of all sound cognitive orientation."²

This rationalistic orientation has neglected "the 'non-logical' aspects of human behaviour in society." Among these are "sentiments of family and informal social relations, peculiarities of regional, ethnic or national culture." Perhaps above all of these is religion. According to Parsons, it is on this level where science has "helped to provoke a most important 'anti-intellectualist' reaction." Fascism is one form of this reaction.³

However, while the ideology is necessary, "it never stands alone. It is necessarily in the closest interdependence with the psychological states and the social situations of the people to whom it appeals." The incidence of the process of rationalisation in society is uneven. It appeals to different people in divergent ways. This is also seen in varieties between spheres of society. Different levels of emancipation create conflicts which associate with other tensions of society. Parsons names that the factors are

first, the difficult competitive situation of the lower middle class... Secondly, the particular strains in the situation of the youth engendered by the necessity of emancipation from the family..., and third, the insecurity of the adult feminine role in our urban society."⁴

Parsons describe how certain part of the population is functioning as spearhead of the process of rationalisation. When they feel insecure they tend to overreact both positively and negatively. On one hand they

¹ Parsons 1959(1942),86f.

² Parsons 1959(1942),88ff.

³ Parsons

⁴ Parsons 1959(1942),92f. Parsons refer to E.Y. Hartshornes unpublished paper in which he has noted that "in Germany the most conspicuous support of the Nazis came from the lower middle class, from youth, and from women." Idem, note 3.

label the old traditions with negative attributes and on the other hand they think that

it is held that if only certain symbolic sources of evil, superstition, or privilege or capitalism were removed "everything would be all right" automatically and for all time.¹

The other reaction in society comes from those who keep the traditional points of reference for orientation. In this group

the typical reaction has been of of an over-determined 'fundamentalist' type. Aggression has turned toward symbols of the rationalizing and emancipated areas which are felt to be 'subversive of the values. Naturally there has at the same time been an exaggerated assertion of and loyalty to those traditional values.²

Parsons sees fascism as a counter movement against the rationalisation process of the society. He concludes this part of his analysis by saying "that its possibility is at least as deeply rooted in the social structure and dynamics of our society as was socialism at an earlier stage." However, at the same time fascism had allied with two powerful forces: nationalism and 'vested interests.' Nationalism "has been perhaps the readiest channel for the fundamentalist reaction to flow into." At the same time the elite found fascism as a suitable means to protect their privileges. Parsons saw that "the relation between fascism and vested interests in general may thus be regarded as a constant."¹

4.1.2 Comments On Parsons

Parsons was inspired about the idea of the combining the European sociological work. This is seen in his work **The Structure of Collective Action** from 1937. The same idea is also seen in this study on fascism. In both works he combines Durkheim's idea of anomie and Weber's thesis on

¹ Parsons 1959(1942), 93.

² Parsons 1959(1942), 93f.

bureaucracy. What was common to all of them was the importance of the world views (Durkheim's representations and Weber's ideas) in human life. Parson's own contribution is that he elaborates these basic ideas into a theory of action. In this article a reader can see a glimpse of what was to be later the structural-functional theory.

In Parsons' analysis one can see some of his root metaphors. For him society is a closed system that regulates itself. If the root metaphor of society is an organism or a machine, it is natural that every part has a particular function. Thus social movements are some kind of leukocytes or over pressure valves. Their function is to restore the stable situation that has been affected by social strains of the modern society.

The weakness of Parsons' analysis is that he does not deal with other conservative movements in Europe. He mentions nationalism and sees it as an ally of fascism. But he does not pay attention that not all nationalism in Western Europe was connected to fascism. Parsons does not mention royalist or religious movements at all. These movements also were affected by the same rationalism that, according to Parsons, caused the emergence of fascism. How did this same rationalisation process inflate to these movements? Neither does Parsons deal with the issue of power structures. What would Europe look like if Franco had lost the war in Spain? What would Europe look like if Britain and other liberal/conservative states would not have reduced their military budgets between the World Wars?

¹ Parsons 1959(1942), 94ff.

In the case of INGOs Parsons' theory calls attention to general cultural trends. Many INGOs are actually social movement organisations and they have arisen to defend or to oppose some trend in society or culture. This in turn calls to focus on the ideology of the organisation and the carriers of this ideology. In the case of the YMCA the structural strain was in the rationalism and its attack against religion. YMCA and other revival movements arose to defend Christian message and Christian ethics. However, Parsons' theory does not explain why the same lower middle class that in Germany in the 1930s was attracted of fascism started reform movements in nineteenth century England.

After all, Parsons' article is one of the hallmarks of the field. Together with Blumer's work Parsons' approach formed the collective behavior approach. The shared main idea is that people behave differently in groups than individually. This is what crowd behaviour and mass psychosis theories supposed. In the formation of collective identity groups act in a way that can not be explained by individual psychology. Later these approaches differentiated again into two schools. The main dividing line is on the question whether the phenomenon ought to be seen positively as adaptive behaviour or negatively as irrational action. The other question is whether collective behavior should be interpreted with the changes in individual attitudes and beliefs or in structural forms. In both strings of collective behavior scholars saw social movements only as one part of collective behavior. Movements were seen from the perspective of emerging process of new structures and in these processes there also were other factors than movements.

4.1.3. Developments of Parsons' Ideas

The theory of anomie was elaborated by **Robert Merton**. He had already in 1938 published first version of his article ***Social Structure and Anomie***¹. Later he revised and extended it in his anthology ***Social Theory and Social Structure***². His basic thesis is that "*socially deviant behavior* [is] just as much a product of social structure as *conformist behavior*³." With this statement he opposes Freudian views "that the structure of society primarily restrains the free expression of man's fixed native impulses and that, accordingly, man periodically breaks into open rebellion against these restraints to achieve freedom⁴."

Merton is concerned with the problems of cultural and social change. Like Parsons, he sees that strain is the key concept "bridging the gap between statics and dynamics." According to Merton

Such strains may be dysfunctional for the social system in its then existing form; they may also be instrumental in leading to changes in that system. In any case, they exert pressure for change. When social mechanisms for controlling them are operating effectively, these strains are kept within such bounds as to limit change of the social structure.⁵

Merton is not actually a collective behavior theorist but his influence can be seen in this field, too. His enormous production in the fields of social structure and sociology of science also contains issues that are relevant in collective action research. Along with this general influence, he has given much to the ***relative deprivation theory*** to which I come later.

¹ Merton 1968(1938).

² Merton 1968(1949).

³ Merton 1968(1949),175. Italics in original.

⁴ Merton 1968(1949),175.

⁵ Merton 1968(1949),176.

In the structural functionalist string the major scholar after Parsons has been **Neil Smelser**. His book *Theory of Collective Behavior*¹ from 1962 became a similar 'handbook' in the structuralist string like Turner and Killian's is in interactionist string.

4.2. Smelser's Generalized Belief and Value-added Approach

Neil Smelser got his first connection to collective behavior through **Gordon W. Allport**. Other important scholars that influenced his thinking were **Erving Goffman**, **Herbert Blumer**, and, above all, **Talcott Parsons**². He was not contented with the previous studies of collective behavior because "they imply that collective behavior flows from sources beyond empirical explanation." His aim was "to reduce this residue of indeterminacy which lingers in explanations of collective outbursts." This task invited explanation to the following question: "Why do collective episodes occur *where* they do, *when* they do, and *in the ways* they do?"³

4.2.1. Analyzing Collective Behavior⁴

Definition of the terms is the first task that Smelser involves himself. According to him, the term collective behavior did "not refer to a uniform, clearly defined class of phenomena." Additionally there were such concepts as **mass phenomena**, **mass behaviour**, and **collective dynamics** that refer to similar kinds of phenomena. He notes that the most accurate term would be **collective outbursts and**

¹ Smelser 1962.

² Smelser 1962, ix-x.

³ Smelser 1962, 1 Italics in original.

⁴ Titles are from Smelser.

collective movements which he for brevity shortened to conventional collective behavior. In this

"Collective outbursts" would refer to panics, crazes, and hostile outbursts which frequently (but not always) are explosive; "collective movements" would refer to collective effort to modify norms and values, which frequently (but not always) develop over longer periods.¹

He notes that there must be both **outside limits** and **internal divisions** for the field². Starting with outside limits, Smelser defines collective behavior "as mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action." With this Smelser says that he expands Blumer's similar definition of social movements also to the elementary forms of collective behavior (panics, hostile outbursts, etc.). Smelser also adds two other criteria for collective behavior. First, there must be

a belief in the existence of extraordinary forces - threats, conspiracies, etc. - which are at work in the universe. They also involve an assessment of the extraordinary consequences which will follow if the collective attempt to reconstitute social action is successful.³

Smelser calls these kinds of beliefs as **generalized beliefs** and notes that they resemble magical beliefs.

Second, he adopts Blumer's statement that

collective behavior... is not institutionalized behavior. According to degree to which it becomes institutionalized, it loses its distinctive character.⁴

When moving to internal divisions, Smelser gives a list of the components of social action:

These components are: (a) values, or general sources of legitimacy; (b) norms, or regulatory standards for interaction; (c) mobilization of individual motivation for organized action in roles and collectivities; (d) situational facilities, or information, skills, tools, and obstacles in the pursuit of concrete goals.⁵

¹ Smelser 1962,3.

² Smelser 1962,5.

³ Smelser 1962,8.

⁴ Smelser 1962,8.

⁵ Smelser 1962,9.

Smelser criticises the previous categorisations and denies that defining characteristics are physical or temporal; they are not based on any kind of communication or interaction; and they are not of psychological type. While doing this he moves away from interactionist string of collective behavior and starts to create a structural functionalist theory in which all the elements are in fixed places and they fit into the general theory. He states that "we must systematize the determinants, and note the changes in the combinations of determinants which produce different outcomes."¹

The key for Smelserian categorisation is Smelser's concept of **value-added**, which he borrowed from economic use. It means that each step adds some value in a process from raw material to the final product. There are two important aspects that Smelser points out in this process. He writes:

Every stage in the value-added process, therefore, is a necessary condition for the appropriate and effective addition of value in the next stage...
As the value-added process moves forward, it narrows progressively the range of possibilities of what final product might become.²

In this way Smelser combines the conditions of any collective behavior and some specific types of it. There are six determinants that he regards important:

- (1) **Structural conduciveness**... Do certain structural characteristics, more than others, permit or encourage episodes of collective behavior?
- (2) **Structural strain**... [must be considered] as falling *within the scope established by the condition of conduciveness*... It is the *combination* of conduciveness and strain, not the separate existence of either, that radically reduces the range of possibilities of behavior.
- (3) **Growth and spread of a generalized belief**... which identifies the source of strain, attributes certain characteristics to this source, and specifies certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate.

¹ Smelser 1962, 12f.

² Smelser 1962, 13f.

- (4) **Precipitating factors...** give the generalized beliefs concrete, immediate substance. In this way they provide a concrete setting toward which collective action can be directed.
- (5) **Mobilization of participants for action.** Once the determinants just reviewed have been established, the only necessary condition that remains is to bring the affected group into action... In this process of mobilization the behavior of leaders is extremely important.
- (6) **The operation of social control...** arches over all the others... the study of social control is the study of those counter-determinants which prevent, interrupt, deflect, or inhibit the accumulation of the determinants just reviewed... [I]t is convenient to divide social controls into two broad types: (a) Those social controls which minimize conduciveness and strain. In a broad sense these controls *prevent* the occurrence of an episode of collective behavior... (b) Those social controls which are mobilized only *after* a collective episode has begun to materialize. These determine how fast, how far, and in what directions the episode will develop.¹

Smelser's theory arises from the analogy of automobile manufacturing. This analogy also distincts the theory from so called natural history analogies that, among others, Blumer and Turner and Killian had adopted. In natural history analogy the previous stage is a necessary precondition to the next one. However, Smelser relies on the analogy of factory: in the painting stage of the car, "the paint itself has been manufactured prior to the shaping of the steel." Thus Smelser distinguishes the concepts of **existence** and **activation** from each other as determinants of collective action. Further, there may be several single empirical events that work simultaneously forming several determinants of collective behavior. Finally, Smelser distincts himself from Le Bons' and others' psychological explanations, and states that psychological determinants are "products in part of social determinants." Thus Smelser's main view is that structural conditions also determine psychological reactions because the latter differ in different cultures.²

¹ Smelser 1962, 15ff. Italics without bolding in original.

² Smelser 1962, 19ff.

4.2.2. Basic Concepts: The Components of Social Action

Smelser borrows the basic components of social action from Parsons. They are in a hierarchical order as follows: values, norms, mobilisation into organised roles, and situational facilities. According to Smelser,

values provide only general notions of desirable end states, and hence are the most general guides of action. At the level of norms certain general rules define the broad rights and duties of human agents in interaction. This transition from values to norms *restricts the possible situational applications* of values as such... At the organizational level even more detailed characteristics are specified - the structure of roles and organizations, the nature of their situational goals, and the kinds of sanctions that facilitate the interaction of roles and organizations. Finally, at the level of situational facilities, the specification of knowledge, skills and tools leads us to the most detailed aspects of action.¹

Smelser sees in these components seven different levels which also move from general to specific. He has collected both aspects in the following scheme. In the scheme the specificity goes from left to right and from top to bottom. This scheme forms the basis of Smelser's theory of collective behavior.²

¹ Smelser 1962,32f. Italics in original.

² Smelser 1962,44.

Level	Values	Norms	Mobilization of motivation for organized action	Situational facilities
1	Societal values	General conformity	Socialized motivation	Preconceptions concerning causality
2	Legitimization of values for institutionalized sectors	Specification of norms according to institutional sectors	Generalized performance capacity	Codification of knowledge
3	Legitimization of rewards	Specification of norms according to types of roles and organizations	Trained capacity	Technology, or specification of knowledge in situational terms
4	Legitimization of individual commitment	Specification of requirements for individual observation of norms	Transition to adult-role assumption	Procurement of wealth, power, or prestige to activate level 3
5	Legitimization of competing values	Specification of norms of competing institutional sectors	Allocation to sector of society	Allocation of effective technology to sector of society
6	Legitimization of values for realizing organizational roles	Specification of rules of cooperation and coordination within organization	Allocation to specific roles or organizations	Allocation of effective technology to roles or organizations
7	Legitimization of values for expenditure of effort	Specification of schedules and programs to regulate activity	Allocation to roles and tasks within organization	Allocation of facilities within organization to attain concrete goals

After defining the components Smelser enters to describe the **structural strain**.

4.2.3. Structural Strain Underlying Collective Behavior

Structural strain¹ is defined "as an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of action." A strain in some form is needed if the episode of collective behavior is to occur. "No causal link exists, however, between a *particular* kind of strain and a *particular* kind of collective episode." This leads to a4 proposition:

*Any kind of strain may be a determinant of any kind of collective behavior. The foci of structural strain constitute a class of determinants which may produce a class of collective episodes.*²

The first three levels of the table above

¹ Smelser sees that in the earlier literature the terms **pressure** and **malintegration** "would suffice" but "**disintegration** and **disorganization** are too strong." **Disequilibrium** and **imbalance** imply that there is also some equilibrium state and he does not want to give such an impression. Finally, such terms as **inconsistency**, **conflict**, **deprivation** and **anomie** are too specific and narrow. Smelser 1962,47f.

² Smelser 1962,47ff. Italics in original.

generate resources, or 'prepare' them to for utilization in concrete action. Level 4 marks a transition between preparation and utilization. Finally, the lower levels... utilize the resources in concrete action. These lower levels constitute short term operations which take the higher levels 'for granted.'¹

The strain, whatever its source is, appears first at the operative level. Therefore Smelser focuses on the levels five, six and seven when he explains the strain. He states that "the principal kind of strain on situational facilities involves a condition of **ambiguity** as to the adequacy of means for a given goal." In mobilisation the strain "involves a relation between responsible performance in roles and the rewards which accrue thereby." Normative strain is linked to such issues as **role strain, role conflict** and **cross-pressure**. "These terms imply competing demands of different roles for the expenditure of limited time and energy, or for qualitative different actions on the part of individual." Finally, in the case of value strains, Smelser deals with the sources of such strain:

In many cases, such strain results from the spread of other types of strain in society... In such cases strain on values is an extension of other kinds of strain. Other sources of value strain may be found in cultural contacts between two groups with divergent value systems.²

As a conclusion of strain Smelser states that "value strain poses the issue of commitment; normative strain concerns the interaction of human interaction; strain on mobilization concerns the balance between motivated activity and its rewards; strain on facilities concerns the adequacy of knowledge and skills." In the following table "strain at any point is sufficient but not necessary condition for strain at all points downward and to the right."³

¹ Smelser 1962, 49.

² Smelser 1962, 51-64.

³ Smelser 1962, 64f.

Level	Values	Norms	Mobilization of motivation for organized action	Situational facilities
5	Strain on the principles of integration of values (Ex: attack on capitalism)	Strain in relations among major social sectors (Ex: the "legality" of labor practices)	Actual or potential deprivation of major social sectors (Ex: squeeze on salaried employees because of high profits and wages)	Ambiguity in allocating facilities to sectors of society (Ex: how to allocate resources to meet communist challenge)
6	Strain on commitment to organizational goals (Ex: attack on "profits")	Strain on integration of organization (Ex: interference of "informal organization" on production)	Actual or potential deprivation related to organizational membership (Ex: loss of income through unemployment)	Ambiguity in allocating facilities to organizations (Ex: how to invest wisely in business firm)
7	Strain on commitment to personal values (Ex: challenge to value of personal honesty)	Strain at level of operative rules (Ex: conflicting directives from a bureaucratic superior)	Actual or potential deprivation in role performance (Ex: "freezing out" the business executive)	Ambiguity in allocating facilities to attain operative goals (Ex: how to guarantee a good planting for a crop)

Smelser pointed out that "for any episode of collective behavior, we shall always find some kind of structural strain in the background." Thus he sees that the preceding structures are those that create collective behavior. However, he also underlines that "any type of structural strain may give rise to any type of collective behavior." With this Smelser deny that certain strains produce only certain outcomes. Instead, it is question of combinations of determinants.¹

4.2.4. The Nature of Collective Behavior

The nature of collective behavior "like many other kinds of behavior,... is a search for solutions to conditions of strain by moving to a more generalised level of resources." If we look at the tables above this means an emphasising the left side of the table, emphasising the top of it, or emphasising both. However, going from some cause of strain to top left may need several steps. Additionally, the difference from normal behaviour is that 'coming back' to the cause of strain does not happen step by step but directly. Thus

¹ Smelser 1962, 65f.

collective behavior is a compressed way of attacking problems created by strain. It compresses several levels of the components of action into a single belief, from which *specific operative solutions* are expected to flow.¹

When accompanied by people who are mobilised on the basis of this belief we come to Smelser's characterisation of collective behavior:

collective behavior is... an uninstitutionalized mobilization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strain on the basis of a generalized reconstitution of a component of action.²

On this basis Smelser excludes some forms of behaviour from collective behavior. First, he excludes "collective reaffirmations of values, rituals, festivals, ceremonials, and rites of passage." All these are based on generalised values and have been institutionalised. Second, the audience is not collective behavior because it is either occasional without any sign of strain or attempt to any component of action (watchers of a street construction) or institutionalised (audience at a symphony). Third, he excludes public opinion. However, he does not give any specific criteria why he excludes it. Fourth, he excludes propaganda because it is often institutionalised and it "is not the act of collective mobilization; it is one instrument" to mobilise people for action. Fifth, crime does not belong in this group because there is no attempt "to *reconstitute* a component of action on the basis of a generalized belief." Finally, individual deviance like hoboism, addiction, or alcoholism are individual and not collective behavior although it has its roots in strains. Thus Smelser opposites Blumer when he excludes public opinion and propaganda out of collective behavior.³

¹ Smelser 1962, 71. Italics in original.

² Smelser 1962, 71.

³ Smelser 1962, 73-78.

4.2.5. The Creation of Generalized Beliefs

Generalized belief is, as we have seen, one of the main concepts in Smelser's theory. Smelser got it basically from the teachings of Le Bon but he tried to give more precise theoretical meaning to it:

Generalized beliefs constitute one stage in the total value-added process by which we account for the occurrence of episodes of collective action. Such beliefs become significant as determinants in the value-added process only when conditions of structural conduciveness and strain are present; these beliefs are necessary, however, to mobilize people for collective action.¹

Smelser sees generalized belief, first, as related to strain and states: "Rumour and related beliefs arise when structural strain is not manageable within the existing framework of action." Second, he links it to ambiguity. In ambiguous situations generalized beliefs reduce ambiguity by restructuring and interpreting the situation. Third, there is a link to short-circuiting which "involves the jump from extremely high levels of generality to specific, concrete situations." Fourth, there is a connection to action in such a way that generalized beliefs "create a 'common culture' within which leadership, mobilization, and concerted action can take place."²

Smelser divides these beliefs into four categories which can be seen as a continuum from simple to complicated. **Hysterical belief** is the simplest form of generalized belief and is defined as "a belief empowering an ambiguous element in the environment with a generalised power to threaten or destroy." Typical examples are premonitions of disaster and undefined rumours. There are three components of this kind of belief: ambiguous situation, anxiety and redefinition of the situation. If the hysterical belief is a negative generalisation of the situation, **wish-**

¹ Smelser 1962, 79f.

² Smelser 1962, 81f.

fulfillment belief is a positive one. It can be found prior to booms and band-wagons and it also is related to magic. The difference from hysterical belief is that it adds the generalised forces that counter the potential threats.¹

Third form of generalized belief is **hostile belief** which has both hysterical and wishful elements. The addition is that there must be some kind of symbol that represents the object under attack. It compresses the different levels of facilitation and mobilisation into one belief. It gives

not only a redefinition of generalized forces... but also an identification and modification of *persons* thought to be agencies of these forces. The modification is to be effected by destroying, injuring, removing, or restricting a person or class of persons considered responsible for the evils at hand.²

Fourth type of belief is **norm-oriented belief** which "involves mobilization for action in the name of a belief envisioning the reconstitution of the Normative Series." Many social movements or reform movements are led by norm-oriented beliefs. A movement might be an attempt to change the existing order or to protect it. Unlike the previous forms of beliefs, this "leaves an observable mark - a norm or an organization - in its wake." It "includes, as *elements of itself*, a reconstitution (sometimes implicit) of the lower-level Mobilization and Facilities Series." The difference to previous forms of beliefs is that the short-circuit is made "to a particular set of laws, rules and customs" and thus traced to normative regulation and not to the controlling agents themselves.³

Finally, there is **value-oriented belief** that "envisions a modification of those conceptions concerning 'nature, man's place in it, man's relation to man, and the

¹ Smelser 1962, 84-100.

² Smelser 1962, 101.

³ Smelser 1962, 109ff. Italics in original.

desirable and nondesirable as they may relate to man-environment and inter-human relations." Smelser says that his determination resembles **A.F.C. Wallace's** conception of revitalisation which is "a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of society to construct a more satisfying culture." Value oriented beliefs are found in religious and political doctrines, nativistic movements, cults, nationalism, etc. The difference from previous forms is that value-oriented belief "envisions a direct reconstitution of the Values Series. Because values stand at the top... this belief necessarily implies a reconstitution of the lower-level components as well."¹

All the mentioned forms of belief are in a hierarchial relation. "The belief in question includes all the components of the beliefs below in the hierarchy, plus one new ingredient which gives this belief its distinctive character." These beliefs accompanied by strain give, according to Smelser, the place of the determinants in the total value-added process.² Next³ I concentrate on those that can be described as Smelser's versions of social movements, namely **norm-oriented movements** and **value-oriented movements**.

4.2.6. The Norm-oriented Movement

Smelser states that "a norm-oriented movement is an attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of generalized belief." This can be done either directly or by inducing some constituted authority to do it. "Any kind of norm - economic, educational, political, religious - may become the subject of such movements.

¹ Smelser 1962,120f.

² Smelser 1962,130.

³ Smelser deals with panics, crazes and hostile outbursts, that I, however, skip here.

Furthermore, norm-oriented movements may occur on any scale... reactionary, conservative, progressive, and radical." It frequently gives rise to some normative innovation but all such innovations are not from such movements. Plenty of normative innovations occur also in purely institutionalised behaviour.¹

As it has become evident, Smelser's value-added approach requires the existence of previous stages as components of higher level. Thus

A norm-oriented movement involves elements of panic (flight from existing norms or impending normative change), craze (plunge to establish new means) and hostility (eradication of someone or something responsible for evils). These lower-level components appear, explicitly or implicitly, in the beliefs that accompany norm-oriented movements.²

How these lower-level components occur depend largely on the conditions and the behaviour of the agencies of social control. It can also be seen that norm-oriented movements may occur independently from value-oriented movements or as a part of them. In the previous case it is a question of reconstructing a norm in society, in the latter it is a question of a goal which aims to change the entire society.³

In the case of **social movement organisations** Smelser makes a fundamental distinction between **party organisations** and **non-party organisations**. Following Heberle, Smelser notes that there are three ways to connect parties and movements. Parties can be part of a broader movement or their members can be divided into several movements or the movement can be represented in different parties. Non-party organisations also have different connections. They can be either established

¹ Smelser 1962,270f.

² Smelser 1962,271.

³ Smelser 1962,271f.

before the movement or they may be new groups that emerge in the same time than the movement. They can be either formal or informal and their purposes may be general or specific. Smelser also notes that "the same norm-oriented movement frequently works through one organization, then changes to another."¹

In general, to the study of movements Smelser uses the same set of categories that he used to study other forms of collective behavior, namely "structural conduciveness, strain, generalized beliefs, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and the response of agencies of social control." In the case of conduciveness Smelser states as follows:

The most general condition of conduciveness concerns the possibility for demanding modifications of norms *without simultaneously appearing to demand a more fundamental modification of values*. If social arrangements permit these more limited kinds of demands, these arrangements are conducive to the development of norm-oriented movements; if social arrangements are such that all demands for normative change tend more or less immediately to generalize into conflicts over values, they are not conducive to the development of norm-oriented movements.²

In the case of strain, Smelser states that "norm-oriented movements are usually fostered by strains which create demands for readjustment in the social situation." However, he adds some remarks to this general statement. First, this strain can be existing deprivation as well as future expectation. Second, "strains frequently appear in periods of rapid and uneven social change - when one subsystem of society changes more rapidly than others." Third, negative stereotypes of different groups create potential state in which minor changes in social conditions give rise to strain. Fourth, "any specific norm-oriented movement may be the product of many different kinds of strain. Fifth, "to become a

¹ Smelser 1962,274f.

² Smelser 1962,278. Italics in original.

determinant... a condition of strain must combine with appropriate conditions of structural conduciveness."¹

When the previous determinants are present, the generalized belief can begin to develop. It "includes a diagnosis of the forces and agents that are making for a failure of normative regulation. It also involves some sort of program." Generalized beliefs may develop over decades in public, they may crystallise in the mind of an individual, they may be a declaration, or they may be a loan from other culture. All the precipitating factors

mark the sudden establishment or symbolization of one of the conditions of conduciveness or strain. In this way precipitating factors focus the belief on a particular person, event, or situation. In addition, precipitating factors create a sense of urgency and hasten the mobilization of action.²

The final determinant of norm-oriented movement, mobilisation for action, takes normally a much longer period than what is required for other types of collective behavior. This makes mobilisation very problematic. Smelser presents four themes that are related to it, namely leadership, the real and derived phases of mobilisation, the effect of success or failure to specific strategies and tactics, and the effect of success or failure to movement's development.³

A movement does not act in a vacuum and thus the reactions of the agencies of social control influence the movement. Smelser states that

in a first place, a *general* encouragement of a norm-oriented movement by political authorities... usually boosts and consolidates the movement... conversely, when government discourages a movement, a decline in its membership follows... this policy is likely to drive a militant minority underground, into hostile displays, or into value-oriented movements.⁴

¹ Smelser 1962, 287-292.

² Smelser 1962, 292ff.

³ Smelser 1962, 296-306.

⁴ Smelser 1962, 306f.

Smelser state that authorities who do not want that kind of reactions have no other choice than to permit the legitimate expressions of the grievance and give a hearing to the complaints.¹

4.2.7. The Value-oriented Movement

The value-oriented movement is, according to Smelser, "a collective attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create values in the name of generalized belief." He includes in this group different nativistic, messianic, millenarian, utopian, religious, political, nationalistic, and charismatic movements. Value-oriented beliefs "may involve the restoration of past values, the perpetuation of present values, the creation of new values for the future, or any mixture of these." He further distinguishes religious movements and secular movements because these have different outcomes. Religious movements may cause religious revolutions like the Reformation and formation of collectivities within the political system. In the same way political movements may cause political revolutions or parties that act in legal ways. Both forms can of course disappear, be transformed or absorbed into some other movement.²

Value-oriented movements have three characteristics that make their classification difficult. First, movements tend to change when they are adopted into a different context. Second, they occur in periods that produce also many other kinds of collective behavior. Third, during movements' lifespan they may change from one form into another.³

¹ Smelser 1962,307.

² Smelser 1962,313-316.

³ Smelser 1962,317.

Structural conduciveness that gives rise to either political or religious movement depends on the status of the religion in the society: "When the world-view is religious, then, protests against the world invariably become defined in religious terms." Further, Smelser states that "value-oriented beliefs... arise when alternative means for reconstituting the social situation are perceived as unavailable." In practice this means that such beliefs arise typically "(1) among politically disinherited peoples, especially recent migrants; (2) among colonially dominated peoples; (3) among persecuted minorities; (4) in inflexible political structures; (5) in post-revolutionary situations; (6) in situations marked by the failure of government by political parties."¹

After explaining structural conduciveness Smelser moves into the strain that underlies the value-oriented movement. According to him value-oriented beliefs quite often arise under situations of deprivation. He states that "such deprivations are relative to expectations." Here Smelser refers to ideas of relative deprivation theory without mentioning it. According to relative deprivation theory the improvement of one sphere of life creates expectations towards the another sphere. If the expectations are not fulfilled, this creates relative deprivation. However, Smelser notes that "for any value-oriented movement, strains are multiple and complex."¹

In the same way as in the case of norm-oriented movements, generalized "beliefs 'explain' the conditions of strain which give rise to it." They "concentrate on a source of evil which overshadows all of life." This evil threatens the whole existence. In the same belief there also is a positive element which gives a view of how this evil

¹ Smelser 1962,319-338.

can be overthrown and the harmony re-established. When there is a precipitating event, this factor links the belief to a concrete situation and enables belief's actualisation.²

In a similar way as in the case of norm-oriented movements, the mobilisation and social control are bound together, although they can be analytically distinguished. Here are also the same factors: leadership, real and derived aspects, influences of success and failure to specific tactics, and general development.³

AS A CRYSTALLISATION of his theory Smelser states: "people under strain mobilize to reconstitute the social order in the name of a generalized belief." His theory "is built on two sets of organising constructs: the components of social action, and the value-added process."⁴

4.2.8. Evaluating Smelser's Theory

Evaluation of Smelser's theory starts from his root metaphor of value-added process. It is at the same time the strength and weakness of his theory. In many cases the metaphor is valid and it combines the different forms of collective behavior into a coherent set. However, the basic weakness lies in the assumption that all norm-oriented and value-oriented movements have gone through certain stages. To follow Smelser's metaphor, a product can be made in many different ways. A boat can be carved direct from a tree; it can be made of board or of plywood; it can be pressed of plastic or constructed of classfiber; or it can be welded of metal. In all cases the result is a

¹ Smelser 1962, 338-342.

² Smelser 1962, 348, 352.

³ Smelser 1962, 352-379.

⁴ Smelser 1962, 383, 385.

boat but the processes how the different types of boats were made are quite different. Smelser did not take into account the old rule in using parables: they should not be taken literally. He was trapped in his root metaphor of line production of similar kinds of products. However, there still exists handicrafts that are unique in their formation and shape.

However, Smelser's theory also has many valuable components. Basically he is quite Weberian in his emphasis of values as root causes for action. This is true in many cases. People act normally according to their values. However, this is only one side of the coin. People also act against their values or do not recognise them. In some cases people adopt values because they have to justify themselves what they are doing. In such cases the action comes first and then comes the definition of values. In this sense the previous theories of collective behavior seem to illustrate the other side: the interaction processes create common beliefs.

Anthony Oberschall has noted that Smelser's credit was on three main themes. First Smelser points out how the causes of conflicts are mediated and filtered before they are activated in episodes of collective behavior. Secondly Smelser standardised the terminology and systematised the determinants of collective behavior. Finally, his interaction orientation (between strain and conductiveness on one hand and generalized belief and social control on the other) shapes the aggregate outcome.¹

Oberschall also criticises Smelser:

Just when collective behavior theorists are coming to see continuities between everyday behavior and routine social processes, Smelser's emphasis is on discontinuities and differences. When other sociologists are coming to see the

¹ Oberschall 1973, 23.

rational components in collective behavior, Smelser's emphasis is on the nonrational components; when sociologists emphasize the diversity of beliefs, motives, and perceptions...Smelser emphasizes the homogenizing effects of generalized beliefs.¹

However, Smelser's concept of generalized belief remains one of the 'pearls' of his theory. It found support from later new social movement research where ideologies, frames and identities are central. Rationality, what Oberschall calls for is a vague concept that too often is reduced to utilitarian rationality. In value rationality the belief systems - or generalized beliefs - are extremely important because they explain why the action is rational from the actor's perspective.

Smelser's view of social movements is more narrow than Park's and Blumer's. He implicitly excludes fads and mass migrations from the category. However, still his determination remains rather wide including parties and other norm-oriented organisations, nativistic, messianic, millenarian, utopian, religious, political, nationalistic and charismatic movements. His distinction between norm and value oriented movement is interesting. In general, it seems that social movement scholars have been interested only of norm-oriented movements leaving value-oriented movements to be a task of anthropologists and students of sociology of religion. Smelser sees both categories as social movements.

In the case of INGOs, one must remember that INGOs in the context of the European Union have more characteristics of national norm-oriented movements than in the context of the United Nations. This is because the EU has legal authority on the member states but the UN has not. Thus lobbying in European level is different from in global level. This might mean that global INGOs could in

¹ Oberschall 1973,22.

turn more characteristics of value-oriented movements. But, on one hand there is so big variety of INGOs and on the other hand value and norm orientations are mixed in individual organisations, that this distinction cannot be used for the classification of INGOs. However, the YMCA is definitely a value-oriented movement although it also has had an indirect effect to some international norms (for example, to the treatment of refugees).

Smelser's strict distinction between religious and secular movements is not valid in the case of the YMCA. Although it started as a revival movement, its main emphasis today is (and already was when Smelser wrote his book) in secular social services. This is true also in the case of Settlement movement, Mother Teresa's order and many other such religious movements that emphasise 'the Gospel of hands'.

5. Other Strings of Collective Behavior Approach

While the core of collective behavior constituted of interactionist and structural functionalistic studies, there are also other strings that were linked to this tradition. However, it can also be said that the concept of collective behavior was a concept that meant both the research tradition and collective action in general (like Jeep, Ski-Doo, Vespa and Xerox have some time given their names to mean all similar kinds of equipment). Thus it is a matter of opinion if the following theory traditions are included in or excluded from collective behavior tradition.

In the case of INGOs they do give much because they are macro theories of societies. They do not deal with such dynamics that can be applied to international level where societies interact with each other through their representative individuals. However, they are worth to introduce shortly because they have had a role in the studies of social movements.

5.1. Social Movements as a Result of Alienation

Mass society tradition¹ has sometimes been added as a third string to collective behavior traditions. It was launched by **William Kornhauser**². The main idea in this tradition has been the Durkheimian ideas of the process in which the traditional forms of community have declined and society has become impersonal³. Primary ties and community cohesion become weak and people will be integrated to

¹ Mayer 1991,59. McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1988,696f.

² Kornhauser 1959.

³ Rootes 1994,371ff.

large-scale organisations¹. Mass movements act in this context, too. Kornhauser states that "mass movements do not build on existing social relations but instead construct direct ties between participants and leaders."²

In fact, mass society, according to Kornhauser, is a social system in which elite are readily accessible to influence by non-elite, and non-elite are readily available for mobilization by elite.³

The critique of mass society theory can be summarised into three notions. Matti Hyvärinen reminds that "Kornhauser's theory aims to be a democratic analogue to Le Bon's aristocratic critics of masses... Movement is a crowd⁴." Oberschall, like many others, points out that empirical findings oppose the main theses of mass society theory. Gary T. Marx and James L. Wood conclude that "mass movements do not seem to usually originate among those who are most socially isolated. Instead members of stable organizations - who experience some discontent - are likely to be early recruits⁵."

When commenting Kornhauser's theory, Turner and Killian point out that it is dealing only with mass movements which "he explicitly contrasts to class movements and to reform movements that abound in pluralistic societies." Thus Kornhauser's theory does not deal with all kinds of movements and it should be used in analysing other than mass movements. Thus critic, in this respect, has been unfair. According to Turner and Killian, Kornhauser has also been misinterpreted in an other thesis. "...people are mobilizable not because they are without personal ties but because the groups to which they

¹ Turner & Killian 1987, 390.

² Kornhauser 1968, 60.

³ Kornhauser 1959, 39.

⁴ Hyvärinen 1985, 75f (my translation).

⁵ Oberschall 1973, 104-113. Marx & Wood 1975, 392.

belong have no linkages to the state."¹ Kornhauser's point is that mass and totalitarian movements are likely to arise in societies where there are few secondary organisations (i.e. the so called third sector) mediating between the state and the family or individual. On the other hand in those societies where there are strong networks of secondary organisations, the protest will be of a more limited variety.

5.2. Social Movements as a Result of Relative Deprivation

5.2.1. Reference Group Theory

The relative deprivation approach is the fourth addition as a string in the collective behavior approach. It has in turn three notable strings. They can be called **reference group theory**, **frustration-aggression theory** and **J-curve theory**.

William E.B. DuBois noted already in 1899 that "a white Philadelphian with \$1500 a year can call himself poor and live simply. A Negro with \$ 1500 a year ranks with the richest of his race and must usually spend more in proportion than his white neighbour in rent, dress and entertainment."² **Herbert H. Hyman** was the first who labelled this type of phenomenon with the concept of reference group in 1942³.

One hallmark in the use of the relative deprivation idea was the project called **The American Soldier** in the 1940s. **Samuel A. Stouffer** and his colleagues⁴ explained with the

¹ Turner & Killian 1987, 389.

² DuBois 1967(1899), cited by Merton & Rossi 1968(1950), 330.

³ Hyman 1942, cited by Merton & Rossi 1968(1950), 329f.

⁴ Stouffer & al 1949

concept why some well-paid soldiers in the US Army were discontent¹. The ideas of Stouffer were elaborated by several scholars. In 1950 Robert Merton and **Alice S. Rossi**² elaborated the **theory of reference groups**. Using the American Soldier data they found that there were three types of references that the soldiers had. First they compared themselves to those "with whom they were in *actual association*." A second reference group was that of "the *same status*" or those "in the *same social category*" without necessarily direct interaction. A third comparison was with those of "*different status* or in a *different social category*." These statuses included such positions as marriage, being overseas, being in combat, education, rank, etc. These comparisons, however, "do not fall simply into one or another of these three types but involve various combinations of them."³

Thus a married man can compare his situation to unmarried men in army and to those in civilian life. A black soldier can compare himself to whites in army or other blacks in civil. A captain can compare his salary to the salaries of others in the same rank or with the same social status, etc.

From this basis Merton and Rossi call for the development of a theory of reference group behaviour. They put it as follows:

*under which conditions are associates within one's own groups taken as a frame of reference for self-evaluation and attitude-formation, and under which conditions do out-groups or non-membership groups provide the significant frame for reference?*¹

Merton and Rossi note that the authors of the American Soldier had focused more on relative *deprivation* than

¹ Gurr 1970, 24; Runciman 1966, 10, 17ff, 22ff.

² Merton & Rossi 1968(1950).

³ Merton & Rossi 1968(1950), 285.

relative deprivation. Thus they underline that it is the relative aspect of the concept that has common elements with the reference group theory, not the deprivation as such. In this respect, one of the best examples in the data is the attitude of married men towards their situation. Although they were in the same position than unmarried soldiers, they felt that they had given a bigger sacrifice than their fellows. When married soldiers compared themselves to married civilian men, they felt that they were asked for sacrifices that the others were totally escaping. Thus the absolute deprivation of both married and unmarried soldiers was equal but the married ones felt their situation to be worse than the situation of others.²

Walter C. Runciman³ stated in 1966 that "the related notions of 'relative deprivation' and 'reference group' both derive from familiar truism: that people's attitudes, aspirations and grievances largely depend on the frame of reference within which they are conceived⁴." Thus the feeling of deprivation depends on with whom someone is comparing himself. It is related to feelings of justice as Runciman says: "Only the theory of justice, therefore, can provide an adequate assessment of relative deprivation⁵." The source can also be the comparison to individual's own past, some abstract ideal, or the standards articulated by his/her reference group. Anthropologist **David F. Aberle** has given perhaps the best definition of relative deprivation. It is "a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and actuality⁶." This feeling is

¹ Merton & Rossi 1968(1950),287. Italics in original.

² Merton & Rossi 1968(1950),288,299.

³ Runciman 1967(1966).

⁴ Turner & Killian 1987,250f.

⁵ Runciman 1967,251.

⁶ According to Gurr 1970,25.

then either articulated as a grievance or it causes sublimation in other dimensions of life.

5.2.2. Frustration-aggression Theory

The other string of relative deprivation stems from **John Dollard's** and his colleagues frustration-aggression theory which in turn stands on the basis of Freud's work¹. Their main thesis was that "aggression is always a consequence of frustration²." Early empirical works were based on their theses and vocabulary.

In this stream one of the leading theorists has been **Ted Robert Gurr**. In his work **Why Men Rebel** he starts from the psychological theories of aggression. He denies the theories of revolutionary personalities, just mentions Freud's theories of aggression as an instinct and child (and social) psychological theories of learned aggression, and takes the lead developed by Dollard and his colleagues. Gurr writes: "The frustration-aggression and the related threat-aggression mechanisms provide the basic motivational link between RD [=relative deprivation] and the potential for collective violence." Gurr also links three other concepts to relative deprivation, namely dissonance, anomie and conflict. The second of these, anomie is important in its effect to value opportunities. There are three models of how the differentiation of value expectations and value capabilities have impact on relative deprivation. **Decremental deprivation model** describes the situation where the expectations are stable but capabilities decline. In **aspirational deprivation model** the capabilities remain the same but the expectations increase. The last model, J-curve or

¹ Dollard & al, 1964(1939), ix.

² Dollard & al, 1964(1939), 1.

progressive deprivation model, fits into situations where expectations and capabilities first increase hand in hand but then capabilities stop to increase or decrease while expectations still go on.¹

From relative deprivation Gurr makes a link to political violence as follows:

The disposition to collective violence depends on how badly societies violate socially derived expectations about the means and ends of human action... It is most likely to occur in societies that rely on coercion to maintain order in lieu of providing adequate patterns of value-satisfying action... By contrast, if discontented people have or get constructive means to attain their social and material goals, few will resort to violence.

Discontent has potential political consequences to the extent that men believe violence against political actors is justified in a normative sense, and potentially useful in enhancing or defending their value positions.²

Gurr points out that relative deprivation, normative and utilitarian justifications are secondary variables in the process. They create the primary variables which are potential for collective violence, and potential for political violence. These secondary variables together with regime control and support create the magnitude of political violence. He also reminds that his models are probabilistic, not deterministic. With this notion he avoids the usual structural problem how to get from potential to action. He offers instructions to operationalise the concept of relative deprivation but he does not use these operational definitions to analyse different data or movements.³

The criticism of relative deprivation approach has stressed that it has little support from empirical evidence. Additionally, Gurr and many others use more such data as employment rate instead of data about people's

¹ Gurr 1970, 30-58.

² Gurr 1970, 317, 319

³ Gurr 1970, 318, 320.

perceptions. In such cases it is more a question of absolute than relative deprivation. Multivariate studies show that relative deprivation is neither sufficient nor even necessary element of protests.¹

However, rebellion is not the only possible outcome of behavior according to this tradition. The other possible form of behavior is **compensative action**. For various reasons it has been central in sociology of religion, too. In religious movement studies sectarianism has been interpreted as an activity of deprived people who seek compensations from religion². However, evaluation of religious movement studies is another story and will be told in other time.

5.2.3. J-Curve Theory

In the early 1960s **James C. Davies** developed his **J-curve theory** based on the theories by Karl Marx and **Alexis de Tocqueville**³. He notes that Marx was not actually speaking of "progressive degradation of the proletariat but rather an improvement in workers' economic condition which did not keep pace with the growing welfare of capitalists and therefore produced social tension." De Tocqueville had, in turn, stated that the rebellions often start when the life conditions start to get better from hard oppression.⁴

Davies notes that when there is a tolerable gap between expected need satisfaction and actual need satisfaction, everything is fine. However, if the expectations are growing but what people gain does not, there will be a

¹ Marx & Wood 1975, 376-379.

² See, for example Glock 1964, for critical aspects, Hine 1974.

³ Davies notes that "this curve is of course not to be confused with its prior and altogether different use by Floyd Allport in his study of social conformity." Davies 1962, 8n.

⁴ Davies 1962, 5f.

point where the situation is felt intolerable. In this moment revolutions occur. As Davies state it:

Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal.¹

Davies mentions, following de Tocqueville, that when the whole society is impoverished the "energies of people are totally employed in the process of merely staying alive." In this kind of situations "the family is a - perhaps the major - solidary unit and even the local community exists primarily to the extent families need it to act together to secure their separate survival." Davies notes that if people have to choose "between losing their lives and their chains, people will mostly choose to keep their chains, a fact that Marx seems to have overlooked." Only after there is a possibility to stay alive, people are ready to cast their chains away. This condition Davies calls *proto-rebelliousness*.²

5.3. Redefinitions of Collective Behaviour After Attack

THE STUDENT ACTIVISM of the 1960s came as a surprise to both sociologists and governments. Neither structural functionalists nor interactionists could sufficiently fit student activism in their theories. Students were not taken seriously and their behavior was explained by psychological reasons like 'the alienation of youth', 'oedipal complexes', and 'conflict of generations.' When students found themselves to be as well research objects as researchers, they had to rethink the theories that labelled them irrational. They were displeased with such interpretations that in their mobilisation it is a question of identity problems of youth or conflict between

¹ Davies 1962,6.

² Davies 1962,7.

generations. Collective behavior approach lost its reliability. The lesson to sociology can be that it is not wise to label people with such concepts that they do not accept. The same sociology students who were labelled by collective behavior theories seem to drop these theories from their own paradigms when they started their own researches. A Kuhnian paradigm shift led to the **resource mobilization**¹ approach in the 1970s.²

The theoretical critics of the collective behavior tradition pointed out that this tradition had focused mostly on the emergence and micro-dynamics of the movements³. As Margit Mayer said it: "...they all explained the origins of social movements by reference to the same dynamics that accounted for individual participation in movement activities."⁴ They did not say much of the development and change of the movements in time. In a similar way the relative deprivation and mass society approaches were more interested of the preliminary conditions from which the movements rose than the movements themselves.⁵

In the critics there seem to be a claim that all collective behavior research was on micro or meso level. I question if this critics fit its target. Especially Smelser but the Langs and Kornhauser also focus on macro level roots and consequences of collective behavior. The point is that they saw that the main actors are individuals and not cultures or structures. "Cultures do

¹ Turner and Killian remind that the irrationalism of collective behavior in Smelser's theory was alien to the main stream of collective behavior research. Turner & Killian 1987,239. However it seems that it has been understood as the dominant line because it was part of then dominant structural functionalistic theory.

² Eyerman and Jamison 1991,19-23; Mayer 1991,62.

³ See, e.g., Weller & Quarantelli 1973,670-674.

⁴ Mayer 1991,60.

⁵ McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1988,697; Mayer 1991,59ff; Buechler 1993,218f.

not act", as Turner and Killian note. Thus every time than a culture or structure changes, the actual transformator is a group of people.

However, while a lot of the critics of collective behavior tradition are valid, it could be questioned if the subject matter of the critics lies in the debate whether the society is a sum of individuals or the individuals are products of the society. In some of the critics it is clearly seen that the critics have such determination for sociology that it automatically condemns action oriented theories as unsociological¹.

When resource mobilization approach appeared, it almost pushed collective behavior approach to history. However, collective behavior tradition did not disappear totally. In their third edition of **Collective Behavior** from 1987 Turner and Killian combine the collective behavior approach with the later research. They now define collective behavior as follows:

Collective behavior may be defined as those forms of social behavior in which usual conventions cease to guide social action and people collectively transcend, bypass, or subvert established institutional patterns and structures.²

In most parts this definition is the same than the one in their first edition. The emphasis that sets them apart from resource mobilization theorists is their distinction of collective and conventional behaviour.

While Turner and Killian use their old definition of the social movement, they also point out that a social movement is not equivalent to its **constituency**³,

¹ See, e.g., Weller & Quarantelli 1973,670-674.

² Turner & Killian 1987,3.

³ "The term *constituency* is borrowed from politics. An elected public official's constituency consists of all the people eligible to vote." Turner & Killian 1987,225.

sympathisers, opposition or **bystanders**. "Constituency includes people who are indifferent or opposed to the movement or only passively sympathetic, and who therefore should not be included within the movement." Sympathisers are those who do not help the movement in any way. They may or may not belong to the constituency. These distinctions are important because many movements claim to speak with the authority of the whole constituency. Thus, "a nationalistic movement claims to speak for the nation, a labor movement for all the workers... and peace movement for all peace lovers."¹

Turner and Killian further distinct activists from adherents:

Since being a movement is a matter of attitude and action rather than formal induction, we speak of movement adherents rather than members. In most movements the supporting actions of most adherents are fairly minimal... It is sometimes useful to distinguish activists from the bulk of adherents by the level of effort and sacrifice they give to the cause.²

However, they point out that "movement boundaries can seldom, if ever, be set with precision, because of the existence of movements within movements and overlapping movements."¹

Turner and Killian also recognise the contribution of resource mobilization theory. They agree that organisations play an important role in movements and that movement is "often an umbrella term... applied to many organizations." However, sometimes movement is a product of one single organisation, as it often is the case in religious movements, some self-help movements and charismatic political movements. They hold their old view that in the continuum of individual behaviour - collective

¹ Turner & Killian 1987, 225.

² Turner & Killian 1987, 225.

behavior - organised behaviour, social movements fall between collective and organised behaviour and have characteristics from both.²

However, Turner and Killian also have some critical questions to resource mobilization theorists. First, if one of the basic claims of the theory is that 'resource' and 'mobilisation' are exact and measurable concepts then the crucial point is what is counted as resources and mobilisation and what is not. Second, Turner and Killian are not happy with the claims of rationality. Authors note that firms do not act rationally, either³. Further, in movements it is impossible to give orders to the adherents. Third, resource mobilization theory forgets the reciprocity of activists and adherents. It is a question of more than only the mobilisation of the adherents. Fourth, values, goals, grievances and conceptions of reality have been taken as granted and not as research objects. Fifth, resource mobilization concentrates on the changes in legislation and other macro level phenomena and forgets to study the changes in micro level.⁴

In the elaboration of the theory of social movements, Turner and Killian list three features:

- (1) the occurrence of a disposition to transcend, bypass, or subvert established institutional patterns and structures;
- (2) the translation of perceptions, feelings, and ideas into action;
- (3) action that takes place collectively rather than singly.⁵

The first feature includes the emergent norms which specify both behavior and conceptions of the situation that guide and justify extra-institutional action. Emergent norms range from the merely permissive to the obligatory... emergent norms emphasize the obligatory nature of the movement's mission, and

¹ Turner & Killian 1987,225.

² Turner & Killian 1987,229f.

³ To this statement they get backing from institutional theories of organisation sociologists. See, for example, Meyer & Rowan 1977,341.

⁴ Turner & Killian 1987,235f.

⁵ Turner & Killian 1987,241.

their normative conceptions of the situation are elaborated into Ideologies and goal hierarchies.

The emergent norm is so central in Turner and Killian's thinking that they point out:

Essential to the understanding of social movements is therefore the understanding of processes leading to the development of movement ideology and goals, and the emergent sense of an obligatory mission.¹

In this way Turner and Killian underline that the important thing in social movement is its *raison d'être*. In this respect authors oppose the resource mobilization theorists who in an opportunistic way proclaim that all the reasons are good and if there are not good reasons, they can be invented.

The second feature is about feasibility (it is possible to do something) and timeliness ('Now or never!'-thinking). The third one presupposes the situation that is out of the range of ordinal happenings (people would act traditionally) and the existence of pre-existing groups in which the new interpretation is made.²

Turner and Killian also point out that the value orientations play a central role in movements. They are used in four ways:

1. Value orientations are used for internal guidance within a movement. They supply answers to the questions: What do we believe? What are we trying to accomplish it? How should we be trying to accomplish it?
2. Value orientations are used to foster solidarity and persistence of effort within the movement... Distillation of ideology and goals into slogans is particularly suited for this purpose.
3. Value orientations are used in appeal for support from constituencies. Indeed this is often the use that stimulates the first systematic efforts to commit goals and ideology to writing... Among themselves... the committed often see no need to formalize their shared convictions.

¹ Turner & Killian 1987,241.

² Turner & Killian 1987,241f.

4. Value orientations are used to represent the movement to outsiders.¹

For this, value orientations must fulfil the following criteria:

1. Value orientations must focus social unrest and activate latent discontent by *identifying a problem in terms that are meaningful and resonant* for potential constituencies.
2. Value orientations must provide a *history and diagnosis* of the problem that explain how it came to be and clarify the directions in which solutions should be sought.
3. Value orientations must serve to *organise and sustain attention and activity*. This is accompanied by establishing a hierarchy of goals, ranging from those that are almost immediately attainable to others that are virtually unattainable.
4. Value orientations must convey *assurance of timely success* for the movement.
5. Value orientations must establish the legitimacy of the movement and its goals, so as to identify the cause as a moral mission. The ideology accomplishes this most directly by anchoring the cause to established sacred values and mores, but declaring a new interpretation and novel application.
6. Value orientations must identify the character of the movement and the style of its adherents... The movement's symbolic leaders must personify the movement's character.²

Collective behavior approach seems to have adopted many results of the other American approaches. The book of Turner and Killian is still one of the best introductions to the field. Its weakness is that it has no reference to the European modern scholars of new social movements.

In the 1980s the resource mobilization theory got other opponents than collective behavior, too. In the US **David A. Snow** and **Robert Benford**³ used Erving Goffman's⁴ framing perspective, **Aldon Morris**, **Hank Johnston** and **Michael Billing** used **Clifford Geertz's** cultural approach⁵, and **Ann Swindler** used the performative tradition of cultural

¹ Turner & Killian 1987,278.

² Turner & Killian 1987,278-282.

³ Snow & Benford 1992. Other works focus on the interface of culture, reality construction, consciousness, and contention. Snow & Oliver 1995,586.

⁴ Goffman 1959.

⁵ Johnston and Klandermans 1995,5ff.

studies¹. In Europe the new social movement approach concentrated on identity². All these challenged the theses of the resource mobilisation approach. However, it is another story and will be told another time.

¹ Johnston and Klandermans 1995, 7f.

² "What individuals are claiming collectively is their right to realise their own identity." Melucci 1980, 218.

6. Summary and Discussion on the Collective Behavior Approach

6.1. Some General Remarks

In the beginning of the century the collective behavior study was mostly social psychological or psychological. Its focus was mostly on micro and meso levels and it included wider spectrum of phenomena than only social movements. Actually, its main focus was on visible mass phenomena and the concept of crowd was the root metaphor of collective behavior. In the 1960s and the 1970s this view was challenged by resource mobilization theory which saw social movements as institutional forms of action. The root metaphor had shifted from crowd to American political campaign or lobbying. As **Steven M. Buechler** put it: "according to this perspective, social movements are an extension of politics by other means, and can be analyzed in terms of conflicts of interests just like other forms of political struggle¹."

Benigno E. Aguirre and E.L. Quarantelli have summed the critics of collective behavior as follows: "Criticisms of the field of collective behavior can be categorized as methodological, ideological, or conceptual-theoretical²." Also other reviewers note the influence of different point of reference that has caused the debates. **J. Craig Jenkins** has put it in this way:

Social movements are traditionally seen as extensions of more elementary forms of collective behavior and as encompassing both movements of personal change (e.g. religious sects, cults, and communes) and those focused on institutional change (e.g. legal

¹ Buechler 1993,218.

² Aguirre & Quarantelli 1983.

reforms and changes in political power). Resource mobilisation theories have, in contrast, seen social movements as extensions of institutionalized actions and have restricted their focus to movements of institutional change that attempt to alter 'elements of social structure and/or the reward distribution of society', organize previously unorganized groups against institutional elites, or represent the interests of groups excluded from the polity.

Most of the disputes in the field flow from this difference.¹

Thus the world view or frame of the research community has been important in paradigm shifts in the field. Basically in this debate it is question of which one comes first - individual or structure. Collective behavior theorists underlined the importance of an individual actor and the influence of ideas. Resource mobilization theorists, in contrast, favoured institutions. The European new social movement approach has shifted the focus again into such issues as identity, ideology and individual motivation. In spite of hard attacks, the ideas of collective behavior theory still are alive, although not necessarily under this label. Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison sum this as follows: "While most sociologists have attempted to move beyond this earlier dominant perspective, it has proved difficult to develop an alternative conceptualization of similar explanatory power²." Below I will evaluate the collective behavior theory, first in general, and then thematically.

While looking at the publications of collective behavior (and, in general, social movement) studies one soon realises that the old Western joke about the difference of sociology and anthropology is evident: sociology is about us and anthropology is about them. The studies have focused mainly to the First World. The Third World scholars do not exist in the realm of the discipline. If Parson's stress on cultural backgrounds is taken seriously

¹ Jenkins 1983, 529. See also Buechler 1993, 218f.

² Eyerman & Jamison 1991, 14.

it means that the theories do not necessarily fit into a context that is outside the Judeo-Christian culture.

The second finding is that the studies are focusing on local or national level. There are quite a few studies that try to take into account the global perspective. As I mentioned, the Third World is missing but so do the actors of 'the global village', namely non-governmental organisations (NGO), too. Rather few studies even mention the concept of (international) non-governmental organisation, which is the main form for social movements today. Although the main increase in the number of NGOs took place after the 1970s there were certainly enough of them to gain data. Red Cross, Young Men's Christian Association (and its allies Young Women's Christian Association, Scouts, World Student Christian Federation), Olympic movement and labour movement might be the biggest ones at that time. Theories do not tell anything about the mechanisms of international movements.

The third finding is related to the previous note. Theories have mostly quite narrow historical perspective. Although we do not always need to go to Old Testament times¹, the time perspective is often too narrow. Buechler notes that "Turner and Killian's formulation... was oriented to short-term, spontaneous actions²." Moreover, the more the theories were bound to the main stream sociology the more the time perspective is limited. This is perhaps because sociologists have a tendency to believe in 'timeless' structures that are valid in all times³.

¹ Talcott Parsons called the era circa 700-600 BC the time which formed the value systems of those great cultures that have guided the civilisation that on. Parsons 1969, 558-563.

² Buechler 1993, 218.

³ **Immanuel Wallerstein** has pointed this several times. Wallerstein 1995; 1998.

The fourth remark is that the mainstream theorists of collective behavior saw the phenomenon as a preliminary form of emerging new structure. All the definitions of collective behavior state that it deals with such situations where the old rules do not work anymore. In this kind of situation one has to create something new from *tabula rasa* basis. The background of this thinking might be in Weber's prophet - priest distinction. As **Peter Berger**¹ has shown, Weber used the results of Old Testament exegetics, which in that time, saw prophets totally distinct from priestly organisations. Prophets were 'voices in the desert' and the movements they established were based purely on their message.

However, it is another question if such forms of collective behavior as propaganda (Blumer) and mass communication (Lang and Lang) are really elementary behavior without previous models and which establish new structures. The same question can be made also in the case of social movements. In many cases they are offsprings of existing organisations or networks and the process of the movement growth starts as an episode in the mother organisation and remains there until it has organised itself as a new organisation. Against the exegetical results of Weber's time, later Biblical scholars found that many prophets came from existing organisations (Jesajah was a cousin of the Jewish king and John the Baptist had connections to Essenes). This phenomenon has also occurred later. Luther was a monk and the Reformation was never really in unorganised stage. It just took the previous organisation with it. In the modern era the US civil rights movement was based on black congregations and priests. These cases show that a prophet does necessarily

¹ Berger 1963.

come from outside. A priest or statesman can also become a prophet.

Fifth general note is that the root metaphors of collective behavior changed when mass communications improved. The metaphor of crowd dominated the early theories at a time when there were no other communication forms than press, letters and telegram. At that time the only way of collective action was physical gathering. When the electronic communication channels emerged, they enabled other forms of collective behavior. This in turn changed the paradigm. Next I will look at these metaphors more closely.

Collective behavior theory tradition was, in general, an attempt to explain the elementary human behaviour. At the same time it aimed to interpret how the structures of society emerge. Social movements were seen as mediatory processes that created these structures. However, in spite of the aim of theorising the emergence of new structures from individual interactions, both strings of collective behavior remained on micro level and on movement formation rather than on movement development¹.

Seeing collective behavior tradition from the perspective of the dawn of the new Millennium, it can be said that the scholars evaluated in this study have laid the foundations for social movement studies. Of course, there is much in the theories that can be criticised but that is always the fate of the pioneers. In any case, the collective behavior theorists paved the way for the next generations. Their main theses remained to live their own life even when the sources of these theses have been

¹ Eyerman and Jamison 1991,13. McAdam & al 1988. Mayer 1991,60.

forgotten. Below I will take a look at some of the main theses of collective behavior tradition.

6.2. Elementary and Conventional Behaviour

The distinction between elementary and conventionalised behaviour was questioned already in collective behavior theories. However, it still has influence in contemporary sociology. Perhaps the main effect is that the field of social movement studies on the one hand, and fields of organisation studies and third sector studies on the other, are still quite far away from each other. This is surprising because all these three traditions focus on social movement organisations and nongovernmental organisations. There is no rational reason for this separation but only the scientific tradition. I agree with Immanuel Wallerstein¹ that these kinds of boundaries should be questioned quite seriously.

The idea that there are situations where the old norms and customs are not valid sounds reasonable. However, as Turner and Killian point out, in such situations the basis for the behaviour comes from the inheritance of those people in such a situation. The issue, that should have been studied more carefully than the collective behaviorists did, is the importance of ethics and world views in the new situations. From which basis the new models are made? What is ethically possible and what is not? From this point of view there is clearly a difference between Russian Revolution and Indian independence struggle. The former valued human life quite little but the latter kept it as one of its basic values and used only pacifistic methods in its struggle.

Elementary behaviour can occur also as episodes inside the conventionalised behaviour. Sometimes an organised movement faces for the first time some new phenomenon and it has to improvise. Sometimes the elementary forms of behaviour are created by agitating people out to the streets. Examples of this kind of phenomenon are Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre in 1572 and Crystal Night in 1938. Both were organised by ruling elite but were typical examples of aggressive crowd behaviour. The mass demonstrations have this kind of features, too. Sidney Tarrow calls the peaks of protests as moments of madness².

However, there also are more peaceful versions of elementary behaviour inside the organised movements. Different situations where expressions can be released belong to this category. These can be found especially in the meetings of charismatic religious movements where there are periods when the 'Book' is left besides and the 'Spirit' is supposed to speak. This is what happens in the movements that collective behaviour theorists call expressive movements.

6.3. Classifications of Collective Behavior

The first remark is that the classifications and prototypes are always children of their time. Crowd was a natural metaphor for collective action at a time where electronic mass communication was unknown. Physical gathering was the only way for joint action. Contemporary situation with possibilities to have connections round the world in seconds does not require such a metaphor. One has to remember the old rule of Bible interpreters that you should not interpret every detail from a parable. You

¹ Wallerstein 1995; 1998.

² Tarrow 1993.

should concentrate into the message of it. In a similar way, the metaphors can be useful in explaining some features of phenomena but not all aspects of them. Classifications should also be used sensitively. Especially in the case of multi-purpose movements it is hard to classify them only into one category.

However, keeping in mind the warnings above, Blumer's classification of social movements has some validity. The concept of general social movement explains the emergence of the ideas before they materialise themselves as visible mobility. Thus Blumer follows Weber's thesis of the importance of ideas pro material things. Blumer compares ideas with cultural trends. In this case it is important to note that there is a difference between concepts 'cultural trend' and '*zeitgeist*'¹. Cultural trend is only one stream inside the *zeitgeist* which in turn is a combination of all the trends and experiences presented in some era. Somewhere between them is a concept 'megatrend'² which is a powerful trend that is clearly visible in the discussions of the era.

If the general movement is more like a trend, Blumer's specific and expressive movements are those that are normally understood as movements. His definition of social movement is wide compared to some later scholars³ who limit the concept only to specific movements, if not even to its subgroup revolutionary movements. This tendency to exclude some movements is problematic because it also bounds some interesting phenomena out. When Pope John Paul II visited Poland he created an expressive mass movement which turned to be a political movement that broke the Communistic rule. In the same way many revivalistic

¹ On *zeitgeist*, see Mannheim 1972.

² On megatrends, see Naisbitt 1982.

³ Tilly 1978,50; Touraine 1981,94; Rammstedt 1978,130.

movements have their political dimension: Biblical fundamentalism is often allied with right wing politics, and Latin American Liberation Theology was an important element in Sandinism in Nicaragua. Nobody can say where the religion stops and the politics begin. In many cases they are the different sides of the same coin.

In general, the notion I made on root metaphors is also valid in the case of classifications: one parable can view only one side of the phenomenon. In the same way classifications frame different phenomena from one certain point of view. In different parliaments we have the typical continuum left - right. However, in Finland there have been both left and right in the same government leaving the centre out. This is because they are close to each other in the axle of urban - rural. If we add the axles of 'greenness', religiosity or feminism, we get again different kinds of classifications. Thus classifications are heavily depending on situations and should be used with care.

6.4. Stages of Movements

What has been said in the cases of root metaphors and classifications is valid in the case of stages as well. The extreme of the theory build on stages came from Smelser. In his case, the root metaphor of automobile factory constitutes the whole theory. However, life is not a factory line and people do not always behave like the theory supposes. In many cases the outfit of movements can be the same but the history behind them is different: number 10 can be got with the calculation 5+5 or with 7+3 or with 11-1. The result is the same even if the basic numbers are all different.

The idea of stages is based on Weber's thesis of bureaucratisation. His mistake was to suppose that charisma is always unstructured. When he trusted the Old Testament scholars of his time, he did not remember that prophets can already be inside the establishment, like Jesaiah (Jewish prince) or Martin Luther (Catholic monk). Especially in the cases when the elite of the society lead social movements the concept of stage does not work in the way the theorists reviewed here have supposed. For example, Scandinavian Lutheran Churches shifted from Catholicism to Lutheranism being all the time in institutional level¹, although the preliminary and popular levels of German Lutheranism had influence in them. Thus the concept of stage is again one of those that should be used with care.

However, the coin is not one-sided. In many cases the theories of stages really seem to explain the development of a movement. For such cases the typologies are valuable. Hopper's four stages (preliminary, popular, formal and institutional) give a loose framework for the development of a movement. The stages that are missing in this theory are the stages inside the institutional stage. Many movements still hold some movement characteristics even if they are institutions². This can be seen in the following cases. First, there are mobilisation episodes inside institutions that are sometimes called protest cycles. In such situations the old institution is activated from its latent institutionalised stage³. It cannot be called a new movement because it uses the resources, reputation, experience, and ideology of the institutionalised

¹ Juva 1962,187.

² Mikko Juva has argued that the entire Finnish Lutheran church became a protest movement in the nineteenth century when it adapted the criticism of Finnish revival movements. Juva 1962,193.

³ See, for example, Bert Klandermans' analysis of the transformation of the Dutch Peace Movement. Klandermans 1994.

movement. Thus much of the energy that a new movement uses into these aspects can be used for other purposes. Second, there is the phenomenon of **second generation** that is central in religious movement studies and especially in the **church-sect** theory¹. It states that the second generation is always closer to the main population than the generation of revival. This in turn leads to new protest and to a new sect. However, the second generation can also be a new boom for the movement with new challenges. The protest against the secularisation of the movement does not always create a new sect but remain in the parent movement². For example, in the YMCA this has been evident: there has been new prophets for new generations that have revitalised the movement. Third, in the cases of world wide movements, a movement can be in different stages in different countries. When the YMCA in the US is highly institutionalised, the same movement in second and third world is still in its popular and/or formal stage. Thus the movement continues to be a movement even if it has established itself. Labour movement has been an establishment for decades but is still a vital force in European societies and uses similar tactics than other non-institutionalised movements.

On the whole, collective behavior tradition did not have much to say about the transformation of the institutionalised movements. This is perhaps because of the root metaphor of crowd which is a momentous phenomenon. Additionally, Weber's dichotomy of charisma and bureaucratise surely has effected in a way that the interest of scholars has stopped when a

¹ Distinction is originally from **Ernst Troeltsch** who elaborated Weber's prophet-priest distinction (1992,331-343). Later elaborations are by **H. Richard Niebuhr** (1954), **J. Milton Yinger** (1957), and **Charles Y. Glock** and **Rodney Stark** (1965).

² This has been the case of Finnish revival movements that have remained in the Lutheran church and have not become sects.

movement has been institutionalised. Although some scholars of collective behavior deny the basic difference of elementary and conventional behaviour, the distinction has determined the boundaries of subdisciplines. Institutions 'belong' into the realm of organisation studies and not into the collective behavior studies.

6.5. Belief Systems of Movements

The view that belief systems are important in social movements comes directly from the theories of Durkheim and Weber. Durkheim saw that collective representations form the society. When they collapse restorative collective action tries to reformulate a new shared interpretation of the world. This model can be seen in the milling processes that Blumer and other scholars emphasised. Milling is a process in which new interpretations are made and new norms formulated. These in turn constitute the basis for collective action. In Weberian thinking this 'ideology first' idea is even more emphasised.

Weber's thinking is strictly opposite to Marxian and Millian emphasis on economical factors that, according to them, constitute the basis for society. The distinction is ancient: "You cannot serve God and wealth¹." If we think the paradigm shift of the 1960s and the 1970s to resource mobilization theory and Marxist based theories, it is quite evident that this distinction was one component in the shift. Marxism did not only create leftist paradigms but it also, as its opposition, shaped right wing thinking. Thus the discussion was polarised to dichotomy left - right. However, both partners of this discussion emphasised material aspects. Spirituality and belief systems were pushed astray. This can be seen in, for

example, how the scientific society received Peter Berger and **Thomas Luckmann's** now famous work ***Social Construction of Reality***². It was simply published during a wrong decade.

While the collective behavior scholars see the importance of belief system, there are variations between them, too. Both Blumer and Parsons emphasise cultural trends (Blumer's general social movement) that lie behind the emergence of any movement. Smelser, Kornhauser and Gurr, in turn, emphasise the structural issues. For all of them, the role of beliefs is in explaining and justifying the action. Blumer's notion of the twofold character of ideology is also interesting. He sees that the movement intellectuals have different ideology than masses. The latter group is not so much aware of doctrines but more aroused by the myths of the movement. This means that a student of movement belief systems should pay attention to different dimensions of the movements' world view. However, these tools are neither available in collective behavior tradition nor in social movement studies in general. A student has to consult sociology of religion³ and anthropology of religion¹ where the dimensions of commitments are studied.

6.6. Social Structures and Movements

The basic thesis of collective behavior is that the task of the field is to study the emerging structures. This means that the emphasis is laid on the elementary behaviour and the focus is mainly on micro level phenomena. However, there are differences between

¹ Matt 6:24

² Berger & Luckmann 1972.

³ Stark & Clock 1968, Clock & Stark 1965.

scholars. Interactionist string draws mostly from social-psychological theories and the general view is that society is a result of individual actions. Especially Turner and Killian emphasise this view. On the other hand, Smelser, Kornhauser and Gurr underline that the structures are the root causes of mobility. In their thinking individual actions are predetermined by structural forces. Lang and Lang are somewhere between these two extremes. In general, the views follow along the old sociological question: which comes first - actor or structure? Their dominance has varied from time to time and it is questionable if there is any final solution for the debate. If such a solution exists, it should be based on their reciprocal relation.

6.7. Movement Membership

Because of the emphasis on micro-level, collective behavior scholars have also written a lot on the people that run the business. There are two kinds of people in movements: leaders and followers. Both of these categories can, in turn, be divided into several sub-categories. Rather a common view is that different stages of movements call for different leaders like agitators, reformers, prophets, martyrs, heroes, statesmen and administrators. In some cases these characteristics are present in one person but often the 'revolution eats its children' and there are changes in leadership. However, there are also such role distinctions that collective behavior scholars do not deal in the reviewed works. Often the group has an instrumental leader and an expressive leader². The former is taking care of the formal side and has the roles of those mentioned above. The latter takes care of the

¹ Smart 1983.

² See, e.g., Bales 1953.

cohesion of the group and is more a shepherd than agitator or administrator. (S)he is the one who makes people feel accepted and needed in the group. In youth movements this role is extremely important because youngsters, in spite of their own opinion, are still unsure of their identity and their role in the world. Thus one of the main tasks of a youth leader is to arise trust and confidence among the group (s)he is leading. Additionally, the leader should be able to react to the needs of youngsters at once. It is worthless to say to eager young people who want to do something that "we will put it to next year's budget."

The followers, in turn consist of central core, rank and file members and peripheral followers, as Lang and Lang put it. If we continue this line from core to periphery, we find that Turner and Killian also mention the sympathisers, constituency, bystanders and opposition. Central core and some part of rank and file members form together the activists. The difference between activists and leaders is not always clear and it does not need to be clear. Activists are those who actually run the business as volunteers. Informal leaders are often found in this group. More passive rank and file members together with sympathisers form the adherency of a movement. Boundaries are not clear cut but depend much on the life situation of an individual. In same way the difference between sympathisers and constituency is not clear. As Turner and Killian say, constituency is formed of those who are potential beneficiaries and form the recruitment basis of the movement. Bystanders and opposition are outside the movement although opposition is often a counter movement that would not exist without the original movement.

While collective behavior scholars emphasise the role of individuals in social movements, it is astonishing that they do not deal more with individual motivations.

Alienation, deprivation and structural strain did assure neither students of the 1960s nor scholars from that on. Why some people join in and some do not? How do personal characters, life situations, career expectations, age, etc. influence voluntarism in movements? These are questions that collective behavior tradition leaves open. Thus a student of social movements again has to consult some other sub-field of sociology, this time nonprofit and volunteer sector studies in which voluntarism is one important topic¹.

6.8. Collective Behavior and INGOs

Collective behavior tradition emphasises heavily the importance of different belief systems. They can be called collective representations, generalised beliefs, ideas, ideology, etc. In any case, these expressions emphasise the Durkheimian understanding that beliefs are social facts that influence peoples' lives. Different belief systems influence in two separate ways. First, they serve as movement ideology which in turn explains the cause of grievances, shows the solution and arises *esprit de corps*. Second, belief systems influence the general thinking of people. Religions and ideologies create concepts that become integral parts of the world views of people. In the interaction of religions / ideologies and culture some issues become self evident and they are not questioned. Thus collective behavior tradition's emphasis on belief systems calls for careful analysis of the ideas in all levels ranging from leader's philosophy to big cultural trends.

¹ A literature review of this theme is from, e.g., Smith 1994. See also Clary & Snyder & Stukas 1996.

The distinction of value oriented, power oriented and participation oriented movements describes that there are different kinds of movements. Not all movements have a defined ideology which they follow. Instead there also are movements that aim to have power or some practical goals. However, in these cases, too, it might be argued that power and practical goals are values that guide the movement. In any case, the importance of the expressed value-orientations varies a lot. Additionally, institutionalisation of a movement leads its leaders to focus more and more to organisational maintaining questions. The organisation or activity becomes an end of itself. However, the distinction can serve as a heuristic device if the types are regarded as ideal types and not pure forms.

The basic argument of collective behavior tradition is that any society is basically constructed of interactions of individual people. In the case of INGOs (and other organisations, too) this means that actually the organisations do not act but individuals in those organisations. Thus the formal organisation is only a context in which the interaction happens. In this interaction there are leaders and followers, activists and bystanders. In the case of INGOs this means that the emphasis should be laid both on the interaction processes inside the organisation and on the connections that activists have to people outside the movement. This is what recently has been done in network analysis.

However, not only individuals are actors but groups and organisations are actors as well. They are also social facts as a group is always more than a sum of its members. Additionally, organisations have a legal status - they are juridical persons. This means that, while the role of individual actor is recognised, the dynamics of decision

making are important because in that process is determined how a group acts. However, we have to remember the sarcastic saying that "the duty of the trustees is to trust." In many cases professional leaders run the business and formal decisions are made afterwards. Anyway, this dichotomy calls the attention to both leader actions and collective decisions.

Movements do not work in a vacuum. As noted, different cultural trends influence them but there are other factors too. Movement's environment consists of bystanders (or public), counter movements, supporters, allies and authorities. All these enable or limit movement's possibilities to act. In collective behavior tradition there have been discussions on what later has been called political opportunity structures. These discussions have dealt with relationships to authorities and counter movements. However, there are also economical opportunity structures - a theme that came along the resource mobilization tradition - that determine the economical possibilities of movements. Additionally, we can also speak about cultural opportunity structures that define what is accepted in a culture and what is not. This theme has been alive in new social movement studies and in institutional theory of organisations. Finally, we can speak of religious opportunity structures that is a political opportunity structure in the sphere of religion.

All these aspects discussed in this chapter are in constant interaction. Social movements cannot be reduced to one determinant, whether it be economy, norms, class, beliefs or any other single variable. All movements and organisations are unique combinations of different determinants. When we acknowledge these factors, we can identify them in our case studies and see that 'in this

case this determinant seems to dominate and these other determinants are equal and that one has minimal effect.'

The interaction process of determinants does not begin, as collective behavior tradition supposes, always from one and same stage. In different cases it can start from any of the determinants. The task is to identify in each case where the process started and how it continued. Different opportunity structures, different world views, different leaders, and different followers knit different kinds of patchwork quilts that are as unique as the fingerprints of the knitters.

6.9. Summa Summarum

Collective behavior studies grow directly from the theories of crowd psychologists of the 19th Century. The tradition started in Chicago School as a part of interactionist sociology. In this stage it was heavily influenced by the sociology of Georg Simmel. When collective behavior shifted towards the main stream sociology it adopted ideas mainly from Weber and Durkheim. The main division in the field was between interactionist and structural functionalistic strings but there were also theories of mass society and relative deprivation that were seen to be associated with collective behavior tradition. The tradition was challenged in the late 1960s when there was a paradigm shift to resource mobilization approach but collective behavior tradition revived in the 1980s when it found an alliance from the European new social movement approach.

In spite of the critics, collective behavior theory still has validity. First, the scholars of this tradition paved the way to the following students. Theories of

pioneers can always be criticised but without their attempts followers would not have elaborated tools to criticise them. Second, much of the work in social movement field in the 1990s contains 'new' ideas that already are present in these hallmark studies. Sometimes the pioneers even have more elaborated theories than their later followers. Third, science is not cumulative as Kuhn and Feyerabend have shown. There are paradigm shifts that are not necessarily rational from the perspective of discipline but heavily based on the influence of external world. In such cases it is good to look behind and seek those forgotten masters that were disregarded after the previous paradigm shift.

I hope that this work will help other students to find the pearls of collective behavior tradition and include them into their own theories. I also hope that this could raise an interest in the studies of world views and root metaphors that lie behind all our thinking.

Literature:

I have included here also some classical works that I have not really used as my sources but only mentioned. Such works are marked with * before the publication year. The reason for this is that they are normally mentioned as hallmarks of social movement studies in the early reviews and readers. However, these reviews do not always give their bibliographical information and thus they are sometimes difficult to find. I try to serve other students of social movements also with this bibliography. I hope that it can give hints where the beginnings of the paths are.

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